

**THE SUBSIDY RE-INVESTMENT AND EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMME (SURE-P) AS A  
PALLIATIVE POLICY IN NIGERIA:  
AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

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**NOVEMBER, 2016**

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**BY**

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**NOVEMBER, 2016**

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled “Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) as a Palliative Policy: An Impact Assessment” has been written by me and that it is the record of my own research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for a higher degree. All sources of information are specifically acknowledged using references.

Ofonmbuk Etido Atakpa

November, 2016

## **CERTIFICATION**

This thesis entitled “Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) as a Palliative Policy: An Impact Assessment” by Ofonmbuk Etido Atakpa (11/PG/SS/PA/PhD/005) meets the regulations governing the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) of the University of Uyo and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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## **DEDICATION**

To God the all knowing, infinitely beneficent and limitlessly providing – for the grace in everything I have achieved and for what I will ever be.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Everyday experience in growth and development lends credence to the fact that great heights (nay, in academics) cannot be achieved in isolation, let alone, the demands of a Ph.D thesis. This feat was therefore made possible through the quality contributions of people - the summation of all intellectual, material and moral support which dwarfed the giants of impossibilities and brought me to a place of success.

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I may not remember to pen it all but I pray the good Lord who knows beyond human limitations to bless and requite everyone who contributed in the minutest possible way to making this study a success. God bless you all.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study assessed the impact of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) which was introduced to cushion the negative effects of subsidy removal on petrol and to convince Nigerians about the good intentions of government as regards the utilization of the funds. The study is anchored on the following hypotheses: that the effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria; that the implementation of SURE-P is positively related to improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria; and that the alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P. Using the Systems Theory of Public Policy as theoretical framework, the study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods. Although the study combined the quantitative and qualitative methods, the main instrument for data collection was 384 survey questionnaire administered across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. After analysis with the Chi Square, the three hypotheses were upheld. It was concluded that although the federal government did not fully achieve its objectives to mitigate the negative impacts of the removal of subsidy due to some impediments including the fall in its revenue profile, SURE-P made significant impacts in the areas of reduction in the level of unemployment, improvements on road infrastructure and the alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria. It was recommended in this study, among others, that Government should streamline the implementation of palliatives to clearly defined projects instead of intervention in too many sectors at the end of which significant impacts may not be felt, open the implementation of the programme to the supervision of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission and direct States and Local Governments to publish projects executed with the SURE-P funds, to ensure accountability, transparency and prudence.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>MEANING</b>
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
AU	African Union
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CAC	Corporate Affairs Commission
CCECC	China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CDA	Community leaders and Development Association
CHEW	Community Health Extension Worker
CSWYE	Community Services, Women and Youth Employment Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Graduate Internship Scheme
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LNG-	Liquefied Natural Gas
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAPTIN	National Power Training Institute of Nigeria
NDE	National Directorate of Employment
NESG	Nigerian Economic Summit Group
NEPC	Nigerian Export Promotion Council
NITDA	National Information Technology Development Agency
NITEL	Nigerian Telecommunication Limited
NNPC	Nigeria National Petroleum Company
NLC	Nigeria Labour Congress
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRC	Nigeria Railway Corporation
NYSC	National Youth Service Corp
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PHC	Primary Health Center
PSIA	Periodic Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
PMS	Premium Motor Spirit
PSO	Public Service Obligations
PIU	Projects Implementation Unit
SAM	Social Accounting Matrix
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SMEDAN	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency
SURE-P	Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme
TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training Project
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer

VHW	Village Health Worker
WHO	World Health Organization
YESSAP	Youth Empowerment Export Skills Acquisition Programme

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Every action of the modern person is guided by government policies which may come in various forms such as legislative enactments, executive orders, administrative procedures or other official acts. Public policy's degree of permeation is so diffusive that Teitz (1968:36) reasoned thus:

Modern urban man is born in a publicly financed hospital, receives his education in a publicly supported school and university, spends a good part of his time travelling on publicly built transportation facilities, communicates through the post office or the quasi-public telephone system, drinks his public drinking water, disposes of his garbage through the public removal system, reads his library books, picnics in his public parks, is protected by public police, fire, and health systems, eventually, he dies, again in a hospital and may even be buried in a public cemetery. Ideological conservations notwithstanding, his everyday life is inextricably bound up with government decisions on these and numerous other public services.

In practical terms, public policy can be conceptualized as consisting of a course of actions and measures deliberately taken to direct the affairs of society towards the realization of predetermined goals or objectives. Public policy sums up the activities of government, whether acting directly or by proxy through agents/organs, but all targeted at the influence of the life of the citizens.

Public policy and its study are most relevant especially in a developing country like Nigeria, to the extent of engaging in the task of igniting national resurgences through political and socio-economic development. This much is buttressed by Sapru (2011) when he stated that public policies expanded their scope from merely one of regulation to that of development in developing countries. Whereas Henry (2007), while writing on the role of public administration as a reconciliatory mechanism for bureaucracy and democracy, harps on the need to encourage public policies that are more responsive to social needs, the influential Economist Magazine of London editorial of February 7, 2015, observed that though Nigeria was one of the world's fastest-growing economies (Africa's largest); that this development, in an ironic twist, 'is largely despite the government rather than because of it; as prosperity has not been broadly shared'. The Magazine went on to score the Nigerian government an "F" grade in economic management, inferring that under President Jonathan, poverty had increased and Nigerians typically die eight years younger than their neighbours in nearby Ghana (Soludo, 2015). Incidentally, the 2013 list of life expectancy by the World Health Organization (WHO) published in 2015 placed Nigeria at the 183rd position against Ghana's overall ranking at 156th position (i.e. placing Nigeria at the 27th position behind Ghana (Anonymous, 2015).

Pundits have however reasoned that the economic problems of Nigeria, over time, have manifested as the interplay of internal and external forces, both of which have combined to act in a manner that is disadvantageous to the Nigerian state and its people. As observed by Akume (2012), significant among the internal forces is the poor decisions and misuse of public resources. The external factor on the other hand rests primarily on the push by the West and their allied institutions that third-world countries in need of aid must restructure their political, administrative and economic institutions

in line with their defined standard. These standards and conditionalities for accessing foreign aid were capsuled neatly around the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Thus, Nigeria's drive toward deregulation gained much verve with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) policy with specific emphasis on privatization, commercialization and deregulation all culminating in the removal of subsidies by the government in Nigeria. Deregulation was not only occasioned by the necessity to improve the efficiency of public enterprises alone (although, public enterprises had come under sustained attack for wasting resources) (Todaro and Smith, 2005) but deregulation was also rationalized by the need to re-channel the resources of the state to areas of 'critical developmental needs' as well as reduce the cost of governance arising from the visible signs of an already ailing government finances. This was fuelled by the belief that the removal of subsidies by the government would eliminate the existing distortions that tended to hinder the smooth operation of the free market system (Akume, 2012).

Before January 1, 2012, the Nigerian government had deregulated both the communications and the banking sectors of the economy with appreciable improvements in services rendered by institutions within these sectors for instance, before this time, the Nigerian Telecommunication Limited (NITEL), a government-owned company, was the sole operator for telephone lines in the telecoms sector. Needless to mention the sector was marred by inefficiency, low telephone access, high tariffs and poor services but once the sector was deregulated, private investors, both domestic and foreign, came in with Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM). Competition ensured and today, Nigerians can attest to significantly improved services in the sector. The same goes for the experiences in the aviation as well as the banking sectors (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012).

Deregulation policy was not a new thing to Nigeria during the regime of former President Goodluck Jonathan. This is so because preceding regimes had intermittently undertaken deregulation in other sectors of the economy, especially since 2002 when the government began with the partial deregulation programme, leaving only the price of petroleum regulated. Accordingly, a presidential steering committee on the Global Financial Crises, while making recommendations to the government on the need for deregulation, noted that the over ₦600 billion spent as subsidy on petroleum products, rather than benefiting the people, only found its way into the pockets of a few. Alamutu (2009) quoted a member of the Committee, Mazi Sam Oluabumwa as declaring thus:

Today, we have stipulated a price that does not reflect the central price. Part of the money we are paying today as a subsidy is fraud. It is inefficient that we are using national funds to pay for it. Can you imagine that in 2008, Nigeria spent ₦680 billion in subsidizing the so-called oil? This is twice the budget of a nation. That would have been helpful if we had used it to build hospitals, roads, universities and schools, manufacturers would have gained from it.

Therefore, between June 1, 2000, and January 15, 2009, the government of President Obasanjo had deregulated the price of petrol eight times while the Yar'adua administration had done so two times, all in the hope of curbing inefficiency, smuggling and corruption (Eme and Onwuka (2011). A publication of the Federal Ministry of Information (2013) claims that between 2006 and August 2011, total government expenditure on petroleum subsidies amounted to ₦3.7 trillion; that expenditure on subsidies increased from ₦261 billion in 2006 to ₦673 billion in 2010, which represents



an increase of about 160%; and that there had been unprecedented payments in 2011 that so far amounted to N1.4 trillion due, in part, to two key factors; increase in subsidy per litre as a result of rising global oil prices, and large arrears due NNPC for household kerosene imports.

The government therefore rationalized the discontinuation of subsidies on the following grounds:

- (a) The subsidy regime in which fixed price was maintained irrespective of market realities had resulted in a huge unsustainable subsidy burden.
- (b) Fuel subsidies did not reach the intended beneficiaries. Subsidy level was directly correlated with household income, as richer households consumed large quantities of petroleum products. Subsequently, subsidies benefited the rich mostly.
- (c) Subsidy administration was beset with inefficiencies, leakages and corruption.
- (d) Subsidy had resulted in the diversion of scarce resources away from investment in critical infrastructure while putting pressure on government resources.
- (e) Subsidy had discouraged competition and stifled private investment in the downstream sector as investors had shied away from investment in the development of refineries, petrochemicals, fertilizer plants etc.
- (f) Huge price disparity had encouraged the smuggling of petroleum products across the borders to neighbouring countries where prices were much higher. Nigeria ended up subsidizing the consumption of petroleum products in those countries.

As a key policy thrust of his administration, the former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, on January 1, 2012, announced the removal of subsidy on petrol. As expected, protests and anger greeted the pronouncement the following day and Nigerians of diverse classes and economic status reacted angrily especially, as the price of petrol fluctuated between N141 and N200. The protests and industrial action that ensued brought palpable tension as the Nigerian economy was almost completely grounded. At the end of the protests, the Government, labour, as well as civil society groups agreed on N98 per litre of fuel. And to convince Nigerians about the good intentions of the government as regards the utilization of funds therefrom, the government, within the same month of January, announced the setting-up of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), to oversee and ensure the effective and timely implementation of projects to be funded with the savings which was estimated in the amount of N1.3trillion. Therefore, the first 21-member SURE-P Committee led by Christopher Kolade was inaugurated with a mandate to channel the Federal Government's share of the resources into a combination of programmes to stimulate the economy and alleviate poverty through critical infrastructure and safety net projects (Madike, 2013).

It is noteworthy to posit that the Nigerian people, through the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and other civil society organizations, had before this period, opposed stiffly, the removal of subsidy on petroleum products, arguing that first and foremost, any change in the price of petroleum products have great influence in the production process of virtually all sectors of the economy; that the impact of increases in their prices needed to be evaluated based on the overall economy and not just the narrow sector of the downstream and government revenues. On the strength of these reports, the NLC highlighted the contradictory impact of increased petroleum product prices on

the productive sectors of the economy, the total which is negative, at least in the short run (Nigeria Labour Congress, 2012).

The negative disposition of Nigerians towards deregulation lends credence to the fact that any analysis of the economic fortunes/development of Nigeria cannot be complete without understanding the value of oil (Petroleum) and gas and their implications for the Nigerian economy. Nigeria is a mono-product economy, meaning that the country is 90 per cent dependent on oil money despite all the talks (over five decades) to broaden the economic base by way of diversification (Otunla, 2012; Gambo, 2000). Therefore, it is not out of place to state that the economy of Nigeria, depends largely on the price of oil in the international market, as such any change in the price of petroleum products affects every other sector and this is why Nigerians are very sensitive to public policy postures that affect the price of petroleum products especially when prices are locally adjusted upwards to improve the revenue base of government.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

Despite the promises of successive regimes which had deregulated the petroleum sector for at least eight consecutive times within the period of Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999-2015), not much had been recorded by way of promised resource reallocation in the form of palliatives to better the lots of the Nigerian citizens. That explains why any decision by the government in Nigeria to remove subsidy on petroleum products has always pitched the government against labour and civil society, whereas successive governments have always hinged their argument because subsidy takes away a significant portion of national resources needed to develop critical sectors of the economy (necessary to avoid total collapse), labour and the civil society always justifies

its opposition because deregulation only adds more pains to the already impoverished citizenry due to a general increase in the ordinary price level of goods and services; and that government is never sincere in fulfilling its promise by properly utilizing the proceeds and gains of subsidy removal for the common good. The suspicion of the citizens is aptly emphasized by Utomi, (2011) who noted that the hopes and aspirations of the people have been dashed by the insincerity of those in the corridors of power, making it difficult to persuade the people of government sincerity in the fuel subsidy removal debates. It was within this precinct that the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) of Goodluck Jonathan was introduced after the partial removal of subsidy on petrol in January 2012.

After the implementation of SURE-P, President Buhari not only announced the scrapping of the programme on November 4, 2015, but also ordered a probe into the activities, funding and expenditure profile of SURE-P, raising questions of credibility as regards the functionality of the implementation processes of SURE-P (Wisdom, 2015). This is even though SURE-P projects and programmes like the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS), the Community Services, Women and Youth Employment Project (CSWYE) and the Road/Transport Infrastructure Renaissance (all targeted at the improvement of the socio-economic well-being of the citizens) constituted the fulcrum upon which the President Jonathan transformation agenda and 2015 election campaign scorecard were hinged. Ironically, it appeared that many Nigerians were unaware of the specific programmes/projects undertaken by SURE-P. A case in point is when the Minister for Transport, Rotimi Amaechi expressed shock at the workability of SURE-P funded rail facility in Lagos (George, 2015), even though he should have

been better informed, at least as the former Governor of Rivers State during the Goodluck Jonathan era.

Suffice it to mention that apart from the lack of awareness and the credibility questions that surrounded the implementation of the SURE-P, many of the targets envisaged by the documented objectives of the programme were not realized, for instance, there were heated debates over the 2014 national conference in Abuja, Nigeria when the Committee on Public Finance and Revenue recommended the total removal of the fuel subsidy by the Federal Government. When it was put to vote, delegates unanimously rejected the proposal but with a caveat that the Federal Government could only remove the fuel subsidy if, within three years from the date, it could build new refineries and repair existing ones to full capacity utilization (Olorok, 2014). This development elicits curiosity when considering that President Goodluck Jonathan, in the heat of the anti-fuel price hike protest and the introduction of SURE-P in 2012, announced the federal government's plans to set up three greenfield refineries in Lagos, Kogi and Bayelsa states (Alohan, Okhomina, Baba, and Abu, 2012). As at the time of this study, none of the proposed greenfield refineries has taken off.

More curious is the fact that the planned implementation of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) as introduced in 2012 was a kind of litmus test on the government to notch up in transparency to the extent that the Nigerian citizens will be willing to further entrust the management of the subsidy funds to it. Unfortunately, the overwhelming rejection of the proposal at the 2014 national conference (a collection of Nigerians representing each of the ethnic nationalities, states, socio-cultural/political groups, professional bodies, elder statesmen, Nigerian

Union of Journalists, Nigerian Guild of Editors, civil society groups etc) paint a picture of little confidence on the part of Nigerians in what Olutokun (2014) describes as “entirely cosmetic palliatives”.

Whereas the federal government, through elaborate media campaigns, hyped myriad programmes and projects as successes recorded by the SURE-P, the reality on the ground appears to negate this success posture. For instance, in the area of infrastructure, SURE-P in one of its promotional adverts regularly aired on the network of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, listed several roads constructed with SURE –P funds including the second Niger Bridge in the South East. However, the Caretaker Committee of Ohaneze Ndigbo (a leading cultural organization in the area) accused former President Jonathan of lying to Ndigbo about awarding the contract for the construction of the bridge (Onyekakeyah, 2015). This is apparently because work on the bridge was not only started late (in March 2014) but also that not much had been done as at the expiration of the tenure of the former President. A poll conducted by the Punch Online (one of Nigeria’s registered frontline media platforms) came off with 70% of the respondents agreeing that kick-starting the bridge project a year before the presidential election was nothing but a political gimmick to curry favour with the people of the South East (Adeoye, 2014). The same goes for the East-West Road, a major project advertised by SURE-P for the South-South region of the country.

Commenting on this, Onia (2014) averred that the non-completion of this road after all these years while humongous budgetary allocations had been officially designated to its conclusion, remained a source of embarrassment to the Jonathan administration. On a general note, out of about 200,000km of road network in Nigeria,

only about 65,000km of these are paved with bitumen. According to Okeke (2015), 68.3 per cent of the country's roads are in terrible condition where 40 per cent of the bad roads belong to the federal government, 78 per cent to the states and 80 per cent to the local governments.

The consequences of bad roads in Nigeria are inexhaustible. A report from the Nigeria Federal Road Safety Corps has it that more than 5,000 premature deaths per year occur on Nigeria's roads. Apart from driving up maintenance and repair costs on roads and vehicles, bad roads lead to increasing costs of transportation and are often the reason for long delays where journeys that should take minutes or a few hours (depending on the distance), actually take up very long hours because of hold-ups and traffic congestion in major highways. This situation also provides opportunities for dare-devil robbers to rob commuters, sometimes inflicting serious casualties on hapless commuters (Anonymous 2009).

In the area of reducing the level of unemployment as targeted by SURE-P, it is unfortunate to note that people are visibly suffering as unemployment at the national level in 2015, stood at 50% with no significant abatement (Omale 2015). The National Bureau of Statistics reported that the unemployment rate in Nigeria which averaged 11.93 per cent from 2006 until 2015, reached an all-time high of 23.90 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2011; but increased from 6.40 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 7.50 per cent in the first quarter of 2015 (Trading Economics, 2015). As of the end of June 2015 (about a month after the end of the Jonathan administration), the rate of unemployment was 8.2 per cent with about 76.9 million Nigerians willing, able and actively looking for jobs (Udo, 2016). The implications of this level of unemployment have negative social, economic and political consequences, part of which is endemic poverty. When cognizance is given to the fact that 40-60% of those unemployed in

Nigeria are aged between 15-25 (Tom, 2014), it is therefore not farfetched why most of those paraded by law enforcement agencies as members of criminal gangs, terrorists groups and other forms of militancy, fall within this age bracket, meaning that there is a strong correlation between the level of unemployment, poverty and high rate of crime in Nigeria (Okafor, 2011). Unemployment lowers overall satisfaction with life, and induces mental health problems including depression, anxiety, demoralization and lower self-esteem (Fryer, 2006), all dovetailing in increased mortality rate and reduction in life expectancy (Brenner, 1976).

Generally, the implication of the deregulation policy to the average Nigerian is interpreted as subjecting the masses to the mercy of the manifestations of market forces which would normally worsen the economy, dovetailing in hikes in transport fares, prices of food and services, closure of industries and job losses and unemployment, deepened poverty level and poor standard of living. The experience in recent times had been the widening gap between the rich and the poor where funds realized from the deregulation exercise, at that time, found their way into private pockets, local and international looters having a field day while Nigerian masses bear the brunt (Eme and Onwuka, 2011). But the question remains as to whether the SURE-P, as was implemented, achieved the desired impact (intended objectives) as a palliative measure to assuage the pains that came with the subsidy removal in the first instance. Therefore, aside from the general scepticism and lack of awareness (among Nigerians) that surrounded the implementation of SURE-P, it is pertinent to note that four years after the implementation of SURE-P must have run its full cycle, the policy is under-researched by the academic community hence this thesis.



### 1.3 Research Questions

The questions this study seeks to proffer answers to are:

- i. Did the government accomplish its set targets in projects/programmes to correspond with the SURE-P objectives?
- ii. What were the impacts of SURE-P on unemployment, road infrastructure and transportation?
- iii. Did the implementation of SURE-P mitigate the negative impacts caused by petroleum subsidy removal?
- iv. What were the impediments against the government's efforts towards fulfilling the objectives of SURE-P?

### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study is two-fold: broad and specific:

#### a) Broad Objective:

To assess the impact of SURE-P as a palliative policy of government.

#### b) Specific Objectives:

- i. To determine the number of Nigerians who may have benefitted from the SURE-P employment-driven components.
- ii. To find out if the implementation of SURE-P was able to mitigate the negative impacts caused by petroleum subsidy removal;

- iii. To highlight the problems encountered during the implementation of the SUJRE-P and how these problems may have affected the smooth implementation process; and
- iv. To make recommendations on ways the implementation of the SURE-P could be modified to achieve the target of mitigating the negative effects of petroleum subsidy removal.

### **1.5 Research Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis 1:** The effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

**Hypothesis 2:** The implementation of SURE-P is positively related to improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria.

**Hypothesis 3:** The alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The significance of the study is two-fold:

1. Empirical (Practical): In this case, the study is significant as it is meant to evaluate the impact of the implementation of SURE-P being one of the cardinal drivers of the transformation agenda of Jonathan's administration. Second, the study will assist in ascertaining the perception of the citizenry as regards the impact of SURE-P as a cushioning factor in mitigating the negative effects of the partial deregulation of petroleum.
2. Theoretical (Academic): The study will contribute to knowledge in kick-starting the generation of academic research material on SURE-P in Nigeria.

Second, since the issue of palliative administration is a recurrent decimal on the policy agenda of the government, the study will provide useful information to policymakers on how to design, improve or modify (either whole or part) of the programme to meet with the current realities and needs of the people. Finally, it will help to ascertain the difference, if any, between the implementation of SURE-P and such other policies of the government in the past, to determine what progress or failure Nigeria has made in the area of policymaking and implementation.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The scope of the study was limited to the verification of the extent of implementation of SURE-P by the Federal Government. An in-depth evaluation for States and Local governments could not be undertaken for reasons of unavailability of records and lack of transparency/clear-cut definition of components for channelling the SURE-P funds. However, in analyzing the implementation of SURE-P by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the study was restricted to some of the basic components of the programme, the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS); Social Safety Net Programmes comprising such areas as, Public Works/Women and Youth Employment Programme, Urban Mass Transit Scheme and the Vocational Training Scheme; the Road Infrastructure Projects; Rail Transportation Projects. Also, the period of analysis will cover the four years of the implementation of SURE-P i.e. between 2012 and 2015.

Since the implementation of SURE-P as a policy of the past Nigerian administration is quite contemporaneous, it is an area that is under-researched hence materials were not readily available in the library. To surmount this, the researcher

relied much on the internet as a source of material. Besides, the researcher also visited the SURE-P headquarters and the different SURE-P implementation units at Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, to obtain information.

The second challenge encountered in the course of the study was related to the fact that since the research involved the whole of the country, the researcher could not afford the cost and time of personally travelling to all the areas covered by the study, hence, the services of research assistants as prescribed by Uzoagulu (2011), were utilized for the administration of questionnaire in states that the researcher could not visit personally.

## **1.8 Definition of Key Concepts**

To drive home, the full import and intentions of the topic under review, it is necessary to provide a working definition of some key concepts on the crest of which the research will revolve. The concepts are:

**Public Policy:** For this purpose, public policy is defined as an integrative course of action taken by the government and implemented by designated governmental agencies to achieve specified targets which are expected to solve perceived problems and provide certain amenities hitherto lacking in the system, all for the betterment of the living condition of the society at large.

**Palliative Policy:** Palliative policy in this context can be defined as a policy action or measure taken by the government to alleviate, cushion or mitigate the negative effects of a given problem that exists or that was created either directly or indirectly by another policy of the government.

**Empowerment:** Empowerment in this context is defined as the provision of the required skills, resources, opportunities, motivation, infrastructure and projects (hitherto considered as lacking) to improve the competence, satisfaction and self-sufficiency of the citizens, for them to overcome poverty and other obstacles to their general well-being.

**SURE-P:** SURE-P means Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme. It was launched by the Nigerian government in January 2012 as a combination of intervention programmes designed to cushion the effects of subsidy removal mostly on the vulnerable population in Nigeria. The programmes include Maternal and Child Health (MCH), Community Services, Employment schemes, Mass Transit programmes, vocational training, Road Works and Rail Transport.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

#### **2.1 General Literature**

This section is devoted to the integrative review of scholarly materials relating to the field of study under assessment. Literature review therefore centers on the themes of policy, policy studies, policy process and the entire gamut of policy formulation and implementation. An attempt is therefore made, not only to establish a correlation among the different components of the study to establish the desired linkage between theory and substance of public policy; but also, to find the areas of convergence as well as divergence between policy and programme. Configurative literature is also undertaken where subsidy reallocation programmes are reviewed about Indonesia, Jordan and Sri Lanka; while the subsidy reallocation programme in Ghana is reviewed as comparative literature with the experience in Nigeria. Finally, literature case study literature is reviewed in the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) in Nigeria.

##### **2.1.1 Public Policy**

Just as is the experience with all other social science concepts, public policy lacks a one, fit-it-all definition but is understood and defined according to the nuance or paradigm of the policy scholar or practitioner. Before then, it is pertinent to identify the basic ingredients of the concept of public policy which consists of two major words: “public and “policy”. Ejere (2015) contends that the term “public” has to do with what concerns the generality of the populace or people, while “policy” can be broadly defined

as a proposed course of action of an individual, a group, an institution or government, to realize a specific objective or purpose within a given environment (Basu, 2005). The problem with Ejere's definition is that he tends to restrict what embodies policy only to the "proposed course of action" which does not involve the fact of actions that are eventually taken to the point of implementation which (at this stage) are no more proposed but actual policy outcomes.

One of the most commonsensical definitions of the concept of public policy is that provided by Dye (1977) who defines a policy as "whatever government chooses to do or not to do". In this definition is the fact that while some scholars view public policy as any action taken by governments, others see the inaction of governments as the policy posture of such governments i.e. as a decision not to act. However, Anderson (1979) questioned Dye's definition when he observed that there may yet be a divergence between what governments decide to do and what they actually do, whereas quite a number of things governments do may have no policy significance.

Seeming to agree with Dye's pattern of reasoning, especially as it relates to the actions of government is the definition of public policy by Leichter (1979) who defines it as a series of goal-oriented actions taken by governmental actors. Thus, public policy as a concept cannot be divorced from the principles of governance since it involves the actions of political institutions and governmental agencies which exercise the authority to make decisions on extensive issues that have binding effects on the whole community and also possess the capacity to affect and alter the pattern of behaviour of individual members of a given society (Andrain cited in Uno and Bassey, 2015). According to Dror (1977), public policy is a major guideline for action where general directives are

laid down rather than detailed instructions to be followed. This definition is problematic in that the concept of public policy is limited only to prescriptive/ directive measures involved in guidelines without the provision of details of how such guidelines should be followed to ensure effective implementation which is the crux of public policy. This is where Jacob and Flink's definition is apt, where policy is defined as a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future decisions (Steiss and Gregory 1980). On his part, William Jenkins defines public policy as a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors, concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve (Sharma, Sadana and Kaur, 2011).

Within the above definition is the idea of public policy not only as a process but also as a set of interrelated decisions as well as goal-oriented behaviour on the part of government. Within this framework too, is an adumbration of the basis or standard by which public policy can be evaluated (Eminue, 2009). According to Sharkansky, (1970), though public policy refers to important activities of government, the reality however is that public policy embraces all governmental activities or outputs as it affects members of the society, and cannot be limited only to important activities of government. In the same vein, Rose (1969) defines public policy as a long series of more or less related activities alongside their consequence for those concerned rather than as concrete decisions, while Mlekwa (1976) views it as official statements determining the plan of action or what government wants to do.

To emphasise the significance of actions and not mere decisions or intentions of government, Ayo (1980) defines public policy as any action taken by the government



in the pursuit of certain aims. Whereas this definition appears too narrow in the social science context, Henry (2007), in a more definite posture, defines public policy as a course of action adopted and pursued by the government. In like manner, Anderson (1979) defines it as a purposive course of action followed by an actor or a set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of social concern. Yet a more integrative definition is that which is found in Ikelegbe (1969) where public policy is defined as an integrated programme of actions which an actor (or a group of actors) is accustomed to or intends to undertake in response to given problems or situations with which he is confronted.

What can be gleaned from all these definitions is the inextricable interrelatedness between what constitutes public policy and the actions of governments. Accordingly, Agbor and Bassey (2015) have identified public policy both as the driving instrument of governance systems and the vehicle through which government expresses institutional responses to situational challenges in a variety of spheres of public interest and domains. This also buttresses the relevance of public policy as an instrument for proffering solutions to societal problems which conforms with the view of Anderson (2011) that beyond public policy connoting a relatively stable, purposive course of action or inaction followed by an actor, such actions must be channelled at dealing with a problem or matter of concern. However, Theodoulou (1995) drawing the following inferences from Anderson's disposition, asserts that apart from the need to distinguish between what governments intend to do and what it actually does, the notion that public policy ideally involves all levels of government and not necessarily restricted to the formal actors/informal actors should be noted; that public policy is pervasive and not solely limited to legislation, executive orders, rules and regulations; that it should be seen as an intentional course of action with an accomplished end-goal as its objectives;

and that policy should be seen as an ongoing process, always in flux, constantly being shaped and reshaped by attenuating and extenuating factors.

Since public policy must necessarily be directed or targeted at finding solutions to societal problems, the implication is that it is related to the ends of the society in its quest for national development. Thus the public policy–economic development nexus takes the goal of public policy beyond the delivery of goods and services for as Kirlin (1984) notes, the Government is the institution of society with singular obligations to facilitate societal choice-making and action. Its ability to make decisions and to act are the dominant dimensions by which governmental performance should be judged (Parsons, 1995), (Darl and Lindblom, 1953) and (Etzioni, 1967).

Public policy therefore implies extending democratic control over the managerial arrangements which thrived in market-driven public policies through reinvigorating and reforming constitutional arrangements, Smith (1994). With the idea of planned development in vogue, the state has been perceived as an agent given to the promotion and shaping of the societies and its myriads of activities. As such, Public policies expanded their scope from merely one of regulation to that of development. With this expansion also came the desirability of more government agencies and institutions coming into being, to formulate and implement policies for the betterment of the society, (Sapru, 2011).

## **2.2 The Policy Making Analysis/Process**

The advent of policy analysis, according to Shafritz, Hyde and Parkers (2004) was an accompaniment of the systems approach that dominated so much of public

administration in the 1960s. They cited Yehezkel Dror whose 1967 Public Administration Review article, “Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service, was one of the first to identify and define this old function but new occupational speciality. In their words, “policy analysis would encompass both the policy formulation process (i.e. understanding the politics and participation aspects) and policy content (that is, consideration of alternative policy outcomes by analyzing costs, benefits, distribution of benefits and so on)”.

Public policy analysis is the study of how governmental policies are made and implemented, and the application of available knowledge to governmental policies for the implementation (Sapru, 2011). On the part of Chandler and Plano (1982), policy analysis is a systematic and data-based alternative to intuitive judgments about the effects of policy options used for problem assessment and monitoring; as a “before the fact” decision tool; and for evaluation. There has been an increasing temptation to equate policy analysis with policy process or advocacy and as Obikeze and Anthony (2004) have noted, some have seen policy analysis simply as the formation, implementation and evaluation of policy which is more or less seen as the policy process. Sapru (2011) contends that policy analysis is not the same as prescribing what policy the government ought to pursue in a given situation (which is the stuff of policy advocacy rather, the government analyzes the situation when there is a need for government intervention in the form of a policy.

It is therefore in the attempt to distinguish policy analysis from either the policy process or policy advocacy that Poister (1978) defines policy analysis as the analysis of the determinants, characteristics and implications of public policies and programmes

and the substantive consequences and outcomes they produce (Obikeze and Anthony 2004).

To add flesh to the concept of policy analysis as a tool concerned with the examination of the impact of policy using the tools of systematic inquiry, Ikelegbe (1996) identifies five salient factors that are of importance in the understanding of policy analysis. They are:

1. Public policy analysis is related to governmental policy-making
2. It is essentially problem-oriented
3. It is prescriptive rather than descriptive
4. It is analytical
5. It is multi-disciplinary

Dye (2004) thus labels policy analysis as the “thinking man’s response” to demands. He maintains that policy analysis has three basic elements:

1. Its primary concern is the explanation of policy rather than the prescription of policy.
2. It involves a rigorous search for the causes and consequences of policies through the use of tools of systematic inquiry.
3. It involves an effort to develop and test general propositions about the causes and consequences of public policies.

Whatever definition of the subject matter of policy analysis one chooses, the most important thing is to understand that the concept, in the words of Obikeze and Anthony (2004) attempts to identify the factors, forces and constraints that shape policymaking in the public sphere while employing some scientific methods to evaluate the impact or

consequences to these decisions on the people. In the same vein, Sharma, Sadana and Kaur (2011) agree that policy analysis seeks to make the policy as a course of action as real and rational as possible and not alone intended to predict its consequences but also to predict circumstances which it has to envisage. In this way, a policy adopted after analysis reduces the risks and chances of error, examines the various constraints in needed detail and seeks ways and means to eliminate obstructions and enlists the cooperation of the people.

Still inherent in the concept of public policy analysis, is the determination of the processes that are involved in policy making. Sadasivan (1985) observes that policy analysis applies itself to reveal the structure of problems, to monitoring and forecasting, to the necessary evaluations and to the making of recommendations and assessing the perceptible influences. To this extent therefore, Howlett and Ramesh (1994) identify five stages of the policy cycle - agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation and policy evaluation. The policymaking process is therefore, a complex web of steps and interactions adorned in stages, sets and sub-sets of activities through which a policy is conceived, born, nurtured, brought to fruition and evaluated by way of gauging its performance, whether positive or negative.

It consists of the stages or the categorization of activities which are involved in the processing of policies, from problem identification to policy effects, (Ikelegbe, 2006). This section shall undertake several such steps and activities.

### **2.2.1 Policy Formulation Stage**

This involves all the crucial issues and activities that precede the declaration of a policy. It seeks to answer such questions as how are problems identified? Who articulated them? What are the alternative courses of action available? How are the

decisions made and who made the decisions The policy formulation stage in itself involves the following sub-activities:

### **2.2.2 Policy Problem**

A policy problem, according to David (1964) is a condition or dissatisfaction, self-identified or identified by others, for which relief is sought. It is commonly referred to as a social situation which many people consider adverse or intolerable in its effect on a large number of people over a long period (Finsterbusch and Motz 1980). Inherent in this definition are the following conditions which Egonmwan (2002) listed as containing

- (a) That a large number of people are in unfortunate conditions, suffer deprivation, and are dissatisfied with an undesirable situation e.g. menace of armed robbery.
- (b) These adverse conditions are recognized by many people.
- (c) The decision-makers are aware of the situation as they have responsibilities for coping with them.
- (d) People outside the immediate social problem must show concern.
- (e) Large number of people think that something should be done about the situation apart from merely recognizing the undesirable situation.
- (f) Conflicting interests and cognitive disagreements.

### **2.2.3 Policy Agenda**

The agenda-setting process is borne out of the fact that the patterns of public policy, after all, are determined not only by such final decisions as votes in legislatures, or initiatives and votes by presidents but also by the fact that some subjects and proposals emerge in the first place and others are never seriously considered

(Schattschneider, 1960). Thus agenda setting, according to Cobb and Elder (1972) may involve the transfer of items from a non-governmental systemic agenda, to a governmental formal agenda, partly through the mobilization of the relevant public by leaders.

On his part, Ikelegbe (2006) observes that public problems that enter or constitute the policy agenda are those to which the government is given or intends to give serious attention. It refers to public problems that are awaiting governmental response. He however emphasized that policy agenda does not usually appear as a listing of or a priority scale of problems, nor does it refer to a set of documented papers on public problems receiving attention. Rather it refers to all issues and problems that receive attention either in discussion, speeches, memoranda or legislative motions.

Kingdom (2004) enumerates the following as capable of influencing the agenda-setting process: first, one influence on the agenda might be the inexorable march of problems pressing in on the system – a crisis or prominent event which might signal the emergence of such problems. Secondly, it might be a process of gradual accumulation of knowledge and perspectives among the specialists in a given policy area, and the generation of policy proposals by such specialists; and thirdly, political processes affect the agenda – swings of the national mood, vagaries of public opinion, election results, changes of administration and turnover in congress all may have powerful effects. All these can act as impetus or as constraints to the agenda-setting process.

### 2.2.4 Policy-Making Stage

The background for the relevance of the policy-making stage is predicated on the rational understanding that it is not all matters or issues that find expression in the domain of policy agenda that can be guaranteed government action on them. This means that following the setting of a policy agenda, it is necessary to formulate relevant and acceptable proposals on alternative courses of action for dealing with the policy problem at stake (Egonmwan 2002). Ikelegbe (2006) emphasizes that the policy-making stage is where there is the development and consideration of policy alternatives about a public problem, the recommendation, consideration and approval of a policy proposal by relevant public agencies and executives and the enactment of the policy by legislative houses.

A typical picture of the policy-making stage is found in Jones (1978) who asserted that people in government discuss what happened; do research; interpret the available data; prepare proposals; meet and discuss some, check with outside government; they determine what is possible; they propose; they seek support. The question is, who are the people mentioned in this context? This goes to determine the actors who are usually involved in policy formulation. Many scholars group these actors into two broad categories:

1. The primary policy-makers and
2. The supplementary policy-makers.
- 3.

The primary policy-makers are those who have direct constitutional authority to engage in the formulation of policy, for example, the President and his aides and the National or State legislatures. But Egonmwan insists that the President and his aides, the administrators and the judges also constitute substantially and formally to policy-



making either as primary or supplementary policy-makers or both. He avers that in the strict sense, apart from the President and the legislators, all others belong to the category of supplementary policy-makers, and these are:

(a) Administrators of Officials

(b) Judges

(c) Interest groups.

However, the place of the public service in policy-making cannot be ignored because, by its strategic location and functions, its recommendations are often invaluable, expected and constitute the core or base material for consideration and modification by political executives (Ikelegbe 2006). After identifying the actors, the policy-making stage is meant to follow a purely intellectual point of view where different courses of action are assumed to be clearly defined and subjected to an analysis in a sequence of rational choices (Eminue 2009). It is at this juncture that Stone (2004) stipulates that the project of making public policy rationale rests on a model of reasoning, which involves a series of well-defined steps:

1. Identify objectives
2. Identify alternative courses of action for achieving objectives
3. Predict the possible consequences of each alternative,
4. Evaluate the possible consequences of each alternative,
5. Select the alternative that maximizes the attainment of objectives.

Apart from the policy choice possibly emanating from rational calculations of net benefits from several options, Ikelegbe (2006) adds that policy choice may also be the result of the interactions and influence, bargaining, compromises and agreements

between different individuals, groups, institutions, organization and appropriate public authorities. Thus a policy decision, according to Eminue (2009) usually takes the form of approval, modification or rejection of a preferred policy alternative for which the proponents of action think they can win approval.

After all the above steps have been followed; after all the necessary or relevant questions have been asked, the other set of activities that follow, according to Anderson (1979), include the actual drafting of legislation or the writing of administrative rules which if adopted, will give effect to the principles or policy guidelines enunciated.

#### **2.2.5 Policy Implementation:**

This happens to be the most crucial stage in the policy-making process. It refers to the process of translating a policy into actions and presumptions into results through various projects and programmes (Okoli and Onah, 2003). Paki and Ebienfa (2011) view policy implementation as the act or process of translating policy mandates into actions, and policy goals into reality. In the same vein, Kraft and Furlong (2007) state that policy implementation refers to the process and activities involved in the application, effectuation and administration of a policy.

Apart from the implementation process consisting of the implementation organization, the social-political and economic environment, the policy target group, the policy objectives, the enumerated methods of implementation and the resources, (Sharkansky and Meter, 1975), Nweke (2006) adds that a variety of activities are involved in the application, effectuation and administration that may include the issuing and enforcement of directives, the disbursement of funds, the signing of contracts, collection of data and analyzing problems, hiring and assignment of personnel, setting up of committees and commissions, assigning of duties and responsibilities and also,

the making of interim decisions etc. Although Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) believe that “by concentrating on the implementation of the programme, as well as the initiation, we should be able to increase the probability that policy promises be realized, Nwankwo and Apeh (2008) warn that it is at this stage that the success or failure of a policy is determined. As such, Majone and Wildavsky (1978) observe that implementation, paradoxically, is in many ways a slippery subject especially stemming from the fact that vague and contradictory policies are difficult to implement.

It is therefore pertinent to note that an understanding of policy implementation is critical to the success of government because when policies work, the executive is eager to take the credit and would not therefore escape the blame when policies fail (Sapru, 2011). Thus it is the concern of Williams (1971) that nothing comes across more strongly than the great naïveté about implementation, insisting that “we have got to learn that the implementation period is not a brief interlude between a bright idea and opening the door for services”. To fill the gap, Grindle (1980) considers implementation to be a general process of administrative action which can be evaluated by measuring programme outcomes against policy goals. He suggests that the general process for implementation can begin only when general goals have been designed and when adequate funds have been allocated for the pursuit of goals.

To conquer the pitfalls that threaten the smooth implementation of government policies, Egonmwan (2000) posits that an analysis of the implementation process should be a precondition for successful policy implementation as failure to do so in the past had created truncated policies which failed to conceptualize all implementation requirements and difficulties far in advance.

### 2.2.6 Elements/Issues in Policy Implementation

There are basic elements and issues involved in the process of policy implementation. For Barret and Fudge (1975), policy implementation is dependent on:

- (1) Knowing what you want to do.
- (2) The availability of the required resources.
- (3) The ability to marshal and control these resources to achieve the desired goals.
- (4) If others are to carry out the tasks, communicating what is wanted and controlling the performances.

On the part of Sapru (2011), the following elements are the minimum tasks in implementation:

- (1) Personnel and the financial resources to implement the policy.
- (2) Administrative capability to achieve the desired goals.
- (3) Political and judicial support (from the legislative, executive and judicial wings of the government) for the successful implementation of the policy.

Sapru enunciates further that the implementation process is divided as well as dependent on three settings which are:

- (1) The inputs (resources personnel and finance mobilized in producing (2) Outputs (decisions taken by implementer) to achieve (3) Outcomes (What happens to the target groups intended to be affected by the policy (Pressman and Wildavsky (1984).

The policy implementation process is interminably linked by three key concepts which, according to Eminue (2009) are: tension, institutionalization and feedback. He explained that first, tension is necessarily generated within and between administrative implementing organizations, the target groups and the environment when a new policy

which aims at transforming an unpalatable situation into a desired or qualitatively superior state of affairs is introduced. Second, the implementation of a new policy is usually expected to lead to institutionalization (thus raising questions regarding the survival of such institutions). Third, in the process of actually implementing a new policy, tensions generated could be fed back to the implementation process in the form of new demands which are subsequently processed and transformed into some policies that in turn have to be implemented.

This brings us to the issue bothering on environmental factors that influence policy implementation. Ikelegbe (2006) points to the fact that such factors include public opinion, elite disposition, partisan configuration, the attitude of interest groups and the attitude of the population, particularly the target groups. The environment may also comprise events, incidents, changes and crises which could create uncertainties and influence the nature of implementation.

### **2.2.7 Conditions for Successful Implementation**

Several conditions have been enunciated upon which the implementation process should be anchored for good results. Okoro (2005) proposes that the implementation of policies operate under the assumptions that:

- (1) The implementation agencies will faithfully implement a given policy.
- (2) The myriads of policies handed down by the legislative branch are implementable.
- (3) The policy is directed to the right target or population.
- (4) There should exist institutional arrangements for implementing a policy. Standard operating procedures of existing institutions should be created to facilitate the implementation process.

To Sapru (2011), emphasis should be placed on administrative capability and the role of leadership as preconditions for successful implementation. He is of the view that institutional capability could be a measure in converting inputs including - resources, structure, technology and support, into output in the form of policy delivery. Leadership is concerned with qualities of the behaviour of key policy managers concerned with facilitating the implementation process, solving the problems arising in the course of implementation; and motivational and behavioural aspects to ensure a commitment to achieve desired policy goals.

Additionally, Hood (1976) emphasizes that effective policy implementation is predicated on the conditionalities that:

- (a) An ideal implementation is a product of a unitary “army” like an organization with clear lines of authority.
- (b) Norms would be enforced and objectives given.
- (c) People would do what they are told and asked.
- (d) There should be perfect communication in and between units of organizations.
- (e) There would be no pressures of time.

### **2.2.7 Obstacles to Effective Implementation of Policies in Developing Countries**

It is somewhat unsettling to observe that despite the devotion to the analysis and studies on the implementation process, many public policies are still doomed to fail. That is why Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) admonished that “People now appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are therefore upset when expected events do not occur or turn out badly”. They therefore implore that “we would consider our efforts a success if more people began with the understanding that implementation, under the best circumstances, is extremely difficult. They would therefore be pleasantly

surprised when a few good things happened. In the same vein, Sapru (2011) reinforces this position by stating that problems in the implementation of policy are common in all countries, be they developed or developing. Many administrative constraints or obstacles to policy implementation in the developing countries have been identified, some of which are highlighted below:

**Lack of Sufficient Data:-** It has become very obvious that by design or by default especially due to the periodical/parochial and narrow-minded interest of political leaders, the issue of data has either been deliberately ignored or often manipulated such that reliance on them for proper planning has been difficult thereby hampering the effectiveness of utilizing such for planning purposes. At its best, Nigerians for instance, abysmally lack the culture for record-keeping, information gathering or the penchant for data, except perhaps the propensity to inflate census figures as birth, death and marriage registers are not kept (Eminue 2009). This is unfortunate whereas Stolper (1966) laments that the paucity of facts already determines how development planning can proceed in a wobbly manner.

The adverse effects of planning without the right data as an inhibitor of rapid improvement in economic conditions as well as the enhancement of quality life for the people is amply portrayed by Abiodun (1999) when he stated that with or without data, we have conceived, planned and executed a variety of major development schemes. The unknown element in such circumstances is the future of such projects and programmes launched through plans that are beset by inaccurate projections and a chain of uncertainties even before the schemes was completed. He cited an example of the Central African Kariba Dam Project which was designed with inadequate data with the

result that a flood 21 times greater than the estimated maximum probable flood came when the dam was still under construction.

### **2.2.8 Poor Implementation Design and Inadequate Definition of Goals**

When examination is made regarding the reasons policy implementation is doomed for failure in most developing societies, literature abounds pointing to the fact that implementation of public policies has been hindered by conceptual problems bothering poor policy design including vague and ambitious goals, ill-defined objectives and inappropriate measures to achieve stated goals (Singh, 2003). Brooding on the negative effects of wrong choices of means and methods of policy implementation, Paki and Ebienfa (2011) observes that the Nigerian state in most cases downplays the crucial issue of implementation design which translates to the advent of policies without clear-cut modalities or mechanism of implementation; and this usually results in policy objectives being misinterpreted in most cases or at worst, abandoned.

Narrowing down on the problem of inadequate definition of goals as a problem of policy implementation in developing countries, Egonmwan (2002) observes that policy goals often lack clarity, internal consistency and compatibility with other policy goals which add to impede the chances for successful implementation of policies. In the view of Chambers (1995), policy goals may be vague and little understood even by those who are responsible for formulating them. He cited as supporting cases, a community organization which is sincerely dedicated to neighbourhood improvement but “without its members ever sitting down to try to determine what they mean by improvement, a very common practice whereby agencies and organizations formulate policies which are unrealistic in terms of available resources and appropriate time frame. Eminue (2009) has observed that events often showed that a majority of cabinet



ministers and senior officials who formally approved the national development plans had not read them.

Besides the problem of vague policy goals is the issue of ambitious or over-ambitious policy goals. Egonmwan (2002) notes this problem when he states that many policies in developing countries tend to be over-ambitious, sweeping and fundamental. Grindle (1980) decries this problem when he notes that most governments in developing countries are likely to espouse policies that will lead to radical and rapid improvement in the conditions of life amidst the enormity of human and physical needs in poor countries but frequently, such policies are concluded in an ideological context that may becloud actual problems involved in executing them. It is pertinent to note however that in the course of this review, it was found that scholars have devoted a lot of interest and attention to the implementation stage of policy making as studies in recent times pay prime attention to this level given utilization concerns. Apparently, due to the myriads of policy failures in the mid-1970s, Sapru (2011) observed that it was felt that the real culprit of policy failure was the administrative delivery system, as such, public policy implementation has variously been described as the major problem confronting the development countries. This is to the extent that Egonmwan (2002) went as far as declaring that implementation turns out to be “the graveyard of policy” in developing countries.

Importing the realities of the precarious complexities bordering on how policies fair in Nigeria, Eminue (2009) reinforces this paradox when he notes that, “it has been claimed that Nigeria has often formulated “good” policies but that these often got bungled at the implementation stage”. Quoting Ikelegbe, he stressed that the policy implementation stage has thus been identified as one inundated with myriads of

problems likely to mar, distort and prevent the implementation process or likely to result in poor callous and haphazard implementation and abandonment including such problems as poor programme leadership, poor management, poor citizenship co-operation, poor inter-agency and inter-governmental co-operation, inadequate resources (poor funding), corruption and indiscipline, contractual failures and problems of overlapping jurisdiction, problems within the implementing organization's agencies etc.”.

By way of summary, it is pertinent to note that in the course of this review, i.e. concerning policy, policy implementation and the impact of policies in developing societies like Nigeria, the researcher came off with the conclusion that though the assertions bordering on the policy implementation stage (and its inherent problems as discussed between 2.2.5 – 2.2.8 ) as the crux of public policy are true, there has however been so much emphasis and concentration on this stage of the public policy process at the risk of abandoning studies and analysis of the policy formulation stage in order to determine whether governments, in designing these so-called “good policies” do consider at all, the real (felt) needs of the people at the decision-making stage (policy formulation). There is therefore the risk of a tendency that the so-called “good policies” were designed, in the first instance either to calm the frayed nerves of citizens at a time of agitation or as mere demagogic political promises without any real intention of affecting their lives. It must be noted that any policy couched on such intentions, no matter how beautiful in outlook, once it is not articulated with clear-cut objectives, taking cognizance of the felt needs of the people, cannot be successfully implemented despite its book presentation format. One of the reasons for such a policy formulation-implementation gap has been the failure of governments to consult the people at the formulation stage, an example of which the SURE-P programme typifies. It is no longer

news that Nigerians were not consulted on the blueprint of SURE-P, rather, citizens woke on January 1, 2012 (with all the grace and great expectations of the New Year) to the grim reality of withdrawal of petroleum subsidy. It appears that it was only in a bid to persuade the citizenry to accept the regime of partial deregulation that the government hurriedly presented the SURE-P template (without the involvement of the citizens whatsoever at the programme formulation stage) even though the programme was to have very far-reaching impacts on their socio-economic lives.

There is therefore the need for policy scholars and the entire citizenry to impress on governments to engage the citizens in proactive policy formulation analysis/processes (as this is still a culprit) without abandoning analysis of the implementation processes in the entire public policy process/cycle.

### **2.3 Policy vs. Programme**

For clarification, it is pertinent to distinguish between what constitutes a programme from a policy. This is because the two concepts have often been used interchangeably. This problem is commonplace in that, even in developed countries as observed by Moynihan (1975), one of the more important things about the structure of American government is that too much policy is defined in terms of programme, rather than true policy, noting that the problem with the programme approach is that it deals with only a part of the system whereas policy (on the other hand) seeks to respond to the system in its entirety.

In trying to distinguish between the two concepts, Starling (2008) writes that a policy is a statement of goals and the relative importance attached to each; that though

a policy comprises one or more plans which specify the objectives to be attained, a programme is a proposed set of specific actions intended to help implement a policy. He emphasized therefore that a programme is that package which would spell out the action to be taken to achieve a set objective. In his essay on Policy vs. Programme in the '70s, Moynihan (1975) insists that whereas programmes relate to a single part of the system, policy seeks to respond to the system in its entirety. Accordingly, he maintains that the defining characteristic of a programme is that it is directed to a specific situation to maintain or change that situation in some desired fashion. However, almost as though he could not completely disentangle himself from the policy-programme mix, Moynihan notes that there are programmes that are quite general in their outlook, and that doubtlessly, there are even programmes that would wish to evolve into policies

Bent on entrenching a dichotomy between the two concepts, Eminue (2009) insists that there is a clear distinction between a policy and a programme; whereas a policy is a course of action intended to accomplish some end, a programme is the means, the instrumentality, the technique or the specific actions designed to achieve an end, or to operationalize the policy. He buttresses this difference further by demonstrating that while a policy identifies the broad objectives or intentions and establishes guidelines; a programme has to do with the actual structure, procedures, inputs (human and non-human) and the processes or activities through which the policy is complemented.

While trying to justify the seeming interconnectivity both in usage and application of the two terms to describe the conduct of governments in decision-making and implementation, Moynihan (1975) observes that “given the fact everything relates

to everything, it follows that there are no social interests about which the national government does not have some policy or other, simply by the indirect influences of programmes nominally directed to other areas". He describes these indirect influences of programmes as the "hidden policies of government". Moynihan therefore draws attention to the fact that the interconnections of programmes directed to one area with outcome in another are sometimes seen; by and large, these connections need to be pretty evident for much note to be taken of them, and that the ability to detect them (the interconnection) is much influenced by intellectual and political fashion.

When utilized to explain the variable under study i.e. the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), the interconnectivity mantra between policy and programme as espoused by Moynihan can be gleaned. In the context of this research work, SURE-P is treated as a palliative policy with specificity in the redistribution of the money saved from the partial deregulation of the petroleum sector to certain areas of intervention covering at least 8 components namely, Social Safety Nets (Maternal and Child Health Care Services, Public Works/Women and Youth Employment Programme, Vocational Training Scheme), Niger Delta Development Project, Road Infrastructure, Rail Transport Projects, Water and Agriculture Projects, Selected Power Projects, Petroleum/NNPC Projects and ICT Projects. To the extent of such an array of areas of intervention, SURE-P is qualified to be captured in the policy domain but as is the observation by Moynihan (1975) that

in America, too much policy is defined as a programme, rather than true policy, Nigeria is not exempt from this policy-programme mix. On the other hand, since a programme approach should necessarily deal with only a part of the system, the eight components

of SURE-P enumerated above should have been designated as the various programmes (to deal with specific areas of intervention) while SURE-P is the overall policy. That is therefore the justification for dealing with SURE-P (in this context) as a policy rather than a “programme” as designated by the framers of SURE-P.

## **2.4 Configurative Literature**

This section is devoted to the review of related literature on regional developments as they pertain to the policy of reallocating or reinvesting subsidy funds to other areas of the economy to boost development. It is worth noting that there has been a global trend in the political economy of subsidy removal and the reinvestment of proceeds thereof to safety net programmes, to mitigate its negative effects on sensitive populations. An example is a recent policy pronouncement from G20 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations in phasing out support for fossil fuels to redirect substantial portions of those subsidies into international climate finance in a programme tagged “stop funding the problem, start funding the solution” (Oil Change International, 2010).

In doing justice to this, attention is focused on the review of the cases in Indonesia (a lower middle-income country), one of the countries that has been cited in the SURE-P document as an example of an ongoing subsidy reinvestment programme), Jordan in the Middle East and Sri Lanka.

### **2.4.1 Subsidy Reallocation Programme in Indonesia:**

Before the removal of fuel subsidy in Indonesia, the World Bank (2011) had warned that the consequence of subsidy in terms of efficiency in resource allocation, was of unequal distributive effects, describing subsidy as a crowd pleaser for particular

socio-economic groups; where the distribution of fuel subsidy was skewed to wealthy households. To reinforce the negative effects of subsidies on allocative resources, Pradiptyo and Sahadewo (2012) emphasized that fuel subsidies also imposed persistent pressure on GoI's fiscal aspects. They indicated that the revised expenditures for subsidy in 2011 accounted for 129.7 Indonesian rupiah (henceforth, IDR) trillion, higher than the planned IDR 95.9 trillion. The realization of fuel subsidy expenditure at the end of 2011, however, amounted to an estimated IDR160 trillion. Fuel subsidy was also noted to hinder the ability of ministries to expand their expenditure function to some extent as fuel subsidy expenditure was 8.5 times (or 850% higher than) food subsidy expenditure in 2011. The ratios are even starker in comparison with other types of subsidy including agriculture-related subsidies, Public Service Obligations (PSO), and credit assistance for micro and small enterprises which are proactive in improving the conditions of poor and low-income households

Fuel subsidy also imposes adverse effects on energy allocation and investment and drives excessive consumption and inefficient use of energy. The price difference between subsidized and non-subsidized fuel creates opportunities for smuggling. BPH Migas reported that 10 to 15 per cent of subsidized fuels are redistributed illegally to industry particularly in industrial zones and mining areas (GSI, 2011). These phenomena lead to distortion in the efficient allocation of energy and resources. The low prices of fuel due to the subsidy create disincentives for investment in energy diversification. Mourougane (2010) concludes that subsidy hinders investment in infrastructure for energy infrastructure.

One of the case studies in Subsidy reinvestment in Indonesia is contained in a report by Widodo, Sahadewo, Setiastuti and Chaerriyah (2012) who used the general

equilibrium model of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to determine the impact of fuel subsidy removal on government spending and on the Indonesian economy, as well as the impact of fuel subsidy reallocation to the economy. The report observed that the main benefit of fuel subsidy removal is the availability of the government's endowment to be reallocated to other sectors. This endowment is reallocated to strategic programmes that would create a multiplier effect both in the short- and long-run. This study therefore provided the impact of reallocation to output, GDP, and income distribution using the analysis of SAM. The sectors were chosen based on several parameters available in Indonesia SAM. These parameters include consumption expenditure, number of workers, and average labour wage. Consumption expenditure parameters include those in agriculture as well as rural and urban non-agriculture sectors. The study observed that the overall benefit of fuel subsidy removal is negative; that since the reliance of sectors on fuel subsidy is very high, the multiplier effects of removal are higher than that of any direct reallocation scheme.

In another report by a World Bank study entitled “Developing Effective Reform Strategy: Safety Nets to Protect Poor and Vulnerable Groups from the Negative Impact of Reform”, it is reported that the Indonesian authorities, in its fiscal sustainability of policy, beginning from 2005 set a goal to reduce spending on energy subsidies by 40% by 2013 and fully eliminate subsidies by 2014. On the whole, fuel subsidy reallocation to fund programmes that benefit the poor in Indonesia was designed to address the following areas: (1) Social Protection = Unconditional Cash Transfer, (2) Education = Operational Aid to Schools, (3) Health = Basic Health Care and Hospital Insurance Poor, (4) Infrastructure = Village Infrastructure.



And so from October 2005, Indonesia commenced what it termed Large Scale Rapid Compensation Programme involving cash transfers plus other social programs as follows:

- Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) - Cash transfer to 15.5 million poor and near-poor families to compensate them for inflationary effects of the fuel price increase;
- Quarterly payment for 1-year period (October 2005 to September 2006), main design features - Rp100,000 (\$10) per month (equivalent to about 17 % of per capita consumption of the poorest decile);
- Disbursement to 15.5 million families, equal to around 62 million people, or 30% of the population – this was designed and implemented in 3 months; implemented through Post Offices - averted going directly through government bureaucracy.

To ensure the workability of the programme through effective monitoring and real-time evaluation, the government adopted rapid external appraisal using two NGOs/research institutes. Also, significant media scrutiny was effected and though not perfect, working, targeting – using geographic targeting (small area poverty map) and proxy means testing. In the case of loose targeting - Given the concentration of people just above the poverty line, the government decided to target the cash transfer not just to the 16 % who fall under the poverty line, but to the near poor also. The cash transfer program thus reached 19 million poor and near-poor households, or 28 % of the population (Yemtsov, 2010).

### **2.4.2 Subsidy Reallocation Programme in Jordan**

In the Middle East, our interest is centred on Jordan, a lower-middle-income country. The Jordanian experience with the distribution of resources garnered from divestment in subsidies started in 1986 after the elimination of food subsidies. A study by the International Monetary Fund, IMF (2006) discloses that though the 1986 package was the most comprehensive transfer program in the country which targeted the poorest households, its coverage of the poorest households was extremely low. However, over 50 per cent of its transfers accrued to the poorest quintile and over 75 per cent to the bottom 40 per cent of households. This compares very favourably to the distribution of kerosene subsidies in Jordan, where less than 15 per cent of benefits reached the poorest quintile. Still, unfortunately, the programme was described as having covered only 14 per cent of the lowest income decile and less than 12 per cent of the lowest quintile. The challenge was, therefore, to maintain the programme's ability to channel funds to low-income households without incurring higher leakage as the programme expanded to cover a substantially greater proportion of low-income households. Since this could only be achieved by investing resources in improving the design and implementation of the programme, the programme could not be used to effectively mitigate the adverse impact of subsidy withdrawal in the short run, so that alternative approaches were required.

However, in 2010, the World Bank Joint Conference on increasing the momentum of fossil-fuel subsidy reform records that the experience with planned elimination of fuel subsidies in Jordan began in 2005, with a major price increase in 2006 followed by a price adjustment in 2008. In an attempt by the Jordanian government to distribute the revenue made from the withdrawal of subsidies, the

government designed and introduced what it termed “a social risk mitigation package” which included:

1. Compensations through wage increases where an additional JD50 per month is paid to civil servants, military and security personnel whose (base) pay is less than JD300.
2. Additional JD45 per month for civil servants, military and security personnel whose (base) pay is more than JD300)
3. Increase in pensions to Jordanian retirees
4. Increase in social assistance payments (additional JD 10 per family member per month for NAF beneficiaries, monthly aid was increased from JD26 to JD36 per family member with a maximum of JD 180 for a five-member family)
5. Government stepped up the national aid fund capacity to cover and target the poor (move from a categorical targeting to a proxy means test). The new targeting included the working poor, the unemployed and the able bodied who are not participating in the labour force.
6. Compensating measures cost 1/3 to ½ what the fuel subsidies cost for a year (World Bank, 2010).

However, the report noted that one particular misgiving about the implementation of the social risk mitigation package was a widespread concern that overly generous compensation offered to civil servants was not well targeted and was not warranted by the situation.

### **2.4.3 Subsidy Reallocation Programme in Sri Lanka**

Sri Lanka, a middle-income country is another example where there are existing safety nets. In a case study undertaken by Jordan, El-Said, Gillingham, Kpodar, Medas and Newhouse, (2006) it was reported that the core component of the safety nets, (the Samurdhi food stamps program) was substantially better targeted than kerosene subsidies. Under this program, 52 per cent of transfers accrued to the poorest 40 per cent of households compared to 41 per cent of kerosene subsidies. The program also had extensive coverage of lower-income households—63 per cent of the poorest 20 per cent of households received transfers compared to the 78 per cent who benefited from fuel subsidies.

Although existing safety net programmes may provide an attractive alternative to kerosene subsidies, often their current design and implementation effectiveness could be substantially improved. In the case of Sri Lanka, the World Bank has been identifying better-targeting mechanisms. Under the existing program, eligibility is determined by local administrators through Samurdhi organizations and is, in principle, based on the assessment of household income and economic status. The proposed targeting mechanism was to be based on a proxy-means targeting approach that identified poor households by attaching a numerical weight to various household socio-economic characteristics to calculate a household score. Households would then be chosen if their score was below a certain threshold score. Simulations for Sri Lanka indicated that this scheme has significantly improved targeting, with the proportion of transfers accruing to the bottom 40 per cent increasing to 67 per cent (mainly at the expense of the highest income group) and coverage of the poorest 20 per cent.

## **2.5 Comparative Literature**

In this section, an attempt is made to compare the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) in Nigeria with its equivalent in a country from within the same region i.e. the West African Sub-Region. For this purpose, Ghana which is graded in “Case Studies of Energy Subsidies Reform by the World Bank” as “a low-income country” alongside Nigeria is chosen for the comparative studies (Yemtsov, 2010). In doing this, both the similarities and dissimilarities in the policy thrust of reinvestment of the subsidy removal resources will be undertaken.

### **2.5.1 Ghana’s Mitigation Measures for Oil Subsidy Removal**

Writing on Ghana’s experience with fuel subsidy removal, Coady and Newhouse (2006) reveal that the first attempt to liberalize Ghana’s subsidized fuel prices occurred in early 2001 with the establishment of an automatic price-setting mechanism that linked domestic prices to international ones. The mechanism was abandoned toward the end of 2002 and the price of petrol came under government control again. The mechanism was reintroduced in early 2003, causing an almost doubling of the domestic price of petrol. However, the formula was again abandoned following public pressure and by 2004 the cost of fuel subsidies had risen to 2.2 per cent of Ghana’s GDP. As the fuel subsidy became an even greater drain on public resources, an impact analysis study was carried out by the IMF to examine the impact on the poor of the subsidy removal. Finding a significant negative impact on the poor, the study made recommendations to expand social transfer programmes to mitigate the impact, several of which were subsequently adopted. The need to remove the subsidy and reintroduce the price formula was communicated to the general public, and President Kufour himself made a public announcement. As a result, the price formula

was reintroduced in early 2005 and a National Petroleum Authority was set up to oversee the deregulation of the sector (Coady and Newhouse 2006).

However, the cycle did not end there. Fuel subsidies were restored briefly in 2008 and then reinstated in 2009 after the Presidential election. Fuel prices subsequently underwent significant upward adjustments in mid-2009, and early 2011. An executive summary by Cooke, Hague, Cockburn, El Lahga and Tiberti (2014) has it that Ghana, like most African countries, was known to have faced increasing challenges to maintain fuel subsidies in recent years. As of 2012, the government reasoned that in the face of a near 12% fiscal deficit in that year, their burgeoning cost had drawn attention to questions of fiscal sustainability as well as their overall efficiency and effectiveness. The government therefore predicted that in 2013, it would have spent cost 2.4 billion GHS (approximately 1.2 billion USD) on fuel subsidies, equaling 3.2% of GDP and more than half of Ghana's allocation to the entire education sector. Given that fuel subsidies around the world had been proven to be generally regressive, benefitting largely the richest group with very little reaching those living below the poverty line, Ghana's case was such that almost 78% of fuel subsidies benefited the wealthiest group, with less than 3% of subsidy benefits reaching the poorest quintile. The richest quintile of the population received 15.86 GHS per year from the fuel subsidies per capita, while the poorest received just 2.23 GHS per capita.

Regarding fuel subsidy mitigation measures, a report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2013) states that the Ghanaian government, after the first fuel price increases in 2005 introduced mitigating measures including cross-subsidies in favour of kerosene and liquefied natural gas (LNG), (the fuels consumed most by the

poorest income groups); an increase in the daily minimum wage; a price ceiling on public transport fares; elimination of school fees for primary and secondary education; and other measures.

Furthermore, the removal of fuel subsidies largely occurred in February 2013 and in reviewing available information on the range of social protection programmes in Ghana, Cooke, Hague, Cockburn, El Lahga and Tiberti (2014) report that Ghana's National Cash Transfer Programme (LEAP) stands out. According to them, LEAP is Ghana's flagship social protection programme, disbursing an of average 36 USD every two months to extremely poor households which also include an elderly person, an orphan or vulnerable child, or a disabled person who cannot work. Furthermore, it has strong political support and is operative at a national scale in 100 districts of all Ghana's regions, though still on a limited scale, reaching 72,000 households in 2013. The review also examines three scenarios for expanding the national cash transfer programme (LEAP) to 150,000, 300,000, and 500,000 households in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively, predicting that, on average, the cash transfers could successfully reverse the impact of the fuel price increase and reduce poverty at the national level by 1.6 – 2.3 percentage points. In applying the subsidy reallocation programme to the educational level, Laan, Beaton, and Presta (2010) observe that the mitigation measures in Ghana included an immediate elimination of fees at government-run primary and junior secondary schools.

At the level of mitigating harsh transportation costs, a programme to improve public transport saw the government providing Metro Mass Transit which charged moderate prices lower than ordinary public transport. Primary school pupils also boarded such buses free of charge (Darfah, 2013). Ghana's mitigating programmes were transparent and easily monitored by society such that whereas the trade unions

remained opposed to the price increases, the public generally accepted them, and no large-scale demonstrations occurred.

In Nigeria, after the partial removal of fuel subsidies in January 2012, the main plank in the subsidy reform was the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P). The SURE-P envisaged channelling the federal government's share of the savings from the fuel subsidy reduction into a combination of programmes to stimulate the economy and alleviate poverty through critical infrastructure and safety net projects. The infrastructure projects financed by SURE-P are selected in line with the government's Vision 2020 development strategy in the power, roads, transportation, water, and downstream petroleum sectors. The social safety net programs to mitigate the impact of subsidy removal on the poor identified by SURE-P are focused in the areas of urban mass transit, maternal and child health services, public works, and vocational training. In 2012, the SURE-P programme facilitated the completion of a major north-south national railway project and improved maternal and child-care services in 500 primary healthcare centres (IMF, 2013).

In comparing the two countries, i.e. Ghana and Nigeria as regards measures aimed at mitigating the negative effects of fuel subsidy removal, one observes that the two countries adopted well-spelt policies to handle the challenges emanating from the withdrawal of subsidies. One point of similarity in the policy thrust is that both countries targeted the poor in an attempt to leverage their access to the gains of petroleum subsidy which earlier studies confirmed as benefitting the rich much more than the poor. As such, these policies in both countries are similar in their cardinal objectives but that appears to be all the similarity between the two countries as the



components of each country's mitigating programme are very different from each other. An examination of these areas of difference will suffice.

It is pertinent to note that the scope of reallocation of funds from petroleum subsidy in Ghana is narrower and more specifically targeted than in Nigeria. It would be noted that whereas the Ghanaian central government is solely in charge of the distribution, that of Nigeria is shared among the three tiers of government i.e. the federal, state, and local governments. This has made it somewhat difficult to evaluate the policy in Nigeria being that it is only the federal government's share (41 per cent) that can be monitored to a large extent whereas there is no template to either determine or control how the 54 per cent funds accruing to states and local governments are utilized.

Nigeria's SURE-P funds are channelled to almost all areas of intervention where the government has already made budgetary allocations SURE-P programme included the expansion of several social safety net programs, such as maternal and child health services, cash for public works, women and youth employment programs, vocational training, and urban mass transit schemes (International Monetary Fund, IMF, 2013). SURE-P funds are added up to already existing programmes whereas Ghana's funds are specifically targeted. Ghana's National Cash Transfer Programme (LEAP) disburses an average of 36 USD every two months directly to extremely poor households which also include an elderly person, an orphan or vulnerable child, or a disabled person who cannot work. In Nigeria, these transfers are based on jobs done either at the graduate intensive scheme level or the women/youth empowerment scheme and the mode of selection of beneficiaries is prone to a lot of political considerations. In this sense, the end beneficiaries sometimes are not those who are really in need of such assistance.

In Nigeria, the cash transfer implemented at the maternal health level is conditional as seen below:

### **Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)**

Eligible pregnant women in targeted communities receive cash transfers based on the following criteria:

Register for Antenatal Care (ANC) – N1,000.00

Complete at least four ANC Visits – N1,000.00

Delivery by skilled birth attendant (facility-based) – N2,000.00

Immediate postnatal care within two days of child-birth – N1,000.00 (SURE-P, 2015).

On the other hand, the cash transfer system in Ghana is unconditionally applicable to the poor. The intervention at the educational level in Ghana is more specific involving the elimination of fees at government-run primary and junior secondary schools whereas there is no such direct educational intervention by way of free education from the federal government in Nigeria.

In the area of transportation Ghanaian government provides Metro Mass Transit which charges moderate prices lower than ordinary public transport. Primary school pupils also boarded such buses free of charge. Intervention here is different in Nigeria as the government only gives zero-interest loans to established transport operations for the procurement of vehicles it cannot be established if these buses have been put to effective use, and there is no free bus service available to any category of Nigerians.

## **2.6 Case Study Literature**

### **2.6.1 Background to the Introduction of SURE-P**

Following the strikes, rallies and mass protests that attended the announcement of the removal of subsidies in January 2012, the Government, after a series of meetings with labour as well as civil society groups, agreed on N98 per litre of fuel. To convince Nigerians that the government meant well, the President announced the establishment of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) to oversee and ensure, (what it tagged) the effective and timely implementation of projects to be funded with the savings accruing from the removal of subsidy on petroleum products, which was estimated at N1.3 trillion (Madike, 2013). The sharing formula required the Federal Government to warehouse 41 per cent of the subsidy savings, the State and Local Governments shared 54 per cent while the remaining 5 per cent was shared between the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and transfers to Derivation, and Ecology, Development of Natural resources and Stabilization Funds (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012).

By February 13, 2012, the President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan constituted a 21–member SURE-P Committee headed by Dr. Christopher Kolade, to not only manage the savings but also to reinvest the Federal Government’s share of the funds (Madike, 2013). Accordingly, the first SURE-P committee as constituted by former President Goodluck Jonathan comprised the following:

1. Dr. Christopher Kolade, CON Chairman
2. Maj. Gen. (rtd) Mamman Kontagora, CON Deputy Chairman
3. Hon Minister of Finance/CME Member
4. Hon. Minister of Petroleum Resources Member
5. Hon. Minister National Planning Member

6. Hon. Minister of State Health Member
7. Gen. Martin Luther Agwai (Rtd) Member
8. Prof. Kunle Ade Wahab Member
9. Mazi S. Ohuabunwa Member
10. Dr. Mrs. Ngozi Olejeme Member
11. Alh. Najeem Usman Yasin Member
12. Alh. Kassim I. Bataiya Member
13. Mr. Kiri Mohammed Shuaib Member
14. Dr. Fatima L. Adamu Member
15. Mr. Audu Maikori Member
16. Alh. Mohammed Garba Member
17. Mrs. Amina Az-Zubair Member
18. Comrade Peter Esele Member
19. Barrister Mrs. Halima Alfa Member
20. Mr. Chike Churchill Okogwu Member
21. Nze Akachukwu Nwankpo Secretary/Member

### **2.6.2 Programme Objectives of SURE-P**

The objectives of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme are:

- (a) To mitigate the immediate impact of the petroleum subsidy discontinuation on the populace, particularly for the poor and vulnerable segments. This applies to both the direct and indirect effects of the subsidy withdrawal.

- (b) To accelerate economic transformation through investments in critical infrastructure projects to drive economic growth and achieve the vision 20:2020.
- (c) To lay a foundation for the successful development of a national safety net programme that is better targeted at the poor and most vulnerable continuously (The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011).

It must be noted that government intentions in terms of the implementation of this programme were designed such that the success there would convince Nigerians why the Government should implement total deregulation (complete removal of subsidies on petroleum products) in the future. The following were the terms of reference for the SURE-P Committee.

1. Determine in liaison with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Petroleum Resources, the subsidy savings estimates for each preceding month and ensure funds are transferred to the Funds' Special Account with the Central Bank of Nigeria.
2. Approve the annual work and cash budget of the various Projects Implementation Units (PIUs) within the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and ensure orderly disbursement of funds by the PIUs in order to certify and execute projects.
3. Monitor and evaluate execution of the funded projects, including Periodic Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA).

4. Update the President regularly on the programme i.e. periodically brief the Federal Executive Council on the progress of the programmes.
5. Appoint consultancy firms with international reputations to provide technical assistance to the committee in financial and project management.
6. Appoint external auditors for the fund.
7. Do such other things as are necessary or incidental to the objectives of the fund or as may be assigned by the Federal Government, (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012).

### **2.6.3 Programme Description**

Although the programme description of SURE-P focuses on the management of the portion of resources accruable to the Federal Government, the share of subsidy re-investment fund for States and Local Governments was separately paid into a special account that they intended to use the subsidy fund for, and where they were free to determine what they want to do with the subsidy re-investment fund. On the whole, the following is the summary of the components of the national programme which were designed to span a period of 3 to 4 years, to lay the foundation for building a robust social safety net mechanism in the country:

1. Maternal and Child Health care services: Designed to utilize the services of the rural population through conditional cash transfer and provision of basic services by female community health workers. The potential beneficiaries targeted were 3 million pregnant women per annum. On the supply side was the training and deployment of midwives to at least 1000 centres of the scheme.
2. Public works/Women and Youth Empowerment Programmes had the objective of providing temporary employment to youth and women labour: intensive

public works. These women and youths were to receive payments based on the amount of work put in:

3. Urban Mass Transit Scheme aimed at providing zero-interest loans to established transport operations for the procurement of vehicles.
4. Vocational Training Centres were to be established in all the states in the country and the FCT where youths were to be trained in vocational skills.
5. Niger Delta Development Project was a component that sought to address the peculiar development needs of the region. It focused on accelerating the completion of long-standing road projects totaling 338km across the whole region.
6. Other core road projects were also envisaged to enhance transportation, economic activities and social integration. Roads contemplated in this component included roads and bridges traversing all the zones in the country and totalling 1,326km.
7. Rail Transport Projects – the aim was to rehabilitate and restore abandoned railway infrastructure and construct new standard gauge railway lines as alternative means of transportation. This component also traversed all the zones in the country with a projection covering 3,877km.
8. Under the Water and Agriculture Project Component, water resources were to be harnessed for national development through self-reliance for rice and other food crop production. Irrigation projects covering a total of 28,850 hectares were envisaged with a projected annual output of 422,000 tons. Urban Water Supply projects were designed to increase the level of potable water supply to

about 10 million people. It has to increase national access to water supply from current levels of 58% to about 75%.

9. In the Power Sector, the programme was to provide counterpart funding for the construction of the large Mambilla Hydro-power project which was expected to generate an additional 2,600 Megawatts of electric power.

Also, the programme was to provide funding to complete a total of 17 small and medium hydroelectric power projects with a cumulative capacity of 140.275MW. Also incorporated within this component was the provision of the counterpart funding for PPPs with the private sector for the development of coal power projects in Enugu, Benue, Kogi, and Gombe, with the potential to generate 1000MW of power.

10. Under the petroleum/NNPC Projects Component, SURE-P funds were expected to be channelled toward the restoration and improvement of domestic refining capacity. The target here was in the building of Greenfield refineries and pipeline reinstatement. The refineries to be built through counterpart funding were listed as (a) Bayelsa - to produce 100,000 bbls/day (b) Kogi – to produce 100,000 bbls/day and (c) Lagos – to produce 200,000 bbls/day. These were expected to, on completion in three years; contribute about 30 million litres of PMS.

In addition, the programme projects approximately 2,500km of petroleum products pipelines vandalized in the southern, North Central and North Eastern parts of the country were to be repaired.



11. ICT Projects – designed to boost broadband connectivity extending same to all territory institutions in the country through the establishment of e-teaching and e-learning platforms. This initiative was expected to generate 70,000 new jobs spread across the country and another 350,000 spin-off jobs over the next 4 to 5 years (SURE-P Progress Report, 2013).

#### **2.6.4 SURE-P Operating Structure, Process and Funds Management**

To oversee and ensure the effective and timely implementation of projects funded with the savings accruing to the Federal Government from subsidy removal, the SURE-P committee, according to the SURE-P Annual Report (2012), employed the following processes and procedures:

1. SURE-P established a fund management structure to ensure probity, transparency and accountability. The operating structure was such that after the committee had approved payments for projects, the Chairman signed the approval, and the DG Budget Office, as Accounting Officer to SURE-P, processed the approvals. He then authorized the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to make payments directly to the bank accounts of beneficiaries.

The Director-General, Budget Office of the Federation (DG Budget Office) was designated Accounting officer for all SURE-P activities as a means of providing the check-and-balance arrangement to guarantee the probity of the SURE-P process. It was also meant to insulate the officials of SURE-P and the Projects Implementation Units (PIUs) from direct contact with contractors on financial matters.

2. In the SURE-P operational structure, individual projects were managed by Project Implementation Units (PIUs) that was located within Federal Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). To perform its oversight responsibility, the Committee had to divide itself into sub-committees, each making up of 3 to 4 members. The subcommittees acted on behalf of the main committee to provide direct supervision to the projects. Sub-committees were not only instituted to carry out site inspection but were also required to sign certificates that assured the main committee that the work that was claimed was fully verified.

The Committee also had a Secretariat for technical and administrative support, and for providing information to stakeholders and the general public.

3. The document emphasized that SURE-P was neither a duplication nor a replacement of the normal activity of each relevant Ministry. Rather, the intervention of SURE-P achieved three major outcomes, viz: Given that SURE-P funds were derived directly from the savings from fuel subsidy withdrawal, the intervention supplemented the normal budgetary allocation so that higher-level results could be delivered on each project; SURE-P methods ensured the faster delivery of project outcomes by employing procedures that were designed to shorten the time between project implementation and authentication; Contractors and other stakeholders got paid directly, and without undue delay, thus encouraging that beneficiaries delivered outcomes on time, and to avoid the possibility of project abandonment.

One additional feature of the SURE-P intervention was that, while the responsibility for the day-to-day management of projects located within the respective

MDAs rested with the PIUs, their staff also included consultants and other capable professionals brought in from the private sector (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012).

4. To make for effective programme monitoring and evaluation, SURE-P carried this out through a designated unit - Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) under the direction of the appropriate department of the Ministry of National Planning. The Unit was complemented, where necessary, by experts and consultants of international reputation. Such consultants were secured through the assistance of several foreign donor agencies.
5. Still so that SURE-P might do its job cleanly and effectively, the federal government constituted the following sub-committees, each headed by a Convener, to oversee the effective implementation of SURE-P. Each of the Sub-Committees comprised members from the full Committee and served to fast-track, monitor and validate the programmes and projects of SURE-P. The committees were as follows:

**Roads & Bridges Committee:** The Sub-Committee provided leadership and vision for the Project Implementation Units (PIUs) and the Technical Teams to enable project progress.

**Niger Delta Committee:** This Sub-Committee was to ensure that the execution of the East-West Road Dualisation contract was fast-tracked to completion with SURE-P funds.

**Vocational Training / Public Works Committee:** This Sub-Committee of this PIU served as the custodian of the mandate of the Committee in all projects

under Vocational Training/ Public Works through programme initiation, verification and approval.

**Maternal Child Health Committee:** The Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Subcommittee was responsible for the oversight of all MCH programmes. The Subcommittee reviewed all projects and deliberated on the best decisions that would be most beneficial for the successful completion of the MCH program and also in the best interest of the citizens of Nigeria. The Subcommittee served as representatives for SURE-P at all MCH events at the Zonal, State and Local levels.

**Community Services Women & Youth Empowerment Committee:** CSWYE Sub-Committee was set up in March 2012 and charged with the responsibility to oversee the Community Services, Women and Youth (CSWYE) Program which had broad focus on Youth related programming.

**Railways/ Mass Transit Committee:** The Sub- Committee on Railways and Mass Transit was established to oversee and supervise the activities of SURE-P Railway Team Lead in achieving the vision and mission of SURE- P.

#### **2.6.5 Implementation/Achievements of SURE-P in NIGERIA**

The federal government of Nigeria, having considered that continuous subsidy on petroleum products poses a huge financial burden on the government, disproportionately benefiting the wealthy and diverting resources from potential investments in critical infrastructure, designed SURE-P as a redistributive policy aimed at addressing equity issues and to develop options targeted at assistance to the poor as well as the unemployed, and to allocate resources to real development.

This section is dedicated to assessing the literature on the implementation/performance of SURE-P between 2012 and 2015. It must be noted however that given the very contemporaneous nature of the SURE-P redistributive policy in the Nigerian context, scholarly literature on it is also relatively few, some of which are reviewed here. For the sake of clarity, the review is undertaken within the context of the different components as enumerated in the SURE-P documented benchmarks. Writing on what appears as the expenditure profile of SURE-P, Usman (2014) quoted the immediate past chairman of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, NESG, and member of the SURE-P committee, Sam Ohuanbuwa as claiming that the Federal government (between 2012 and 2014) had spent about N280 billion under the Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme, SURE-P, maintaining that SURE-P had also rolled over about N80 billion from 2013 to 2014 which it committed into various intervention projects, under the 2014 fiscal year.

One of the most recent reports on the general achievements of SURE-P was captured in an editorial comment of the National Mirror which quoted the former Chairman of SURE-P, Gen. Martine Luther Agwai as announcing that since the programme came on board in 2012, SURE-P had spent N280 Billion on various projects across the country for example, the Abuja-Lokoja road, upgraded 500 health centres, while working on another 700, sunk over 630 boreholes (potable water), provided health medication and what he tagged “mama kits” for expectant mothers, reduced maternal mortality by about 60 percent, and provided adequate medical attention from professionally qualified midwives to half a million women during child birth in several health centres nationwide (Anonymous, 2014). Therefore the performance/achievements of SURE-P according to programme components can be summarized under the following sub-headings:

### **2.6.6 The Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS)**

According to the SURE-P Scorecard (2015), the GIS was predicated on the understanding that the majority of unemployed graduates have no working experience and are most times rejected by employers who prefer experienced hands. GIS was introduced to address the plight of these graduates consistent with the vision of President Goodluck Jonathan's administration to tackle youth unemployment and enhance the capacity of the workforce towards achieving the desires of national development and reducing youth restiveness in the country. Under the scheme, graduates are placed in firms and organizations, non-governmental organizations and selected government agencies, on a one-year internship. The interns are expected to acquire professional skills, training and work experience to improve their job-placement opportunities. The Federal Government is responsible for paying a monthly stipend to them while participating institutions are expected to provide adequate opportunities for training and mentoring.

The Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) had the following objectives:

- a) To enhance the employability of at least 50,000 unemployed graduates the 36 states of the Federation and in the FCT through internship programmes.
- b) To provide a safety net and income supplement for unemployed graduates
- c) To reduce the vulnerability of unemployed graduates
- d) To build the critical manpower and capacity required for national development.

**Implementation:** GIS was implemented by a Project Implementation Unit in the Federal Ministry of Finance. It was headed by a Project Director under the leadership of the former Coordinating Minister for the Economy/Honourable Minister of Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. The Project was overseen by the SURE-P Committee headed by the Chairman.

**Eligibility Criteria for Graduates:** Following strategic publicity sensitization, interested Nigerian graduates meeting the programme criteria submitted their application online ([www.wyesurep.gov.ng](http://www.wyesurep.gov.ng)). Unemployed individuals who had graduate-level education and had completed mandatory National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) or were exempted were eligible. Graduates must be citizens of Nigeria (with a valid ID), must not be more than 40 years of age at the time of joining the Scheme (birth certificate or Statutory Declaration of Age required) and must submit a CV/Résumé online at [www.wyesurep.gov.ng](http://www.wyesurep.gov.ng). He/she must make available all original documents for sighting at the point of selection by the employing firm.

**Eligibility Criteria for firms:** Firms must be registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and other relevant professional bodies as applicable, must provide evidence of VAT Registration and Tax Clearance Certificate and be prepared to provide a mentoring plan for each intern, detailing specific activities to which intern should be engaged and must be able to employ interns for one (1) year. They must also prove that they are economically viable and engaged in legitimate business, evidenced by audited accounts, etc. MDAs/State Owned Enterprises must provide a justification for using interns and the specific area of operations and are also required to provide a mentoring plan, including duties for which the intern would be responsible.

**Conditions of Service:** Standard working hours of the firm/organization/institution applied; Interns were required to abide by all rules/regulations of the employing organization. The total number of days interns put into the work was not to exceed 240 days in a year and the intern was expected to report to a designated supervisor in the firm/organization/institution. They were also entitled to annual leave.

**Mobilization/Registration:** Firms/organizations and graduates were mobilized to register for the scheme. This happened through media publicity, door-to-door publicity and specially arranged sensitization workshops for firms and Internship fairs. Firms and graduates then went online and registered on the GIS website.

**Verification and Approval:** Registered firms were pre-screened to ensure they met the criteria for physical verification. These criteria included registration with CAC, confirmation that they pay taxes, that they had office space for the interns required and that they could mentor. They were also required to state the number of interns they needed. At the onset of the project, verification was handled by the PIU. However, due to the vagaries of cost, inefficiency and the fact that officers had to travel to states to conduct this assignment, the assignment was ceded to the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency (SMEDAN), as they have an existing relationship with firms and they have offices in each state. A list of pre-screened firms was then forwarded to SMEDAN to send its officials to the states to visit these firms and conduct physical verification of all claims contained in the pre-screening report. A recommendation from these officials led to approval and activation or rejection. In between registration and approval, a firm was kept in pending status. This, so far shortened the time between registration and approval of firms, cut down costs and enhanced the verification process.



**Matching and Mentorship Plan:** Upon approval, a firm went to the portal and selected graduates. This was based on the course of study and location on a first come first served basis. Selected graduates had a choice to accept or reject any firm that had selected them. Graduates who accepted a firm's selection then reported at the firm and were verified to ensure that their credentials were genuine. They were then accepted into the scheme and a bank account opening form was endorsed for them to facilitate account opening with the bank. A competency assessment was then conducted on them to ascertain the skill sets they had and those they required for the job. This was also to establish the strengths/weaknesses which could guide the formation of a monthly action plan. From this, a mentorship plan was drawn up for their progression during the year and a mentor was appointed for them to keep track of their progress. The mentorship plan was developed to run every quarter, which was reported on and submitted to the PIU at the end of the quarter. Graduates were then deployed to their duty posts. Internal induction training was organized by the firm to acclimatize the new intern to the internal processes of the organization.

**Memorandum of Understanding:** To establish structured engagement of stakeholders, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) guided partnership containing key elements/roles/responsibilities of key actors and guidelines for operations and maintaining healthy relationships. The purpose of the MoU was to affirm the common commitment of the Government and participating firms to the provision of internship placements and mentoring for interns. It was effective from the date of commencement of the first intern and lasted as long as the firm continued to engage interns under the GIS. However, content could be reviewed annually.

**Payment:** Each intern was eligible for a stipend payment upon submission of returns on core compliance by the employer, to a monthly stipend currently set at N30,000

(thirty thousand naira only). Eligibility for payment was subject to the submission of a timesheet/monthly report by the designated supervisor of the firm/organization/institution. Stipends were paid directly into interns' accounts opened in designated banks at the commencement of the scheme. There has been no cash payment of stipends. All transaction costs for maintaining a bank account by beneficiaries were borne by the Project.

**Mobilization, Sensitization and Internship Fairs:** To mobilize firms/organizations and graduates across the country, initially, the scheme relied on jingles, advertorials, and state-level sensitization events across the country. However, in 2014 arising from complaints by firms as regards the slow matching process of graduates, the unwillingness of firms to follow online selection procedure; and not enough opportunity to choose graduates, an interactive graduate selection option was established. Internship opportunities fairs were organized across states where verified and approved firms and registered graduates were brought together. Firms had the opportunity to interview and select interns that met their requirements as against the system-based matching and selection. This process stimulated greater firm participation and confidence in the scheme. Arising from the job fairs undertaken in 2014, 2155 firms attended the events out of 3232 invited. Arising from this, 10,219 graduates were selected and deployed. To facilitate awareness of the scheme, a lot of publicity preceded the event, such that attendance for both firms and graduates was maximal. In 2014, over 10,000 new interns were engaged through these fairs. In addition, sensitization has been sustained through radio jingles and TV commercials.

**Orientation and Employability Skills Training:** At the onset of deployment, the PIU organized an orientation and employability skills training for the interns. The objective of this training was to enable interns and firm representatives to understand how GIS

works as well as to optimize the internship period by providing them with the requisite tools to guide this. To contribute to service delivery and performance of partners, each firm was expected to send a representative to the training. The training covered personal branding, organizational culture, skills for the workplace, financial literacy and entrepreneurship skills. In addition, it focuses on performance management, which is very useful not only to the interns but to the firms as well. This training was held in most states of the federation, with 8,499 intern beneficiaries and 858 firm beneficiaries.

**Exit Training:** Exit training was organized for interns who planned to exit the scheme. Its objective was to prepare interns exiting from the scheme on opportunities for wealth creation, to guide them on strategies for enhanced job creation or employment, and expose them to opportunities in the cooperative system in mobilizing funds for business start-ups and sources of funding; it was also to help them develop networking and partnership. For the exit training, interns were trained on how to evaluate the job market and prepare CVs. It also exposed them to the techniques used for shortlisting, testing, profiling and selecting candidates as well as preparing for job interviews and negotiating salaries.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** The scheme had an in-built mechanism to track its progress by ensuring proper feedback from partners and monitoring activities to ensure compliance with the laid down procedure. Such mechanisms included feedback fora with partner firms and interns, spot-checks on partners and interns and third-party monitoring and other scheduled activities.

As a means of gauging the pulse of both interns and partners feedback platforms were created by the scheme, which include (i) e-mail correspondence/call centre (ii) interactions in the course of training and (iii) interactive sessions. The Scheme took feedback on its activities and mandate very important; as such, regular meetings were organized with partner firms and interns to review progress and address challenges. The outcomes were fruitful and led to improving the success levels of the GIS that they recorded. This platform reportedly contributed to the enhancement of stipend paid to interns from ₦18,000 (2012/2013), to ₦25,000 (2013/2014) to ₦30,000 from early 2014. In addition, this brought about the introduction of Group Life and Accident insurance coverage to all interns as a way of government commitment to take away such responsibilities from firms. Furthermore, some other outcomes from the feedback included:

- (a) That GIS was the most laudable youth policy of this administration, and the first time in the history of our country.
- (b) That GIS had proved to be the hope of Nigerian unemployed graduates in particular for skilful empowerment towards making them employable.
- (c) That a review of our educational curricula in higher institutions as currently designed is necessary to provide for the development of workplace skills, by introducing the life and entrepreneurial skills to make graduates relevant to the demands of the labour market,
- (d) The need to institutionalize the Graduate Internship Scheme for sustenance beyond 2015 by developing a National Policy and Strategy and legislation (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012; SURE-P, 2015).

Adegbe (2015) praises the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) as the first of its kind in sub-Sahara Africa, claiming that it not only enhanced the employability of many graduates in the 36 states of the federation and the FCT but also reduced the vulnerability of unemployed graduates and built manpower base toward attaining national development. According to Papka (2015), the key lessons emerging from different partnering firms around the country indicate that many graduates utilized the scheme to determine prospective candidates for their employment without having to search wide. One of such SURE-P's partnerships with the private sector and other corporate responsibility-minded organizations was recently demonstrated at a scorecard event organized to orchestrate the success of the Graduate Internship Scheme of SURE-P in Lagos. Two organizations, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) and the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) were on hand to offer the graduate youth enrollees of GIS newer opportunities. First, it was NEPC which came up with the Youth Empowerment Export Skills Acquisition Programme (YESSAP) in collaboration with SURE-P. YESSAP, the CEO of NEPC stated was meant to develop the export skills in graduates who would then be deployed to companies for 1 year. It was at this event also that some of the beneficiaries, Olabisi Taibat Apanishile, and Ibrahim Ahmed Sani, (who developed software for Zamfara and especially the wireless network for Gussau town) eulogized the programme as being of immense benefit to them. NITDA is partnering with SURE-P GIS to train 600 interns in specific areas of ICT, equip them with laptops, platform infrastructure, training content, venue for training, facilitation, mentoring, business incubation services and certification examinations. The focus of NITDA included agriculture, health, oil and gas, finance and creative industries (Oyetomi, 2015).

The GIS stood out as the most crucial of the employment components of SURE-P especially as it involved the bridge that transported graduates from the classroom to the labour market in a transmogrified, sharpened, blended, garnished, motivated format that made them more appealing, hands-on and ready to perform the task set before them (Haruna, 2015). He (Haruna) maintained that the GIS can stand by this claim based on the number of graduates that gained full employment within a few months of internship, insisting that others got retained at the end or got employed by other firms that found them skilful and experienced – something they were not before their internship. Good enough, the firms that took these graduates are in every sector: public and private, providing a kaleidoscope of experiences for both the firms and interns across the country.

Equally commenting on the usefulness of the GIS beyond the individual experiences, TJS (2015) observes that challenges that had appeared in the polity that required solutions were also handled as many state governments which had over time abandoned agriculture and now desired to get back to it, found such opportunities in the GIS. This was possible because these state governments contracted the services of GIS-trained agricultural scientists, agricultural economists, agricultural engineers, veterinarians, extension workers and many more professionals in the sector for use. An instance is in Zamfara state where a conglomerate of four firms in the agriculture sector, Hoe Farmers, Food and Frimea Trading had applied for 500 graduates and got approval for 250 interns who were primarily trained to provide extension services to farmers in their local governments of residence. In the words of the coordinator of the conglomerate, Abdulkadir Nasir “the GIS has provided a conventional window to get graduates that can be trained and motivated to take over the extension sub-sector and build a career along the agriculture value chain”

As added value to the prospects of personal business development, Haruna (2015) writes that the GIS interns were encouraged to take advantage of corporative investment ventures where they contributed ₦5000 monthly, out of their ₦30,000 stipend, to corporative account from where they could use funds to secure facilities from lending institutions and where the farmers, seeing the importance of the services provided, equally subscribed to the corporative for regular updates and queries, thus divesting government of the service eventually. He cited an instance where an intern, one Mahe Bala who studied Botany set up his catfish farm from the savings from stipends; while other interns branched out and took advantage of the financial inclusion policy of the government through mobile money and agent banking businesses.

#### **2.6.7 Community Services Women and Youths Employment Scheme (CSWYE)**

The CSWYE was a Social Safety Net (SSN), an arm of SURE-P domiciled in the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity to employ women and youth in labour-intensive community services. According to a publication by the Federal Ministry of Information in collaboration with SURE-P (2015), the key objectives of the scheme were:

- i. To provide temporary employment opportunities in community services for up to 185,00 unemployed and unskilled Nigerian women and youths from all the states of the federation and the FCT on an annual basis;
- ii. To ensure a direct socio-economic impact on the lives of the target population by consistently paying their monthly stipends of N10,000 per beneficiary for completed 5-hour work per day and 5 days per week, directly to their bank accounts;

- iii. To make a significant impact on the quality of the socio-economic environment in rural communities where the beneficiaries reside due to the services delivered by the beneficiaries; and
- iv. To renew the trust of beneficiaries and the general public, especially the poor masses in rural communities not often reached by governance, in government policies, programmes and projects.

**Pre-design Assessment:** The project cycle commenced with an assessment of all 36 states and FCT to understudy similar previous projects and learn from their experience. The assessment also served to obtain input from the stakeholders in a bottom-top approach to project design.

**Sensitization and awareness creation:** Communities were subsequently sensitized on the project design and objectives and their roles to ensure success by the project were clarified for each set of stakeholders.

**Services identification:** Communities select the services they required from the services menu. Community Services categories and menu fall under 7 sectors of the economy and include:

- i. **Health:** The rehabilitation of hospitals, primary health care centres and clinics with an emphasis on projects that involve the use of local labour. Projects can include improving buildings (painting, plumbing, electrical, new wings etc) or revamping equipment in the buildings (beds, chairs, etc);
- ii. **Education:** The rehabilitation of primary and secondary schools with a focus on the classrooms. Staff rooms, teacher's quarters (painting, electrical, roofs walls,



and floor), school sanitation and water infrastructure (toilet and plumbing) and repair of school furniture etc;

- iii. Water and Sanitation: Utilizing local labour in the construction of water supply projects particularly the sinking of boreholes and mini-water schemes to serve small communities. Jobs can also be provided through the construction and operation of public toilets across the country;
- iv. Environment: Building of new and maintenance of existing solid waste management facilities, landscaping of public spaces, building and maintaining culverts, gutters and drainages, planting of trees, planting and maintaining green parks; and solid waste management facilities including local incinerators hillside terracing;
- v. Water and Transport: Manual clearing of unwanted species on waterways;
- vi. Infrastructure construction and maintenance: Construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of all other critical infrastructure needed to stimulate the local economy e.g markets, market yards for animals, access and feeder routes, wooden pedestrian bridges, parking lots etc; and
- vii. Social Services: Community security, traffic Control, pupil truancy control etc.

### **Beneficiary Selection:**

Selection of beneficiaries was done by the communities, with the participation of Community leaders and Development Associations (CDAs) who are better placed to know the poor and qualified persons among them based on laid down criteria. Equity

was adopted in the distribution of numbers allocated to each state. Criteria for beneficiary selection were well defined to ensure focus on the target population. The following criteria guide the selection and mid-stream replacement of project beneficiaries:

- i. Must be a Nigerian;
- ii. Must come from a core poor household;
- iii. Must be in the age bracket of 18 to 35 years for men and 18 to 50 years for women;
- iv. Must have no other source of income;
- v. Must not have educational qualification above Senior Secondary School Certificate or its equivalents;
- vi. 30% (i.e. 1500 per state) to be reserved for women (to accommodate gender issues)
- vii. 20% (i.e. 1000 per state) to be reserved for other vulnerable persons including the physically challenged, widows, people living with HIV/AIDS, people living in border communities, and Albinos;
- viii. Must not select more than one beneficiary from one household at a time;
- ix. Selection must be done by the community members (leaders of various groups) who know the poor among them;
- x. All sectors of the society in each state must be carried along in the selection of beneficiaries; and
- xi. Replacement of an already selected beneficiary for any reason must follow the same process as the initial selection and with the approval of the Federal Project Implementation Unit (FPIU).

Application forms were completed by all intending beneficiaries. These forms were endorsed by the community leaders and LGA project officials who then forwarded same to the State Project Officers within two (2) days. The officers screened the completed forms for compliance to guidelines, listed the qualified recommended and forwarded same to the Project Bank and the Federal Project Implementation Unit for further documentations.

### **Beneficiary Registration and Bank Documentations:**

This was designed in such a way that the project bank takes the bio-data of each beneficiary to open individual bank accounts through which monthly stipends are paid directly to each person. The bank accounts are being linked to an integrated communication and identification system for enhanced transparency and accountability.

### **Beneficiaries Orientation:**

Pre-deployment orientation was conducted to explain the intent of the federal government on the project and expectations from beneficiaries and their communities. The re-orientation sessions followed defined contents and further served to tune the minds of beneficiaries towards achieving the set project objectives and to prepare them for efficient management of the stipends to make savings in preparation for life after exit from the project. From the onset, beneficiaries were guided on the choice of exit plan to ensure sustained economic self-reliance beyond their period of participation in the scheme.

**Beneficiary Deployment:** Beneficiaries were deployed to identify services in their communities. The idea was to eliminate the need to spend their stipend on transportation to service points. A group of 25 beneficiaries were placed under one (1)

supervisor democratically elected from among them. The Supervisors had responsibilities that included assignment of duties to beneficiaries, safekeeping of the tools and making daily attendance/time sheets for the beneficiaries. Overall supervision rested on the different stakeholders at different levels.

### **Time Sheet Reports and Stipend Payment:**

Supervisors recorded daily timesheet reports for each beneficiary, payment of stipends to the beneficiaries was based on the minimum number of hours individuals put into work. The supervisor maintained a register of attendance and active participation in assigned jobs daily and made weekly returns on beneficiaries' performance to the State Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) where information was entered into the payment schedules database. The payment schedule was submitted on the 25th day of each month at the latest, with clear records of the number of hours committed to work by each beneficiary and recommendations for payment. The Federal PIU reviewed the submission from each state and promptly mandated the project banks to make the payments. Beneficiaries were entitled to a monthly stipend of N10,000 each, for five (5) hours daily work for 5 days in a week or 20 days in a month. For work input below 20 days, the amount payable was pro-rated at the rate of N500 per day. However, attendance for less than 5 days in a month earned no stipend. In communities far from Banks, beneficiaries were given other payment options including mobile money options through GSM phones, while also serving as the medium of communication. Information on bank account details and GSM numbers as well as other personal data form part of the documentation at the point of beneficiary registration.

### **Beneficiary Exit:**

Each set of beneficiaries participated in the project for a period of up to one year during which they were expected to acquire enough experience and skills from the service, or elsewhere, to engage in other activities for economic self-sustenance thereafter. However, a beneficiary who got an alternative means of income could exit before the expiration of one year. Exit plans for beneficiaries included enterprise development and small business management. They were also assisted in identifying viable businesses in their localities for enterprise. These were delivered in the form of short training sessions and counselling. Before exiting, beneficiaries were given certificates of participation for recognition and enhanced prospects.

### **Partnership for Effectiveness & Sustainability**

The Inter-Ministerial Consultative Committee played an advisory role and also inputs in critical sections of the project e.g. integration of beneficiary exit strategy in the Ministry's, Department's or Agency (MDA's) programme, and sourcing for special funds for project sustainability.

Respective state and local governments were encouraged to partner with the project at those levels. Such partnerships created enabling peaceful environment for the project implementation and also provided frameworks for ownership and sustainability beyond federal government sponsorship.

Opinion Leaders, Traditional Rules, Community Development Associations and Civil Society Organizations played different roles in the project process, ranging from advocacy to monitoring and evaluation.

The CSWYE project operated within government policy on Public-Private Partnership. The six leading banks in the country viz: Access, FCMB, First, UBA, Unity, and Zenith Banks served as the project banks, each assigned to one geopolitical Zone, for the payment of beneficiary stipends and management of the project account at that level; while the four key Telecom Service providers, namely Airtel, Etisalat, Globacom and MTN worked with the project on integrated beneficiary identification, communication, and e-payment system, with empowerment content for the beneficiaries that lasted beyond their participation in the project.

**Crisis Management:** The project was operated with the guidance of established templates and also within the provisions of relevant extant government rules and regulations. These principles were designed to eliminate crisis to the barest minimum. However, the resolution of any emanating crisis followed an established channel that ran from bottom to top, with stakeholders playing reconciliation and mediatory roles as the case may be.

### **Key Achievements**

#### **Employment Creation:**

- (i) 123,049 jobs were created under the project nationwide;
- (ii) 3,699 beneficiaries voluntarily exited the project in different states;
- (iii) 118,984 beneficiaries participated in the project comprising 75,718 males (63.64%); 43,266 females (36.36%);
- (iv) Among these figures are 5,122 (5,122) (5%) other vulnerable persons (PLWD, people in border communities, etc).

### **Economic Empowerment:**

- (i) The sum of N15,745,756,718 was paid as monthly stipends to beneficiaries from February 2013.
- (ii) The sum of N1,567,424,000 was paid to the 36 states and the FCT and project running/management cost between January 2013 and June 2014;
- (iii) Beneficiaries resided in rural communities where they rendered services and spent their stipends, economic growth of rural communities was thus boosted.

### **Community Service Delivery:**

There were 8,868 service points under the project, spread across 11,139 communities, in the 774 LGAs in the country.

The service types cut across the following key sectors: Social, Health, Education, Water and Sanitation, Environment Conservation and Beautification, and Infrastructure Maintenance and Construction

### **Rural Development:**

Services delivered by beneficiaries contributed to rural development by improving the quality of infrastructure

A recent pilot survey on community impact by the project in the six geopolitical zones gave the following results:

- (a) Awareness about the project – 96.3%,
  - (b) Preferred service type – Sanitation (64.7%),
  - (c) Degree of usefulness to the community – 92.8%,
  - (d) Highest form of usefulness – improved community sanitation (30.8%),
  - (e) Measure of positive impact on lives of beneficiaries – 89.6%.
- Specific benefits to beneficiaries:

- (i) Gainfully employed – 30.2%,
- (ii) Improved self and family welfare – 29.5%,
- (iii) Now useful to the village – 20.2%,
- (iv) Desire for the project to continue – 91.2% (SURE-P CSWYE, 2015).

**Entrepreneurship Development:** This was an integral part of the project processes to ensure that the beneficiaries exited the project with alternative reliable sources of income to avoid relapse into worse economic situation. Some of the measures include:

- i Opening of individual bank accounts of the beneficiaries who were largely among the unbanked segment of the society before their engagement on the project, thereby widening their prospects for profitable interaction with the banks beyond the project life;
- ii Pre-deployment orientation of the beneficiaries had financial prudence and savings as part of the contents;
- iii Beneficiaries worked for a maximum of 5 hours a day and were encouraged to use part of the remaining hours of the day to engage in learning some skills of their choice;
- iv A total of 925 beneficiaries (25 from each state) were trained for two weeks on different skills in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Youth Development. Each of them was thereafter given a starter package in the amount of N150,000.00 (One hundred and fifty thousand Naira) to establish the trade.
- v A nationwide training of all the beneficiaries on telecom enterprises and mobile money services was carried out. The training was done in collaboration with the 6 project banks (Access, FCMB, First, UBA, Unity, and Zenith) and the Telecom Companies, with Airtel Nig. Plc on the lead. The training was



conducted in indigenous languages and was supported by simplified documentation business tips.

- vi A recent community impact assessment revealed that 61.3% of the respondents confirmed that the beneficiaries in their communities invested their savings from their monthly stipends wisely.
- vii Practically all the states of the federation had several success stories of beneficiaries being transformed from job seekers to employers of labour through a successful investment of savings from their monthly stipend.

#### **2.6.8 Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET)**

SURE-P TVET was also domiciled at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity. The Sub-Committee on TVET was headed by a convener, Comrade Peter Esele who provided oversight for the implementation of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) which had responsibility for day to day management of the project.

##### **Mandate/Objective of TVET**

While the broad mandate of TVET PIU was to reduce unemployment and poverty in Nigeria through the development of skills, building institutional capacity and investing in technical/vocational educational training infrastructure, its specific objectives, according to SURE-P TVET (2015) were;

- (a) To facilitate short, medium and long time technical vocational training
- (b) To improve the employability of both the unemployed and the underemployed
- (c) To facilitate employment of vulnerable groups
- (d) To facilitate entrepreneurship training
- (e) To promote cooperative models of enterprises

- (f) To upgrade the existing training centre, as well as build new ones

### Implementation Framework

To ensure effective delivery and wider participation in the programme, the PIU enlisted the collaboration of some numbers of private and public sector organizations whose original mandate could impact passively on the outcome of the programme. See the list in Table 2.1:

Table 2.1: List of Institutional Partners and Areas of Collaboration

S/N	Organisations	Areas of Collaboration
1	Federal Ministry of Labour & Productivity	Provision of Administrative Platform for the PIU
2	National Directorate of Employment (NDE)	Provision of Training centers and oversight citizen based training
3	Federal Ministry of Works	Provision of training centers and actual training in relevant highway maintenance trades
4.	International Labour Organization (ILO)	Provision of capacity building for Labour based method of rural infrastructural development
5	Federal Ministry of Education	Provision of Training Centers
6	Federal Min. of Lands and Housing	Provision of training center and training of housing related trades
7	Kaduna Polytechnic (KADPOLY)	Provision of capacity building for borehole maintenances, rig, etc
8	National Power Training Institute of Nigeria (NAPTIN)	Capacity building for power generation, transmission and generation
9	Industrial Training Fund (ITF)	Provision of training Centers for training of beneficiaries
10	Nat. Board for Technical Education	Curriculum Review and certification

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11	Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC)	Capacity building for rail track Maintenances
12	British Council	Support for capacity building in creative industry
13	NIMASSA	Capacity Building in Maritime Industry
14	Federal Ministry of Agriculture	Skills training for graduate irrigation
15	Ajaokuta Steel Company	Capacity building in Steel Industry
16	Julius Berger	Artisan training in road/building Construction
17	Root & Tuber Agric Training	Capacity Building in crop farming
18	Livestock Training Center zaria	Capacity in livestock farming
19	University of Agriculture, Umudike	Capacity in Agro-Biz
20	Bank of Industry	Enterprise Development and Funding
21	Bank of Agriculture	Funding for Agro-Biz
22	NEXIM Bank	Training for export products
23	UNN/RFID Centre of African University of Science and Technology	

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Source: SURE-P TVET (2015)

Technical Vocational Education and Training Project offered two (2) broad categories of capacity building i.e. enhancement of training infrastructure as well as, actual Training Skill Acquisition. The enhancement of training infrastructure entailed rehabilitation of existing government-owned technical/vocational training centres; construction of new technical/vocational training centres and; retooling/equipping of training workshops within training centres.

## Training and skill acquisition

There were two categories of Skills Acquisition:

- (a) Client-Based Training:** This involved capacity building for beneficiary institutions desirous of improving the capacity of their potential actual workforce. Several institutions that showed interest had been enlisted for the client-based training programme as shown in the list in Table 2.2 below. However, many institutions that met the required criteria for the programme were to be considered by the PIU.

Table 2.2: Clients and the Areas of Skill Demands

S/N	Client	Areas of Trainee Skill Demand
1	States Ministry of Works	Zonal coordinators, supervisors and Technicians for general rural road and Infrastructural Development
2	Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC)	Zonal coordinators, supervisors and gang men for railway surveillance maintenance
3	Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing & Urban Development	Artisanship in Mass Housing
4	National Power Training Institute of	Graduate training in power generation, transmission and distribution for fresh graduates in Mechanical and Electrical Engineering
5	Federal Ministry of Culture	Hospitality and Tourism
6	Federal Ministry of Agriculture	Graduate agribusiness scheme
7	Nigerian Maritime Administration	Marine and shipping

**Source:** SURE-P TVET (2015)

## Training and Skill Acquisition

- (a) **Citizen-Based Training:** Under this training scheme, courses were offered to school leavers and graduates of different institutions of learning seeking knowledge of technical and vocational skills for them to earn wages and be self-employed with time, thereby depopulating the teeming number of young Nigerians in search of white collar jobs. The table below presents different trades offered under the citizen-based training.

Table 2.3: List of Trade Offered and Industry Area

S/N	Industry Areas	Specific Trades
1	ICT -Hardware & Software Engineering	Database Administrator, Programmer, Web Designer, IT Security, Training Consultant
2	Telecommunications	VOIP VSAT, Spectrum Management, Wireless
3	Creative Art	Fashion Design, Music, Video Production, Graphic Art, Choreography, Cinematography, Directing, Set Design, Editing, Script Writing, Music Studio Production, Film & TV Production, Photography, Costume & make UP
4	Leather works	Footwear & Leather Making
5	Shipping	Cargo Handling and Storage, Ship Safety Officer, Celestial navigation for Ocean Endorsement
6	Hospitality	Catering & Baking, Hotel Management, Management and Planning, Tourism Management
7	Oil & Gas	Drilling Engineering, Instrumentation & Control, well head services, Non Destructive Testing
8	Automobile	Auto Maintenance, Auto Spraying & Painting, Welding and Panel beating
9	Maritime/Shipping	Sea Farer, Deck Rating Officer, Crane & Lifting, Equipment Operation, Quarter Master, structural Welding, Marine Diesel Engine

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		mechanic, Boat Building maintenance & Operation, Motor Man, Efficient Deck Hand
10	Agriculture / Agro-Biz:	Poultry, Livestock, Crop Production, Horticulture, Agriculture Food Processing
11	Mass Housing/ Construction Artisan	Draughtsmanship, Mansory, Tilling, Carpentry, woodwork, Plumbing & Pipe Fitting, POP Making, Electrical Installation & maintenance, Metal/Aluminium Works, AIC & Refrigerator Installation & maintenance, Heavy Duty Equipment Operation & Maintenance

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**Source:** SURE-P TVET (2015)

### **Entrepreneurship Training**

This was another interesting and beneficial area of training which focused on offering Basic Business Entrepreneurship training for school leavers and graduates who for whatever reason had not gone through any of the other training programmes and now wanted to start their businesses.

### **Cooperative Business Platform**

This scheme was targeted at semi-skilled artisans who benefited from business enterprises in cooperative clusters/trade such as auto-works, Mass Housing, and Agriculture.

### **Train-the-Trainer**

The (TVET) PIU had a robust framework for ensuring proper training programmes for trainers of different skills and vocations to upscale their existing skills for prompt transfer of knowledge to trainee beneficiaries. Towards the realization of its objectives, the Project Implementation Unit completed the rehabilitation and the commissioning of the under-listed skills acquisition centres across the federation:

- i. Federal Ministry of Works, Highway Training Centre, Ijora Lagos State,

- ii. Ministry of Lands And Housing Training Centre, Yaba Lagos,
- iii. National Directorate of Employment (NDE) Training Centre, Aba, Abia State,
- iv. National Power Training Institute of Nigeria (NAPTIN) Oji, Enugu State,
- v. Federal Ministry of Works Highway Training Centre, Kaduna, Kaduna State,
- vi. Industrial Training Fund, Centre of Excellence, Bukuru, Jos, Plateau State,
- vii. Federal Ministry of Works, Highway Training Centre, Ugoneki, Edo State,
- viii. Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity Skills Acquisition Centre, Bauchi, Bauchi State.

The Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) project of SURE-P, therefore facilitated wealth creation and job generation through investment in free technical vocational training for Nigerian youths in diverse vocational training programmes involving the following:

- (a) Up-skilling programme for the construction/housing sector in collaboration with the National Institute of Building. (1000 Beneficiary)
- (b) ICT-Based enterprise development and promotion programme for unemployed Nigerian youths in collaboration with the Galaxy Back Bone Plc. (1000 Beneficiary)
- (c) Skills development programme for young Nigerian University/Polytechnic graduates of Electrical/Mechanical Engineering in collaboration with the National Power Training Institute of Nigeria (NAPTIN) (220 Beneficiary)
- (d) Up-skilling programme for semi-skilled Nigerian Autoworkers in collaboration with the National Automotive Council. (1000 Beneficiary)
- (e) Technical training for Railway Technicians for the maintenance of the Lagos-Kano Rail line. (1805 Beneficiary)

### 2.6.9 SURE-P and Maternal and Child Health (MCH)

Although the scope of the thesis does not include a comprehensive evaluation of SURE-P intervention in the health sector, this sector is of importance to the extent of the supply side of the component which is in the area of employment of health workers under SURE-P across the country.

In a general sense, the SURE-P Maternal and Child Health Component had the following objectives:

- (a) Increase the availability of skilled health workers to provide maternal and child health services at the primary health care (PHC) level;
- (b) Provide visible infrastructural renovations to primary health care centres under the SURE-P MCH project;
- (c) Increase supply of essential commodities at PHC facilities to improve service delivery; and
- (d) Increase the demand for MCH services in rural communities through the use of conditional cash transfer (CCT) and community engagement at the grassroots.

SURE-P MCH therefore had two main components:

**The Supply Side** – involved increasing and improving both infrastructure and human resources to health service delivery at the primary health care level. In specific terms, this component was to refurbish PHC infrastructure, scale up the number of trained health workers i.e. midwives, community health extension workers (CHEWs) and village health workers (VHWs) to guarantee adequate antenatal attendance, skilled delivery at birth, routine immunization and postnatal care for women and their babies;



**The Demand Side** – aimed to increase the utilization of maternal and child services in the PHC facilities through the use of incentives such as conditional cash transfer (CCT) after the fulfilment of prescribed responsibilities (SURE-P MCH Project, 2015).

According to Bello-Malabu (2013), for the enrolment and orientation of Midwives and Community Health Extension Workers (CHEWs), the exercise aimed to recruit 2000 Midwives and 2000 CHEWs. At the end of the exercise, 1168 Midwives and 2188 CHEWs were recruited in all 6 geopolitical zones. For these Human Resources, an expenditure of N209,257,229.76 was made. This included the screening, recruitment, orientation and deployment exercise in 6 zonal centres: Bauchi, Benin, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna and Minna. The total MCH budget in 2012 was N15.9 billion. At the end of 2012, only a total of N3.8 billion was disbursed for the activities that were carried out. The SURE-P MCH ‘health worker model’ requires 4 Midwives, 2 CHEWs and 6 VHWs to be present at the SURE-P PHC facilities.

Contracts for the award of drugs and equipment for all the facilities had been completed and awarded to the qualified bidders by the PIU, to equip them and enhance performance on the project. All these were uniformly supplied to all 500 SURE-P-supported PHC facilities. A total of N810,500,000.00 was committed to this endeavour (SURE-P Annual Report, 2012). These facilities are located in rural and underserved communities, spread across the six (6) geopolitical zones of the country and involving an estimated 600 Local Government Areas (LGA). The selection of communities and LGAs to benefit from the Project is based on set criteria as defined within the SURE-P MCH Project (2015).

Writing on the achievements of SURE-P in the Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Programme, Nwosu and Ugwuera (2014) point to the fact that the total number of health care workers recruited as of July 2013, stood at 6,630 and they were deployed to provide quality antenatal, skilled birth delivery at birth and post-natal services for previously underserved rural, poor women accessing maternal, neonatal and child health services in 500 SURE-P supported primary health care (PHC) centres spread across the 36 states and FCT. These healthcare workers comprised: 1,304 midwives; 254 community health extension workers (CHEWs); and 3,072 female village health workers (VHWs) cut across the six geo-political zones of the country.

Concerning the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), Ogbobo (2014) declares that SURE-P had successfully launched Pilot Programmes in Dei-Dei Comprehensive Health Centre, Bwari Area Council, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory. In 5 Primary Health Care (PHC) Centres in FCT, as of 30th June 2013, a total of 2,150 beneficiaries had been enrolled on the programme as follows:

- (e) Dei-Dei Comprehensive Health Centre: 670 beneficiaries
- (f) Old Dei-Dei Health Post: 200 beneficiaries
- (g) Byazhin Health Centre: 272 beneficiaries
- (h) Dutse Alhaji Health Centre: 449 beneficiaries
- (i) Kuje Health Centre: 559 beneficiaries

Summary of the achievements of SURE-P in the MCH sector are as follows:

- (a) Total number of Primary Health Care facilities supported by SURE-P MCH across the 36 states and FCT = 1000.

- (b) Total number of health Workers employed and deployed to health facilities = 12, 110, Midwives = 3158, Community Health Extension Workers = 3123 and Village Health Workers = 5829
- (c) Medical Equipment and Maternal and Child Health drugs supplied to the 1000 facilities
- (d) Mama Kits supplied = 680,000, Midwifery Kits supplied = 2000, Outreach Kits supplied = 1000 and Village Health Worker Kits supplied = 3000
- (e) Supplied 80 motor ambulances and 10 boat ambulances to states to support a robust Referral Services System.
- (f) 500 primary health care facilities renovated, 625 boreholes installed and 145 units of midwives accommodation built across the 36 states and FCT.
- (g) Total number of women beneficiaries from the conditional cash transfer = 49,708
- (h) Total amount of cash paid out to these women = N90,000,000.00 (SURE-P MCH Project, 2015).

#### **2.6.10 Public Mass Transit Revolving Fund Scheme**

Under the Public Mass Transit Revolving Fund Scheme, the SURE-P Annual Report, (2012) documents that SURE-P disbursed a total of N9, 137,375,155.00 as a loan by the Infrastructure Bank to purchase 809 buses distributed to all the geo-political zones in the country in the following ratio: 52 – South East, 10 - South South, 20 - South West, 15 - North East, 245-FCT, 34 - North West, 320 - Nationwide, 13 - North Central and 100 – Lagos. (See Appendix 2 for a Summary of the Mass Transit Revolving Fund Scheme).

**2.6.11 SURE-P Roads and Bridges:** The programme involved the construction and rehabilitation of 21 projects on roads and bridges. These national highways straddled

all six geopolitical zones in the country. The SURE-P Committee was mandated to intervene on the most critical federal roads that had become hot topics due to the bad state they were in, and because of the needless loss of lives and property along these roads. The most prominent of these roads include the Abuja – Abaji – Lokoja highway, Benin – Ore – Shagamu Expressway, Lagos – Shagamu – Ibadan Expressway, and Onitsha – Enugu – Port Harcourt Expressway.

To ensure speedy but quality completion of these roads, most of them were divided into sections or phases and awarded to different reputable contractors. On completion, the projects were expected to deliver the following benefits to Nigerians:

- (a) Enhanced transportation of passengers and goods in the country;
- (b) Enhanced economic activities and social integration;
- (c) Creation of job opportunities for professionals, artisans and workmen; and
- (d) Improved road safety and reduction of road accidents and fatalities.

### **Project-by-Project Description of Interventions on Roads and Bridges**

#### **Daulization of the Abuja – Abaji – Lokoja Road**

Abuja-Abaji-Lokoja Road is easily one of the busiest roads in Nigeria. Before SURE-P's intervention, it was a one-lane highway, repeatedly failing in many sections, and a death trap to those who drove on it. Many lives were lost each year on the road. The death arose from accidents on failed sections, single lane status, and driver error. To assure speedy completion, the road was divided into four sections, each of which has been awarded to a different contractor:

##### **1. Section I: International Airport Link Road – Sheda Junction (FCT)**

This 42-kilometer road stretches from International Airport Link Rd Junction to Sheda Village Junction. The contractor was Dantata & Sawoe Construction Co. Ltd.

Its new carriageway comprised a wearing course, binder course, drains and culverts while the existing carriageway was rehabilitated the same way. The project also involved bridgeworks. At the time SURE-P was scrapped, it was 78.29% completed.

## **2. Section II: Sheda Junction-Abaji Road (FCT)**

The 52.55km section begins from Sheda Village Junction and stretches to Abaji. The contractor was Reynolds Construction Co. Ltd. The project involved the construction of wearing courses, binders, drains, culverts and bridges both for new and existing carriageways. The bridgeworks had been completed while the overall completion rate as of the end of SURE-P was 99.09% - almost completed.

## **3. Section III: Abaji (FCT) – Kotonkarfe (Kogi)**

This section of the project stretches from Abaji (FCT) to Kotonkarfe (Kogi State). It is a 49.36km road and the contractor is Bulletin Construction Co. Ltd. The contract was for the construction of a new carriageway as well as the rehabilitation of the old one. It involved a wearing course, binders, lined drains, bridge works, and culverts. The overall completion rate for this stretch at the end of SURE-P was 48.08%.

## **4. Section IV: Kotonkarfi – Lokoja Road (Kogi)**

The contract for the construction of the Kotonkarfi to Lokoja stretch (50 km) was awarded to Gitto Construzioni Generali Nig. Ltd. As with the other contracts, this involves the construction of a new carriageway and the rehabilitation of the old one. Apart from wearing and binding courses, other works on the project included bridges, lined drains and culverts. The project was 40.45% completed at the end of SURE-P.

## **The Dualised Kano – Maiduguri Road (Section I)**

This is one of the longest road stretches in Nigeria. It is also a dangerous road, both in terms of robbers who operate from there and the many accidents that are usually recorded each day. Recently, it even became more dangerous following the insecurity situation that developed in the North East part of the country. The road was divided into five (5) sections and awarded to different reputable contractors to ensure speedy completion. Considering the security situation in this area, it is noteworthy that work had progressed well in four of the sections.

### **1. Section I: Kano – Wudil – Shuwarin (Jigawa)**

This is a 101.37km stretch. The contract for dualisation of this road was awarded to Messrs Dantata & Sawoe Construction Co. Ltd and entails carriageway construction, drains, culverts, 3 river bridges and 2 interchanges on the new carriageway. There are also drains, culverts, bridges and wearing and binder courses being constructed on the existing carriageway, the project was 44.08% completed at the end of SURE-P.

### **2. Section II: From Shuwarin (Jigawa) – Azare (Bauchi)**

This 141.78 kilometer stretch of road was awarded to Setraco Nigeria Ltd. It involves the construction of a new carriageway, rehabilitation of the existing carriageway, 100.13km culverts, 2 river bridges and one interchange. Overall completion rate for the project at the end of SURE-P was 43.79%.

### **3. Section III: From Azara – Potiskum**

This section of the road is 104.37 kilometers. It was awarded to Mothercat Nig. Ltd and involved the construction of binder, wearing courses, bridge works, drains and culverts on its new carriageway. Rehabilitation of the existing carriageway involved

the construction of binders, wearing course, bridge works, drains and culvers. The project is 68.21% completed at the end of SURE-P.

#### **4. Section III: from Potiskum – Damaturu (Yobe State).**

This section is the second most challenging project because of the security situation in the North East. The distance covered is 105km and the contractor handling it was Messrs CGC Nigeria Ltd. It involved the construction of wearing courses, binders, bridges, lined drains and culvers in the new as well as the existing carriageway. at the end of SURE-P, the project was 46.95% completed.

#### **5. Section V: From Damaturu (Yobe) – Maiduguri (Borno)**

This is easily the most challenging section of the road to construct at the moment because of the insecurity situation in the North East. This 145.11km project was awarded to China Civil Engineering Construction Co. Ltd. At the end of SURE-P, it had been 29.36 per cent completed.

### **Reconstruction of the Benin – Ore – Shagamu Road**

The bad state of the Benin – Shagamu Expressway had been a hot topic in the news for a long time until SURE-P came on the scene. Today, it is a different story on the road, with the near completion of the reconstruction of the sections of the road in Edo and Ondo State. The project was awarded in phases to the same contractor.

#### **1. Phase I: From Ofosu (Edo) – Ajebandele (Ondo State)**

This entailed the reconstruction and asphalt overlay of the Benin-Shagamu expressway, between Ofosu in Edo State and Ajebandele in Ondo State.

The contractor was Reynolds Construction Co. Ltd. The project was almost completed. (Overall completion was 96.00).

## **2. Phase II: Benin – Ofosu Stretch (Edo State)**

This also involved the reconstruction and asphalt overlay of the Benin-Shagamu dual carriageway from Benin City of Ofosu. The contractor was Reynolds Construction Co. Ltd. The project was 96.00% completed at the end of SURE-P.

## **3. Phase III: Outstanding Sections**

The third and final phase of work involved the reconstruction of the outstanding sections of Benin – Ofosu – Ore – Ajebandele – Shagamu Expressway. Reynolds Construction Co. Ltd was also handling this 86.7km stretch. The project comprised a binder course, macadam, and drains. Overall completion rate was 44.66%

## **Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Expansion of Lagos – Ibadan Road**

There had also been public outcry over the poor state of the Lagos – Ibadan expressway. The SURE-P Committee had embarked on the rehabilitation, reconstruction and expansion work on this dual carriageway. The road was divided into two (2) sections and awarded to two reputable contractors. The project had delays following efforts to resolve fallouts from the concession that was granted to a private concern.

### **1. Section I Lagos – Shagamu Stretch**

Contract for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and expansion work on the Lagos to Shagamu stretch of the Lagos – Ibadan dual carriageway was awarded to Julius Berger Nig. Ltd. The project is only 9.90% completed at the end of SURE-P.



## **2. Section II: Shagamu – Ibadan Stretch**

This project was the rehabilitation, reconstruction and expansion work on the Shagamu to Ibadan section of the Lagos – Ibadan dual carriageway. The contract was awarded to Reynolds Construction Co. Ltd. As at the end of SURE-P, its overall completion rate was 7.42%

## **Rehabilitation of the Onitsha – Enugu – Port Harcourt Road**

### **1. Section I (Phase I): Anambra State**

This project was the rehabilitation of the Enugu-bound carriageway of Onitsha-Enugu Road in Anambra State. It is a 49km stretch of road that was awarded to CC Construction Ltd. It involved the reconstruction of the wearing course, binder course, drains and culvers. The project was 76.48% completed at the end of SURE-P.

### **2. Section I (Phase II): Anambra State**

The second phase of this section for the rehabilitation of the Onitsha bound carriageway of Onitsha-Enugu Road was handled by Messrs CC Construction Ltd. It involved the reconstruction of a wearing course, binder course, and lined drains. The project was 62.18% completed as at the end of SURE-P.

### **3. Section II: Anambra – Enugu Border**

The rehabilitation of Onitsha-Enugu dual carriageway, Section II begins from the Anambra State border and terminates at Enugu State capital city. This 56km road contract was awarded to NigerCat Co. Ltd. The project was 45% completed.

## **Rehabilitation of Enugu – Port Harcourt Road**

### **1. Section I: From Lokpanta – Umuahia Tower**

Contract for the rehabilitation and construction of the 59.5km Lokpanta-Umuahia Tower section of the Enugu – Port Harcourt Expressway was awarded to Setraco Nigeria Ltd. It involved the provision of a wearing course, binders, and lined drains. The project was 8.02% completed at the end of SURE-P.

### **2. Section II: From Umuahia Tower – Tower – Aba Tower**

This section stretches from the Umuahia Tower to the Aba Tower Rail/Road Bridge Crossing in Abia State. It measures 56.1km and the contract for its rehabilitation and construction was awarded to Arab Contractors O.A.O. Nig Ltd. It was 3.59% completed.

## **Rehabilitation of the Calabar to Katsina Ala Road**

### **1. Section I: Calabar-Ugep in Cross River State**

Section I is the rehabilitation of Calabar-Ugep-Ogoja-Katsina Ala Road. It begins from Calabar and ends at Ugep, all in Cross River State. The road is 51km long. The contractor was Piccolo Brunelli Engineering Ltd, who got the initial contract in 2009. The first phase of the project was for the rehabilitation of failed sections of the road. Government wanted continuity on the road rehabilitation, hence a second contract was awarded to the same contractor for full rehabilitation, who achieved 52.69% completion at the end of SURE-P.

## **2. Section II: From Ugep (Cross River) – Katsina-Ala (Benue State)**

The contract for the rehabilitation of the Ugep to Katsina Ala section was awarded to Messrs CCECC Nigeria Limited in 2009. The contractor had only achieved 59.19% project completion on this 53km highway before the SURE-P intervention.

### **Construction of New Bridges**

#### **1. Construction of Oju/Loko – Oweto Bridge Over River Benue**

This 2-kilometre bridge links Benue and Nassarawa States. The contract was awarded in 2011 with a completion period set for November 2015. The contractor was Reynolds Construction Company Ltd. The project was 60.25% completed in terms of excavation and pilling, substructure and superstructure.

#### **2. Construction of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Niger Bridge at Onitsha – Asaba**

The bridge is the major gateway between the East and West of Nigeria and connects the commercial city of Onitsha with Asaba, the Delta State Capital. The Early Works Phase I comprising survey works, morpho-dynamic study, soil investigations, etc., was completed and the bridge design and cost were finalized. Construction of the Bridge which is 1.5km long was awarded to the Julius Berger-AIIM Consortium, through a public-private partnership arrangement. That is where this project was at the end of SURE-P.

### **Special Presidential Intervention Projects**

#### **1. Rehabilitation of 9<sup>th</sup> Mile-Otukpo-Makurdi Road, Oturpo Section**

SURE-P rehabilitated the Otukpa to Otukpo Section of the 9<sup>th</sup> Mile to Makurdi Road. The contract for the rehabilitation of this 64km stretch of road was awarded to Rockbridge Construction Company Ltd. The project achieved 48.00% completion.

## **2. Dualization of Suleja-Minna Road in Niger State**

The contract for the dualisation of the Suleja-Minna road was awarded to Messrs Salini Nigeria Limited. The road is 40 kilometres long. The contractor has reported 55.56% completion at the end of SURE-P.

## **3. Rehabilitation of Ningi-Yadagunganme-Fuska-Mata Road in Bauchi State**

The government awarded the contract for the rehabilitation of the 27-kilometre Ningi-Yadagunganme-Fuska-Mata Road in Bauchi State to Moulds Nig. Ltd in 2009. The contract was reviewed and was 99.05% completed at the end of SURE-P.

## **4. Rehabilitation of Section 1A Sokoto-Tambuwal-Jega-Kontagora - Makera Road, Phase I**

This 99.94km road traverses Sokoto, Kebbi and Niger States. The contract for its rehabilitation was awarded to Triacta Nigeria in 2013 and its completion date was April 2017. The project was 27.73% completed as at the end of SURE-P.

## **5. Construction of Kaduna Eastern Bypass Road Project**

The contract for the construction of the 58.52km road project was awarded to Eksiogullari Construction Nigeria Ltd in 2002, with the completion date set for July 2013. At the end of SURE-P, 62.78% of the work had been completed.

## **6. Rehabilitation of Pambeguwa-Saminaka-Jos Road Section II**

The 25.96km Pambeguwa-Saminaka-Jos traverses Kaduna and Plateau States. The contract for its rehabilitation was awarded to Messrs PW Nig. Ltd in 2009 with a completion date set for November 2010. As at the end of SURE-P, the contractor had reported 93.00% work completion including wearing course, binder course, works on shoulder base course and surface dressing.

## **7. Construction of Utor Bridge along Asaba-Ebu-Uromi Road in Delta State**

Contract for the construction of the Uto Bridge along the Asaba – Uromi Road in Delta State was awarded to Inter-Bau Construction Ltd in 2008. As of July 2014, it was 72.17% completed with earthworks, stonebase, wearing course, and bridge works which include piles and caps, cross beams, abutment walls, and wing walls.

## **8. Rehabilitation of Apapa-Oshodi Expressway in Lagos State**

The Apapa Oshodi expressway is an important commercial highway linking Lagos and the Apapa Ports to the rest of Nigeria. SURE-P intervened to rehabilitate this highway which was awarded in 2010. The contractor is Julius Berger Nigeria Ltd.

## **9. Rehabilitation of Lagos – Abeokuta Expressway**

SURE-P was intervening in the rehabilitation of this road project which was awarded to Julius Berger but work stopped on site due to paucity of funds.

## **10. Dualization of East-West Road (Section i - iv)**

The East-West Road project was conceived within the Niger Delta Component of SURE-P. However, before the intervention by SURE-P, Section (i) of the East-West Road had an 87km contract awarded in 2003 with a 52.21% rate of completion. SURE-P took the construction work to 66.52% completion before it was scrapped.

In Section (ii-i) involving 101 km, the percentage completion before SURE-P was 23.17 % while SURE-P took the job to 28.92% completion; in Section (ii-ii), the level of work was 18.21% while the project progressed to 27.31% after SURE-P intervention; in Section (iii) involving 99km, SURE-P intervention saw the project to a completion level of 86.81% from its initial 73.44% level; and in Section (iv) involving 51km, the SURE-P intervention increased the job done to 58.45%, from its initial 53.55% level before SURE-P intervention.

It is worth noting that SURE-P did not limit itself to the aforementioned projects under its roads and bridges component but that in addition, 7,179 youths were not only mobilized but were also engaged, trained and retained by the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA), under SURE-P for aggressive maintenance of the 22,500km of roads and 80 bridges of different lengths maintained by the Agency across the country (SURE-P Roads and Bridges, 2015).

#### **2.6.12 SURE-P Railway Projects**

Reporting on one of the salient achievements of SURE-P in the railway sector, Tunji (2015) wrote that The Chairman of SURE-P, Martin Luther Agwai (Gen Rtd) said that the Nigerian Government's decision to revamp the nation's erstwhile moribund railway system was purposed at repositioning the sector for sustainable development. This was at the flagging off ceremony of the Gombe – Kafanchan – Port Harcourt and the Gombe – Kafanchan – Kaduna Inter – City Train Services in Gombe, Martin Luther Agwai noted that SURE-P's intervention in the sector from 2012 to date has gulped over N73b (Seventy-Three Billion Naira) for both rehabilitation and modernization works on the Western, Eastern and Idu – Kaduna lines. He added that the steps so far taken are in line with the Goodluck Jonathan Administration's Transportation Master Plan and move toward the realization of the Vision. (See Appendix 3 for the spread of Railroad Projects across the Country).

### **2.7 Implementation of Sure-P at the State and Local Government Levels**

As mentioned earlier, the Federal Government receives 41 per cent of the subsidy savings while the state and local governments share 54 per cent. But whereas it has been somewhat easy to trace the expenditure outlay of the Federal Government's utilization of the funds, those of the States and Local Governments are, at best,

somewhat sketchy during the period of analysis, the local Government's share being mired in grave controversies akin to the peculiarities of the State/Local government Joint Account system where funds meant for the Local Government must need to pass through the State Government. This is so because most States are yet to publish the list of intervention programmes or projects where the SURE-P funds have been utilized.

Although all the States have so far set up their version of the Implementation Committee, the disbursements of the funds have not been transparently done. This much was decried by the national committee when it accused States and Local Governments of keeping sealed lips over monthly allocations from the SURE-P fund. Afunke (2013) reported that the Chairman of SURE-P Sub-Committee on Public Transportation, Mr. Ola Chike while speaking on a Yoruba programme on Faaji FM 106.5 Lagos, revealed that though the states and local government had received their share of the money up to date (each third tier not receiving less than N10 million every month), they had not spent the allocations to the benefit of their people.

In another instance, Eroke (2013) reported that workers in the construction industry under the umbrella of the National Union of Civil Engineering, Construction, Furniture and Wood Workers (NUCECFWW) recently lamented that despite the huge funds allocated to the states and Local Governments, the states' owned roads are still in deplorable conditions, adding that government in affected states have refused to embark on new capital projects that can boost the infrastructure development and growth of their states.

The meddlesomeness of State Governors in managing the SURE-P funds for the state has raised so much concern that the House of Representatives, on November 16, 2012, while ordering an investigation into the implementation of SURE-P, noted that the implementation of the programme in the States and Local Governments was at zero level, as “there are no systems and mechanisms in place to ensure that the amounts that accrued to them are judiciously administered, Ameh (2012). To give a fillip to the gravity of this, an editorial comment of the National Mirror (2014) observed that “once the FG takes its share of SURE-P funds, the others are passed to the states where governors use the money mostly to buy commercial vehicles and tricycles to pacify their grumbling thugs, cronies and a handful of their stubborn political foes and thereafter gloat about having empowered the poor”.

## **2.8 Impediments against the Successful Implementation of SURE-P**

According to the SURE-P Annual Report, depending on the component level of operation, issues that tended to slow down the pace of implementation of SURE-P, apart from the untimely release of funds to fast-track projects implementation include but are not limited to the following: the health-related sector- many of the Health Facilities were of very low standards and lacked the necessary equipment required for MCH related issues; Shortage of Midwives accommodation in the States; Low literacy level of the participants; Discrepancies in the list of Midwives and CHEWs submitted; Shortage of information technology equipment for biodata capturing; Low response of Midwives in the Northern zones than in the South; Midwives rejecting deployment to the Northern states, especially in the North-West and North-East zones, e.g. Yobe State has only 1 Midwife compared to the expected recommended number of 32 per state.



There were high concerns about security in the Northern region; there was an issue concerning gender imbalance in the committees due to lack of awareness and religious belief.

On the road projects, heavy rainfall in 2012 delayed the progress of work; unavailability of suitable fill material near the projects; Incidences of high water table along the road alignment; non-payment of outstanding compensation delayed acquisition of land, demolition of structures along the right of way; non-payment for works carried out delayed some projects before the commencement of SURE-P intervention and prevented the contractor from mobilizing adequately to site. Challenges facing the Mass Transit Scheme involved the indecision as to whether the scheme should be domiciled at the Federal Ministry of Transportation or the Federal Ministry of Trade & Investment. Barring the widely publicized intervention project and programmes of the SURE-P, especially from the angle of the Federal Government, SURE-P is not without its share of controversies bordering on corruption, mismanagement and non-clarification/ classification of intervention areas in its implementation process.

Decrying what he described as the “inequitable distribution of projects implementation by SURE-P across the federation, Sen. Ita Enang who represented Akwa Ibom North West in the 7th Senate lamented that the huge amount of money appropriated under SURE-P, though meant to cushion the negative effects of the removal of petroleum subsidy among the generality of Nigerians, was not equitably distributed, neither to all the regions nor to all the states of the federation. He went short of implying that most of the SURE-P projects were cited in the Northern Region of the country (Mohammed, 2014).

The former Chairman of the Federal Government SURE-P Implementation Committee, Dr. Christopher Kolade, while presenting a report at the National Assembly Joint Committee on Petroleum (Downstream) in December 2012 was upbraided by members of the Senate. The Committee was alarmed that the SURE-P Committee, in just four months, had spent N2.2bn on its secretariat and N75m on tours. Dissatisfied with Kolade's explanation, the Chairman of the session, Sen. Magnus Abe said, "It is clear that some of your expenditures are questionable, while your explanations are unsatisfactory. We can't work with figures without details" (Anonymous 2012).

Perhaps, the most controversial allegation that trailed the SURE-P implementation process was about the riddle as to whether the former President (Goodluck Jonathan) was appropriating the funds from SURE-P to build a financial war chest to prosecute his 2015 re-election campaign. This is against the backdrop of a statement credited to the National Publicity Secretary of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Lai Mohammed, that the President had seriously violated the constitution of the country where it was reported that 11 States Coordinators of the SURE-funds were the same persons who co-ordinated the Goodluck/Namadi Sambo Presidential campaigns in their various states. In a report by Azuakola (2013), Lai Mohammed noted that "where there is a problem is when these party men come into public positions and then pursue a party or personal agenda. Unfortunately, in state after state, oppositions have raised complaints about the politicization of the funds, protesting that the "national cake" has been converted into a "PDP cake". Still quoting Mohammed, Azuakola went on to state "by the SURE-P arrangement, part of the funds are now available for the FG to share freely by approving contracts, programmes and activities by its whims and caprices. The PDP-controlled FG has now seen the accruing

of huge funds as money which may well be spent with special favour for its cronies and party affiliates, without regard to the constitution.

The allegations above are poignant when we consider another report by Akoni and Depoakinrefon (2013) in which they alleged hijacking of the SURE-P funds meant for the PDP members in Lagos state, by the Bode George faction and the crisis that it generated was reported. Also, Madike (2013) reported how, during a public hearing by the House of Representatives' Joint Committee on SURE-P, the Chairman, Dakuku Peterside had to ask the delegation from the Presidency led by the former Minister of Finance, Okonjo-Iweala, if "the programme is designed as a mechanism for young men and women to work for the re-election of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 and if SURE-P state coordinators are members of Jonathan's team for 2015, as well as the operations and application of the fund.

It is however curious to note the growing trend where literature with a positive outlook on SURE-P tends to emanate only from government, its agents and SURE-P officials. This assertion was given a fillip by Akinloye (2013) who observed that while attempts have been made by government officials to trumpet the achievements made by SURE-P since its inception, the truth of its lacklustre performance is becoming ever more apparent. An instance is when Daniel (2013) wrote that former President Olusegun Obasanjo had declared that he did not believe in the Federal Government's subsidy reinvestment and empowerment programme, SURE-P. Obasanjo who was a special guest at the book launch of "Kolade's Canons", a collection of lectures delivered over the years by the former chairman of SURE-P, Dr. Christopher Kolade, lampooned SURE-P, saying it was an initiative he did not understand and that he didn't know what SURE-P stood for.

Piqued by how the SURE-P fund is being managed, Akinloye (2013) wrote that how SURE-P's money is being spent remains unclear. He cited a case where the National Assembly asked SURE-P in November 2012 to produce its 2012 budget expenditure analysis where the lawmakers were dismayed to hear that lots of the things SURE-P committee members pointed to were projects already being carried out by the Federal Government. For instance, the SURE board claimed to have spent N16 billion (\$100 million) on the Benin Ore Shagamu road - a project for which the Federal Government had already awarded a N65.2 billion (\$400 million) contract in September 2012; SURE P claimed it contributed N9.3 billion (\$57 million) to the Lagos-to-Ibadan railway - a development for which a \$1.4 billion contract was signed between the Federal Government and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) in August 2012. Akinloye quoted Senator Danjuma Goje, a member of the Senate Committee on Petroleum as lamenting that in all of these, SURE-P was not in any way financing any new projects, was not initiating any new projects, but only putting money into existing projects.

Predicting the future of SURE-P is a precarious exercise. This is because if the import of the 2015 budget for SURE-P as appropriated by the government is anything to go by, then the future of SURE-P as palliative policy is somewhat bleak. The immediate past Chairman of SURE-P, Gen. Martin Luther Agwai, noted this much when he said that Nigerians should not expect much performance from the programme with a mere budgetary proposal of N102 billion in 2015. Elaborating further, Agwai said out of the N268.37 billion in 2014, only the road sector gulped N104 billion, wondering what a mere N102 billion will achieve in the new year. This is even as he has said that SURE-P might cease to exist after next year because if a mere N102 billion

has been proposed for its programmes for 2015, then in 2016 and beyond there might not be any budget, adding “This is the danger of relying on oil” (Anonymous, 2014).

In conclusion, it is insightful to seriously consider an observation by Clement (2013) who wrote that the projection of the Federal Government to invest the SURE-P funds to the transformation of the economy in line with Vision 20:2020 may be a mirage given the poor state of the power sector and other environmental factors militating against rapid economic transformation. Quoting Prof. Akpan Ekpo, the Director General of the West African Institute of Financial and Economic Management, Clement maintained that the rate of unemployment in Nigeria stood at 23.9 per cent, describing the current growth rate of the Nigerian economy as “a jobless growth”.

## **2.9 Theoretical Framework**

### **2.9.1 The Systems Theory**

The concept of a political system came into the social sciences through the instrumentality of Marion Levy and Talcott Parson who adapted it from biology to the fields of Anthropology and Sociology. The concept became a major influence on political thinkers like Almond Powell who defines a political system as “that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies, which perform the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-à-vis other societies) using employment of a more or less legitimate physical compulsion” (Asirvatham and Misra, 2000). To Dahl (1984), a system is any collection of elements that interact in some way with one another. Cherry (1961) defines a system as a whole, which is composed of many parts; that is, an ensemble of attributes. And to this extent, Ikpe, (2010) agrees that the conceptualization of the system by many authors suggests that a system is a

group of objects or elements standing in some characteristic structural relationships to one another and interacting based on certain characteristic processes.

It is the definition given by David Easton that has gained ascendancy in utilizing the systems theory as a model for explaining public policy. According to Easton (1953), a political system is “a set of interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society”. From Easton’s definition, public policy, according to Eminue (2009) is perceived as the response of the political system to the demands emanating from the environment. What this means is that the political system receives demands and support from the environment and converts them into policies and decisions. Nyong (2005) therefore views policymaking in terms of inputs and demands (claims made by individuals or groups on the political system), conversion (policy making and policy choices), output (policy outcomes) and feedback (policy impact analysis). He adds that public policy may generate new demands by the ecological, personal, biological, social, international or political environment which may lead to further policy outputs, and then impact analysis to determine whether the desired output has been achieved.

Dye (1977) infers that the systems theory implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that function to transform demands into authoritative decisions requiring the support of society. It also implies that elements of the systems are interrelated; that the system can respond to forces in its environment; and that it will do so in order to preserve itself.

The systems theory is therefore considered a more ambitious but more general approach where everything is interrelated and capable of providing insight into how policies are made or changed from a comprehensive look at all the relationships

(Greenberg, 1983). The theory therefore views the policy process as a set of interactions between ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ mediated by a conversion process; in which case, public policy may be viewed as a response of the political system to demands arising from its environment; and where the political system comprises those identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities in the society that make authoritative allocations of values that are binding on the society.

When applied as a tool for the study of SURE-P, the Systems Theory reveals the web of interactions and influences within the political system (Nigeria) and their overall effects on the public policy process. It helps to explain the intricacies that occurred within the socio-economic and political environment of Nigeria which constituted the “inputs” that necessitated the introduction of SURE-P (policy action); the implementation of SURE-P (policy output); the resultant impact (policy outcome); and this attempt at assessing SURE-P which constitutes part of the “feedback” process. Therefore, the protests that followed the announcement of the removal of subsidy on petrol on January 1, 2012, led by the Nigeria Labour Congress, Trade Union Congress and Civil Rights Organizations, represent the “inputs” on the political system which had to deal with the problem. After the implementation of SURE-P following an exhaustive conversion process involving meetings between the Nigerian Government and all the parties to the dispute, this survey research becomes an attempt to gauge the response of the citizens which is expected to act as a feed-back on the political system.

Thus information derived from respondents is of considerable importance as they could be useful accounts, reports and descriptions of programmed output, impact and performance. On the other hand, citizen evaluation (feedback) enables the measurement of the qualitative aspect of programmed performance, which objective

data cannot measure effectively. What this means is that the citizen data could be used to validate or cross-check records which may either be inaccurate or biased. This in turn is capable of confirming or disproving official claims about government policies and programmes, for instance, whereas a programme may be assessed as a failure by objective data criteria, such a programme may be excellent to the citizens or clients because of some social, psychological and other values and needs that it satisfies and vice versa.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHOD**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

A research design is defined as “the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure” (Kothari, 2012). The researcher combined the quantitative paradigm with a qualitative paradigm in a fashion that Creswell (1994) describes as a “dominant–less dominant design”. In this wise, the researcher adopted the quantitative approach in testing the hypotheses (dominant paradigm), while the qualitative method was utilized through Focus Group Discussions (FGD)/interviews and personal visits to key project sites to collect data. This study is therefore a survey research where the intention is not only to assess the extent of implementation of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) but also to find out the opinions of Nigerians on some basic components of the programme and their impacts on their socio-economic wellbeing. In this context therefore, the independent variable is the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) while the dependent variables include some of the components/targets of the programme which are: poverty reduction, road infrastructure development and impact on transportation.

These components were chosen because they are most salient about the net impact of fuel subsidy removal which harbours both direct and indirect negative effects on the lives of the generality of the low-income as well as the middle-income earning Nigerians. The researcher also limited the survey to these areas since they represent the areas in which an assessment is easy in terms of access to information and records, the

level of awareness among Nigerians and the length of time and finance at the disposal of the researcher. This research therefore utilized data both from the secondary and primary sources. The secondary sources of data included library/scholarly literature from books, journals, official gazettes and reports, magazines and newspaper reports, while the primary data were generated from the administration of structured questionnaire, Focused Group Discussions/interviews and personal inspection of some key project sites.

### **3.2 The Study Area**

The study area for this research is the entire geographic entity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. An etymological account of Nigeria has it that the earliest inhabitants of the country were highly civilized people who practised different kinds of art forms such as making sculptures out of Terracotta and bronze. Innumerable kingdoms were set up by the local rulers of Nigeria, for instance, the kingdom of Benin and the kingdom of Yoruba. Nigeria became one of the British colonies during the 18th and early 19th centuries, and it achieved its independence on 1st October 1960. It is believed that the name Nigeria was taken from the Niger River running through the country. This name was allegedly coined in the late 19th century by British journalist, Flora Shaw who later married Baron Fredrick Lugard, a British colonial administrator. The origin of the name *Niger*, which originally applied only to the middle reaches of the Niger River, is uncertain. Thus it is believed that the word is likely an alteration of the Tuareg, name *egerew* *n-igerewen* used by inhabitants along the middle reaches of the river around Timbuktu before 19th-century European colonialism (Anonymous, 2015).

Nigeria is a country covering about 923,768.00 square kilometres. It shares a 4,047-kilometre (2,515 mi) border with Benin (773 km), Niger (1497 km), Chad (87 km), and Cameroon (1690 km), and has a coastline of at least 853 km. Nigeria lies between latitudes 4° and 14° N and longitudes 2° and 15°E. Often referred to as the "Giant of Africa", Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous country in the world. Though its official language is English, the country is a multi-national state inhabited by more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups and about seventy "nationalities" and roughly half of Nigeria's states have primary ethnic identities. Nigeria is divided roughly by half between Christians who live mostly in the southern part of the country and Muslims who live in the northern part. However, a minority of the population practices religions which are indigenous to the country such as those native to the Igbo and Yoruba peoples (Anonymous, 2015).

Nigeria is considered an emerging market by the World Bank which, as of 2015, overtook South Africa to become the 20th largest economy in the world worth more than \$500 billion and \$1 trillion in terms of nominal GDP and purchasing power parity respectively (a position South Africa regained in May 2016). On the political front, Nigeria has been identified as a regional power on the African continent, a middle power in international affairs and also an emerging global power. Nigeria is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the African Union (AU), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the United Nations among other international organizations. Like the United States, Brazil, and India, Nigeria is structured as a federation with a thirty-six-states structure (36), one Federal Capital Territory (FTC, Abuja), and 774 local government areas. Nigeria contains. Yet power resides in the central government, which controls most of the country's revenues and resources (Hanson, 2007).

### 3.3 Population and Sample Size

Though the universe of this study is the entire Nigerian population which, according to the World Bank records (extrapolated at a 3% growth rate from the 2006 census) was 178,000,000 in 2014 (CIA, 2014) and (Maja-Pearce and Whitehe, 2014), the researcher (for reasons of accuracy) decided to adopt the actual population of this study from the number of registered voters in Nigeria since the adult population belong here. Accordingly, the population of this study was drawn from the 2015 record of registered voters as obtained from the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is 70,383,427 (Ifoh, Oladimeji and Aja, 2014). However, for the sake of convenience, time, and economy, a sample size of 384 divided into six geo-political zones of the country was drawn for the study. This sample size was arrived at using the formula by the Research Division of the National Education Association NEA, 1960 (Udoh, 2014):

$$S = \frac{\chi^2 NP (1-P)}{a^2 (N-1) + \chi^2 P (1-P)}$$

Where:

a = sample size;

$\chi$  = chi square table value for one degree of freedom at the desired level of confidence, which is 3.84;

P = Population proportion, assumed to be 0.5 as it provides maximum sample size;

N = Population size;

a = Level of significance, usually 0.5 at which decision errors (type 1 and type 2) are reduced to barely minimum.

The sample size was calculated using the above formula (see Appendix 5 for calculation). Thus, the sample size was = 384.

However, the strategy was to divide the population into the 6 existing geopolitical zones of the country from where one state each was chosen through balloting. Thereafter, a state capital was chosen for the administration of the questionnaire. The result of the balloting therefore yielded the following results:

S/N	Geopolitical Zone	State	Town
1	North East	Gombe	Gombe
2	North West	Kaduna	Kaduna
3	North Central	Kogi	Lokoja
4	South East	Anambra	Awka
5	South West	Oyo State	Ibadan
6	South South	Akwa Ibom	Uyo

Sample size per each of the 6 Geo-political zones =  $\frac{384}{6} = 58$

Sample size per zone = 58

Still within each of these states, the 58 questionnaires were divided and administered to the following fields and categories of respondents:

1. 28 copies of questionnaire administered to workers within each state secretariat;  
and
2. 30 copies of questionnaire administered to academic/non-academic staff and students of any given tertiary institution/university within each state.

The above fields were chosen based on the assumption that they are a potpourri of all the socio-cultural characteristics of each state, as well as containing respondents who are educated and enlightened on the variables. The researcher therefore utilized the services of research assistants as prescribed by Uzoagulu (2011), for the administration of questionnaire in states that the researcher could not visit personally. Apart from the administration of 28 copies of the questionnaire to each of the Federal Secretariats in the State capitals, 30 copies of the questionnaire were also administered in the following institutions by the research assistants: Gombe State – Federal University, Kashere; Kaduna State – Kaduna State University; Kogi State: Federal University, Lokoja; Anambra State – Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nsuka Campus; Oyo State – University of Ibadan; and Akwa Ibom State – Akwa Ibom State University, Obio Akpa Campus.

### **3.4 Sampling Technique**

Since the quantitative method is the dominant paradigm for this study, the simple random sampling technique (where everyone has an equal chance of being selected) was used to administer the questionnaire. This was done in order to validate qualitative data personally obtained from the field.

### **3.5 Instrument for Data Collection**

This research relied on data both from the secondary and primary sources. The secondary sources of data included library/scholarly literature from books, journals, official gazettes and reports, magazines and newspaper reports. On the other hand, the main instrument for the collection of primary data in this survey was the structured questionnaire method. The researcher administered a multi-purpose questionnaire

entitled “SURE-P Impact Assessment Questionnaire (SURE-PIAQ)” with sections including multiple choice questions, closed-ended questions and open-ended questions (inserted to provide a more complete picture of the respondents’ feelings and attitudes toward the implementation of SURE-P). However, the main component of the questionnaire used in testing the hypotheses was Section “C” containing 20 items of closed-ended questions designed to measure citizens’ opinions on the impact of SURE-P. The decision rule was based on the Likert Scale of five levels namely: Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Undecided (U); Disagree (D); Strongly Disagree (SD). Each level was assigned a number ranging from 5 (SA) to 1 (SD).

Because the study involved many geo-political areas (zones), the researcher adopted the cross-sectional (latitudinal) approach in order to administer the questionnaire simultaneously (at the same time) in all the chosen states. The researcher therefore e-mailed copies of the questionnaires to research assistants in five selected states (representing each of the selected geo-political zones), while that of the south-south was administered personally. This was accompanied by funds transfers to the research assistants for purposes of production and logistics in the course of administering the questionnaires. Research assistants were instructed to administer the questionnaires and collect them immediately and after an interval of between three days and one week. Copies of completed questionnaires were returned by courier to Uyo from each of the sampled states.

In addition, the researcher also mounted a Focused Group Discussion session at Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory involving 10 respondents (interviewees) classified into the following categories: From the SURE-P implementation side were the SURE-P National Programme Technical Adviser (Communications), the Director of Press and

GIS Communication Specialist, Federal Ministry of Finance, the Deputy Director of Press and Public Relations (SURE-P CSWYE) Unit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and the National Director, Project Implementation Unit, SURE-P MCH; while from the beneficiary/impact assessment side included - one former SURE-P GIS intern (beneficiary), one representative of the GIS beneficiary firm – Resource Manager of Hipoint Global Royalty Limited, one member of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW, Gwarimkpa, Abuja, one SURE-P TVET beneficiary, the Chief Executive Officer of the Bush house Nigeria Media Group, one respondent representing the civil society. The checklists used in the discussions and interviews included all the research questions asked to ascertain the level of accomplishment of SURE-P objectives and their corresponding impacts.

Finally, the researcher undertook a personal tour of some strategic project sites to gather information to see if they would synchronize with some of the facts obtained from the qualitative data source.

### **3.6 Validity of Instrument**

This instrument was face validated by the thesis supervisor, the co-supervisor, the Head of the Department and one other senior lecturer from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Uyo, and one other senior lecturer from the Department of Curriculum in the Faculty of Education, University of Uyo. Besides, on the guideline and insistence of the Authorities of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, returned copies of the questionnaire were tendered to the Head of Department and Chief Examiner for inspection and confirmation after analysis.



### **3.7 Method of Analysis**

Data obtained from the field were analyzed using the Chi-Square method. At 0.05% level of significance, the Chi-Square was therefore used to analyze all three hypotheses for the study. The decision rule was that the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) would be accepted if the calculated value is less than the table value, otherwise, the null hypothesis would be rejected in favour of the alternative ( $H_1$ ). The population mean of 12 was adopted and was calculated thus: 4 items from Employment, Infrastructure and Transportation (respectively) multiplied by 3 (mid-point between Agree and Disagree on the response scale).

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Data on SURE-P Implementation**

In line with the method of combining the quantitative and qualitative methods for this study, data drawn from both sources were presented and analyzed in this chapter. This was done with strict focus on the objectives of providing answers to the research questions and testing the hypotheses. After administering a total of 384 copies of the structured survey questionnaire, the researcher was able to have 314 copies of the questionnaire returned representing an 81.8% return rate. However, a total of 309 questionnaires were validly filled upon which analysis was based.

Plate I shows the researcher (left) and Mr. Austine Asamu, SURE-P National Programme Technical Adviser – Communication (right) at the SURE-P Headquarters, Central Business District, Abuja, Nigeria, on December 18, 2015, before the Focus Group Discussion session where he (Asamu) acted as leader of the team from SURE-P components implementation units' respondents (interviewees).




Plate I: Researcher with SURE-P National Programme Technical Adviser (Communication), Sure-P Headquarters, Abuja

## **4.2 The Extent of Accomplishment of Set Targets against SURE-P Objectives**

In an attempt to proffer answers to some of the research questions, this section is dedicated to determine the extent to which government accomplished its set targets in projects/programmes to correspond with the SURE-P objectives. This is done by evaluating each of the components of interest, to determine the extent of accomplishment thereof.

**4.2.1 Research Question 1:** Did government accomplish its set targets in projects/programmes to correspond with the SURE-P objectives?

### **4.2.2 SURE-P level of Accomplishment on Employment Generation**

To determine the level of accomplishment of SURE-P on employment generation, the number of Nigerians engaged under all the sub components i.e. the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS), the Community Services Women and Youth Empowerment Scheme (CSWYE), the Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET) and Maternal and Child Health (MCH) was determined and calculated from available qualitative data thus:

Table 4.1      Number of Nigerians Employed under the SURE-P Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) (2012-2015) Per Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria

S/N	Geopolitical Zone	Number Per Zone
1	North West	4,428
2	North East	1,475
3	North Central	3,016
4	South West	4,444
5	South East	3,531
6	South South	4,004
	<b>Total</b>	<b>20,898</b>

Source: SURE-P: The Job Seeker Magazine (2015).

During an interaction with the Director of Press and GIS Communication Specialist, Federal Ministry of Finance, Suleiman Haruna, he affirmed that the Graduate Internship Scheme of SURE-P was designed to facilitate manpower development by engaging and deploying graduates who do not have jobs, to prepare them for employment within one year while paying each of them an allowance of N18,000 in 2012, ₦ 25,000 in 2013 and ₦ 30,000 between 2014 and 2015. These graduate Interns were engaged by SURE-P and deployed to interested registered firms/companies where they received training and skill development for one year each. He maintained that the template for running the GIS was reliant on an online website operated by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Would-be interns were required to register online indicating their location, and area of specialization but none are recommended to the company at this stage. Rather, once any registered company indicates interest for an intern or interns at any given time assuming the firm needs an accountant.

#### **4.2.3 Employment Generation under the SURE-P Maternal and Child Health (2012-2015)**

As noted in 2.6.9, SURE-P through its interventional levers for increasing demand and access to maternal and neonatal health services, employed and deployed several Midwives, Community Health Extension Workers (CHEWs) and Village Health Workers (VHWs) across the length and breadth of the country for community outreach. Using data personally obtained from the former National Director of Project Implementation Unit SURE-P Maternal and Child Health Programme, the number of health workers per state is calculated as follows:

Table 4.2: Number of Nigerians Employed under the Community Health Workers  
Employed by SURE-P (2012-2015)

S/N	Geopolitical Zone	State	Number of Midwives	Number of CHEWs	Number of VHWs	Total Per State
1	South-South	Akwa Ibom	89	96	143	328
2		Bayelsa	81	94	142	317
3		Cross River	102	90	142	334
4		Delta	88	96	144	328
5		Edo	96	90	144	330
6		Rivers	98	94	143	335
7	South East	Amanbra	95	88	144	327
8		Abia	95	86	141	322
9		Ebonyi	117	113	183	416
10		Enugu	92	85	136	313
11		Imo	96	88	143	327
12	South West	Ekiti	93	87	142	322
13		Lagos	91	87	142	320
14		Ogun	93	87	144	324
15		Ondo	91	87	144	322
16		Osun	89	88	144	321
17		Oyo	94	88	144	326
18	North Central	Benue	94	85	144	323
19		Kogi	94	74	143	311
20		Kwara	91	92	141	324
21		Nasarawa	87	83	144	314
22		Niger	89	82	144	315
23		Plateau	88	94	144	326
24		FCT	99	95	142	336
25		North East	Adamawa	44	76	162
26	Bauchi		111	71	186	368
27	Borno		41	91	132	264
28	Gombe		79	43	192	314
29	Taraba		55	92	192	339
30	Yobe		5	91	160	256
31	North West	Jigawa	109	70	192	371
32		Kaduna	99	81	191	371
33		Kano	90	65	189	344
34		Katsina	43	156	192	391
35		Kebbi	100	64	191	355
36		Sokoto	80	29	191	300
37		Zamfara	60	39	192	291
Grand Total						12,107

Source: SURE-P MCH Project (2015).

#### 4.2.4 Employment Generation under the SURE-P Community Services Women and Youth Empowerment Project (CSWYE) (2012-2015) Per Service Type

The SURE-P CSWYE scheme was designed to provide temporary employment for 185,000 unskilled Nigerian women and youth in community service with a monthly payment of ₦10,000 to each beneficiary during the period. At the end of the programme, the number of all those employed across the country were as follows:

Table 4.3: Number of Nigerians Employed under the SURE-P Community Services Women and Youth Empowerment Project (CSWYE) (2012-2015) Per Service Type

S/N	Service Type	Number of Beneficiaries
1	Environmental Sanitation	74, 998
2	Institution Maintenance (Labour only)	22,445
3	Infrastructure, Construction and maintenance (Labour only)	10,963
4	Traffic and Pupils' Truancy Control	4,033
5	Vigilante	6,545
	<b>Total</b>	<b>118,984</b>

Source: SURE-P CSWYE (2015)

#### 4.2.5 Employment Generation under the SURE-P Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET) (2012-2015) Per Service Area

Under this scheme, training courses were offered to school leavers and graduates of different institutions of learning seeking knowledge and vocational skills for them to earn wages and be self-employed with time. At the end of the programme following number of persons were trained across Nigeria in different service areas:



Table 4.4: Number of Nigerians Trained under the SURE-P Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET) (2012-2015) Per Service Area

S/N	Service Area	Number of Beneficiaries
1	Up-skilling programme for the construction/housing sector in collaboration with the National Institute of Building.	1000
2	ICT-Based enterprise development and promotion programme for unemployed Nigeria Youths in collaboration with the Galaxy Back Bone Plc. (1000 Beneficiary	1000
3	Skills development programme for young Nigerian University/Polytechnic graduates of Electrical/Mechanical Engineering in collaboration with the National Power Training Institute of Nigeria (NAPTIN)	220
4	Up-skilling programme for semi-skilled Nigerian Autoworkers in collaboration with the National Automotive Council.	1000
5	Technical training for Railway Technicians for the maintenance of Lagos-Kano Rail line	1805
<b>Total</b>		<b>5,025</b>

Source: SURE-P TVET (2015)

Table 4.5; Total Number of Employments Undertaken by SURE-P (2012-2015)

S/N	SURE-P Employment Component	Number of Beneficiaries
1	Community Health Worker Employed by SURE-P	12,107
2	Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS)	20,898
3	Community Services Women and Youth Empowerment Project (CSWYE)	118,984
4	Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET)	5,025
5	Youths Employed by the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA) under SURE-P for aggressive maintenance of 22,500km of Roads and 80 Bridges across Nigeria	7,179
<b>Total</b>		<b>164,193</b>

Source: Field work, 2015

Table 4.6: Respondents' opinion on whether the Implementation of SURE-P provided a lot of job opportunities to Nigerians (see Section C, Item No. 5 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
5	Through SURE-P, the federal government provided employment opportunities for a lot of Nigerians	34	127	38	63	47	3.12	1.28	Accept

Table 4.7: Respondents' opinion on whether the number of Nigerians employed through SURE-P is enough to reduce the rate of unemployment (see Section C, Item No. 7 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
7	The number of Nigerians employed through SURE-P is not enough to reduce the rate of unemployment in Nigeria	100	109	45	36	19	3.76	1.19	Accept

Table 4.7 shows a mean score of 3.76. Since this is higher than the population mean of 3, but since this question was couched in the negative, it therefore, means that respondents do not agree that the number of Nigerians employed through SURE-P is not enough to reduce the rate of unemployment in Nigeria.

#### 4.2.6 SURE-P Level of Accomplishment on Road Infrastructure

Below are kilometres of roads either constructed, reconstructed or rehabilitated by SURE-P during the period under review, calculated from the percentage of the job done before and after the intervention by SURE-P

Table 4.8: Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on the Dualization of Abuja – Lokoja Road

		Section I (42Km)	Section II (52.55Km)	Section III (49.36Km)	Section IV (50Km)	Total: 193.91Km
Percentage Completion before SURE-P		38.00%	38.00%	16.06%	16.28%	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P		78.29%	99.09%	48.08%	40.45%	N/A
Total Percentage of roads done by SURE-P		40.29%	61.09%	32.02%	24.17%	N/A
<b>Total km by SURE-P</b>		16.92km	32.10km	15.81km	12.1km	76.93km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)



Plate II: Dualization of Abuja-abaji Road (section 1) with spur – to airport road (16.92 km)

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate II is a photograph of a section of the SURE-P sponsored 16.92-kilometer dualization of Section 1 of the International Airport Link Road constructed by Dantata & Sawoe Construction Company. The Road is a 42 km stretch and was 38% constructed before SURE-P funds were injected in 2012. SURE-P had therefore constructed 40.2% of the road.



**Plate III: Dualization of Abuja-abaji Road leading to Lokoja (60 km)**

Plate III is a portion of Sections II, III and IV of the Abaji – Kotonkarf – Lokoja Road with a 60km stretch constructed with SURE-P funds (see Table 4.8 for a detailed description of the level of work done before and after SURE-P intervention on each section of the road).

Table 4.9: Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on the Dualization of Kano – Maiduguri (Sections I-V)

	Section I (101.37km)	Section II (118 KM)	Section III (104.37 Km)	Section IV (105Km)	Section V (132km)	Total: 560.74
Percentage Completion before SURE-P	33.33%	46.88%	48.07%	31.82%	36.32%	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P	44.08%	51.02%	68.21%	46.95%	40.62%	N/A
Total Percentage of road by SURE-P	10.75%	4.14%	20.14%	15.88%	4.3%	N/A
Total km by SURE-P	10.89km	4.89km	21.02%	14.10km	5.68km	56.58km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)

Table 4.10: Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on the Reconstruction of Benin-Ore –Shagamu (Sections I-V)

	Phase I (36km)	Phase II (76km)	Phase III (86.7km)	Sect II (98km)	Total: 296.7km
Percentage Completion before SURE-P	75.11%	55.61%	0.00%	98%	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P	98.20%	90.84%	44.66%	98%	N/A
Total Percentage of road by SURE-P	23.09%	38.23%	44.66%	Nil	N/A
Total km by SURE-P	8.3km	29.05km	38.72km	Nil	76.07km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)

Table 4.11 Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on the Rehabilitation /Construction of Onitsha – Enugu (Phase I-II), 2nd Niger Bridge, Loko - Oweto Bridge

	Phase I Sect I (52km)	Phase II Sect I (49km)	Section II (56km)	Oju/Loko- Oweto Bridge (2km)	2nd Niger Bridge at Onitsha (2km)	Total: 161km
Percentage Completion before SURE-P	26.10%	8.61%	33.00%	0.00%	Nil	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P	36.66%	14.66%	45.00%	13.68%	Nil	N/A
Total Percentage of road by SURE – P	10.56%	6.05%	12%	13.68%	Nil	N/A
Total km by SURE-P	5.5km	12.35km	21.43km	0.27km	Nil	39.55km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)



Plate IV: Second Niger Bridge (2 km)

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate IV is a view of the Second Niger Bridge that was loudly celebrated as one of the flagship projects of SURE-P. Construction of the Bridge which is 1.5km long was awarded to Julius Berger-AIIM Consortium, through a public-private partnership arrangement. SURE-P funds were expended in Early Works Phase I comprising survey works, morpho-dynamic study, soil investigations, etc. completed and the bridge design and cost finalized.

Table 4.12 Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on the Construction of the East - West Road (Sections I-IV)

	Section I (87km)	Section II-I (101km)	Section II-II (54)	Section III (99km)	Section IV (51km)	Total: 392km
Percentage Completion before SURE-P	52.21%	23.17%	18.21%	73.44%	53.55%	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P	66.52%	28.92%	27.31%	86.81%	58.45%	N/A
Total Percentage of road by SURE-P	14.31%	5.75%	9.1%	13.37%	4.9%	N/A
Total km by SURE-P	16.45km	5.81km	4.91km	13.24km	2.50km	42.91km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)





Plate V: Dualization of East-west Road Section III Port Harcourt (Eleme Junction) – Eket.

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate V shows a portion of the SURE-P-funded construction of the East-West road that was conceived as part of the Niger Delta component of SURE-P intervention. SURE-P funds had therefore been utilized in the construction of 42.91 km of some sections of the road (see Table 4.12 for details of intervention before and after SURE-P).

Table 4.13 Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on Rehabilitation of Calabar – Ugep - Katsina Ala (Sections I-II)

	Section I (51km)	Section II (53km)	Total: 104km
Percentage Completion before SURE-P	N/A	59.19%	N/A
Percentage Completion to date SURE-P	52.69%	90%	N/A
Total Percentage of road by SURE-P	52.69%	30.81%	N/A
Total km by SURE-P	26.87km	16.33km	43.2km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015).

Table 4.14 Calculation of SURE – P Intervention on Projects captured under the Special Presidential Intervention

Project	Type of Intervention	Kilometer Stretch	% Level of Intervention	Total km by SURE - P
9 <sup>th</sup> Mile Otukpo Makurdi Rd.	Rehabilitation	64km	48%	30.72km
Suleja – Minna Rd	Dualization	40km	55.56%	22km
Ningi – Yadagunganme – Mata Rd. Bauchi	Rehabilitation	27km	99.05%	26km
Sokoto – Tambuwal – Jega – Kontagora – Makera Rd.	Rehabilitation	99.94km	27.73%	27.71km
Kaduna – Eastern Bypass	Construction	58.52km	62.78%	36.74km
Pambeguwa – Saminka – Jos Rd.	Rehabilitation	25.96km	93%	24.14km
Total Km by SURE-P				167.31km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Progress Report (2013); SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)

Table 4.15      Calculated Summary of SURE-P Intervention on Road/Bridge Infrastructure (Construction Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) in Nigeria

S/N	Road Project	Number of km
1	Dualization of Abuja – Lokoja Road	76.93km
2	Dualization of Kano – Maiduguri (Sections I-V)	56.58km
3	Reconstruction of Benin-Ore –Shagamu (Sections I-V)	76.07km
4	Rehabilitation/Construction of Onitsha – Enugu (Phase I-II), 2nd Niger Bridge, Loko-Oweto Bridge	39.55km
5	Construction of the East - West Road (Sections I-IV)	42.91km
6	Rehabilitation of Calabar – Ugep - Katsina Ala (Sections I-II)	43.2km
7	Projects captured under the Special Presidential Intervention	167.31km
	Grand Total	502.55km

Source: Adapted from SURE-P Roads and Bridges (2015)

Table 4.16      Respondents' opinion on whether SURE-P construction of 502 km of federal roads was adequate to improve on road infrastructure in Nigeria (see Section C, Item No. 9 of Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
9	SURE-P construction of 502 km of federal roads is adequate enough to improve on road infrastructure in Nigeria	24	78	67	100	38	2.85	1.19	Reject

Table 4.17 Respondents' opinion on whether the condition of federal roads had generally improved because of intervention with SURE-P funds (see Section C, Item No. 10 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
10	The condition of federal roads across the country has generally improved because of intervention with SURE-P funds	34	103	65	57	49	3.06	1.27	Accept

#### 4.2.7 SURE-P Level of Accomplishment on Transport related components

Table 4.18: Calculation of SURE-P Intervention on Railway Projects across the Country

S/N	Railway Project	Percentage Completion before SURE-P	Percentage Completion to date by SURE-P	Remark
1	Lagos-Jebba Rehabilitation		100%	Completed/functioning
2	PH - Makurdi Railway Rehabilitation Project	25%	42%	17% significant improvement
3	Makurdi - Kanfanchan - Kuru - Jos & Kanfanchan - Kaduna Junction Railway Rehabilitation Project	6%	30%	Significant improvement. Gombe – Kafanchan – Port Harcourt; and Gombe – Kafanchan - Kaduna functioning
4	Kuru - Maiduguri Railway Rehabilitation Project	5%	14%	9% significant improvement
5	Abuja (Idu) - Kaduna Railway Modernisation Project	35%	65%	65% completion
6	Design, Supply and Installation of Signaling on the Eastern Line (Port Harcourt - Maiduguri)	5%	40%	35% installation level

Source: SURE-P Progress Report (2013)



Plate VI: Port Harcourt-Makurdi Railway Rehabilitation Project by Sure-P (42% Completion)

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate VI displays a portion of the SURE-P-funded rehabilitation of the Port Harcourt – Makurdi Railway Line. SURE-P contributed some 5% rate of intervention having spent more than ₦2 billion on it (see Appendix 3 for detail).



Plate VII: SURE-P Intervention on Kafanchan - Kaduna Rail Road (30% Completion)

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate VII is the railway line traversing Markurdi - Kafanchan – Kuru – Jos and Kafanchan – Kaduna Junction. SURE-P contributed at least ₦4.2 billion to bring the project up to a 25% rate of rehabilitation (see Appendix 3 for details). It is pertinent to note that the flag off of this project in January 2015 represented a watershed development in the restoration of train services in Nigeria (Tunji, 2015).





Plate VIII: Abuja – Kaduna light rail modernization project (65% completion) by SURE-P

Source: Field Work (2015)

Plate VIII shows the researcher at the Abuja site of the brand new Abuja – Kaduna Light Rail modernization project where SURE-P funds were injected to the tune of ₦4.5 billion with a 69.3% completion rate before SURE-P was rounded off (see Appendix 3). The project which was commissioned this year by President Buhari on July 26, 2016, was constructed with counterpart funding from the Chinese Exim Bank (Nnabugwu, 2016).



Table 4.19 Respondents' opinion on whether the construction/rehabilitation of railway lines has restored train services in some parts of the country (see Section C, Item No. 14 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
14	SURE-P reconstruction/rehabilitation of railway lines has restored train services in some parts of the country	33	108	73	52	43	3.11	1.22	Accept

Since the mean score of 3.11 in Table 4.19 is higher than the population mean of 3, the implication is that respondents agreed that SURE-P construction/rehabilitation of railway lines had helped to restore train services in some parts of the country.

Table 4.20 Respondents' opinion on whether the availability of train services has made travelling easy for commuters in Nigeria (see Section C, Item No. 16 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
16	The availability of train services has made travelling easy for commuters in the country	10	88	62	89	60	2.67	1.17	Reject

Although respondents agree that the construction/rehabilitation of railway lines has restored train services in some parts of the country in Table 4.19, they (respondents) do not agree in Table 4.20 that the availability of train services has made travelling easy for commuters in Nigeria. This is obviously because the available number of rail routes and train services is grossly inadequate compared to the population of commuters that would have loved to access this facility.



Plate IX: SURE-P Mass Transit Bus (809 in number)

**Source:** Field Work (2015)

Plate IX is a prototype of the 809 mass transit buses sponsored by SURE-P through its revolving fund scheme (see Appendix 2 for details). The researcher had observed that though these buses were distributed throughout the country, a greater number of them could only be sighted at Abuja during the field study.

Table 4.21 Respondents' opinion on whether the provision of 809 mass transit buses was adequate to alleviate the transport challenges faced by Nigerians (see Section C, Item No. 17 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
17	The provision of 809 mass transit buses for the whole of Nigeria is adequate to alleviate the transport challenges faced by Nigerians	11	56	56	87	99	2.33	1.20	Reject

Source: Field Data (2015)

The mean score of 2.33 in Table 4.21 is lower than the population mean of 3. This indicates that respondents do not agree that the provision of 809 mass transit buses for the whole of Nigeria was adequate to alleviate the transport challenges faced by Nigerians.

#### **4.2.8 Research Question 2:** What were the impacts of SURE-P on unemployment, road infrastructure and transportation?

In the area of employment, Table 4.5 indicates that a total of at least 164,193 Nigerians were employed through SURE-P in all categories of work throughout all the geopolitical zones of the country. This means that the level of unemployment in Nigeria (between 2012 and 2015) had been reduced by at least 164,193 due to the implementation of SURE-P. According to Suleiman Haruna, the Director of Press and GIS Communication Specialist, at the Federal Ministry of Finance, although the GIS

unit of SURE-P did not provide direct employment per-se, the GIS alone was able to train and deploy over 20, 000 Nigerian graduates out of the 50,000 target. This represents about a 40% achievement rate under this scheme. Out of these, 70% of them were employed by the firms that engaged them permanently, while the other 30% have either got jobs or are self-employed because they were now better equipped to face interviews or they had started their businesses due to the skill acquired and from savings made from the monthly ₦30, 000 allowances paid during internship. Mr. Haruna maintained that on the other hand, at least 4, 796 firms have benefitted from free services rendered by graduate interns. This much was corroborated by the representative of one of the benefiting firms, Hipoint Global Royalty Limited who agreed that his firm (A real Estate Development Company) had received and trained four of such staff, three of whom were retained by the firm.

One of the interns who proudly brandished her GIS batch number – OBA-04086 was full of praise for the scheme, claiming that she had been retained by the company where she underwent her internship training.

On CSWYE, 118,984 (64.31%) out of the 185,000 target was achieved. Besides, the fact that beneficiaries resided in rural communities (where they rendered services and spent their stipends) may not only improve on the quality of rural infrastructure but must have also boosted/contributed to the economic growth of these rural communities. It is also on record that 925 beneficiaries (25 from each state), after being trained on different skills by the Federal Ministry of Youth Development, got N150.000 to establish trade and have become employers of labour at their different job levels.

Under the TVET, the 5,025 beneficiaries engaged all over the country not only gained employment but were also trained in various vocational skills including construction/housing, electrical/mechanical engineering, automobile and railway maintenance. These are skills that will always remain with these beneficiaries and which they can deploy not only for their good but also to train others in due course.

On infrastructure, there is no gainsaying the fact that the areas that benefitted from the various road construction/rehabilitation interventions had witnessed some relief in the areas of enhanced transportation, enhanced economic activities and social integration, improved safety and reduction of accidents and fatalities.

On transportation, out of the two components evaluated e.i. restoration of railway services and provision of mass transit buses, the restoration of rail services in some parts of the country have no doubt offered remarkable relief to commuters in areas where available, but the mass transit version of this component was grossly inadequate to alleviate the transportation challenges of the generality of Nigerians since the number of buses were grossly inadequate to cater for such needs. Nevertheless, in Abuja where these buses were mostly sited, testimonies from those interviewed in the Focus Group Discussion pointed to the fact that fares charged by these bus operators (to any part of Federal Capital Territory) were generally low (often half of what other private commercial bus operators charged).

#### 4.2.9 Research Question 3: Did the implementation of SURE-P mitigate the negative impacts of petroleum subsidy removal?

Table 4.22 Respondents' opinion on whether the implementation of SURE-P mitigated the negative impacts of subsidy removal (see Section C, Item No. 20 on Appendix 1)

S/N	Factor	5	4	3	2	1	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	Remarks
20	The Implementation of SURE-P has adequately mitigated the negative impact of the partial removal of subsidy on petrol	19	67	69	106	48	2.68	1.15	Reject

Source: Field work (2016)

Table 4.22 shows that respondents are not convinced that the implementation of SURE-P has adequately mitigated the negative impacts of the partial removal of subsidies on petrol. This is so because the mean score of 2.68 is lower than the population mean of 3.

#### 2.2.10 Research Question 4: What were the impediments against government's efforts towards the fulfilling the objectives of SURE-P?

Although part of this question has been partly answered in Section 2.8 of the Literature Review in Chapter Two, a summary of some of the problems encountered during the implementation of SURE-P (gathered from the field study) included:

There was the fact of reduced allocation to the SURE-P committee due to shortfalls in the price of crude oil. Originally, the federal government was expected to approve and release the sum of ₦180b annually to fund SURE-P. Austine Asamu (SURE-P National Programme Technical Adviser - Communications) pointed out that apart from the first year (2012) in which the projected sum of ₦180b was released to the committee, further allocations kept reducing to the extent that the National Assembly reduced appropriation for SURE-P from ₦102.50b in 2014 to only ₦21.03b in the 2015 budget (SURE-P Mama, 2015). This generally reduced the capacity of SURE-P to deliver on most of its mandate, for instance, there were reports of protests due to non-payment of contractors after completion of certain phases of projects (Asamu, 2015).

Asamu also decried the problem of low awareness by the populace on the impact of SURE-P, attributing this to the fact that most of the ministries and departments that handled the direct delivery of some of the salient components of SURE-P like the Federal Ministry of Works and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) refused to acknowledge SURE-P while commissioning projects that were funded in these ministries and departments with SURE-P funds.

Members of the Focus Group Discussion were unanimous in decrying the very obvious lopsided/inequitable distribution of projects sponsored by SURE-P, especially about the intervention of road infrastructure as distributed to the six geo-political zones of the country in Table 4.15. The distribution on this table indicates that apart from zones in the North receiving more in terms of the number of kilometres of road constructed, much of the intervention work in the zones comprising the South West,

South-South and South East (apart from the East-west road) were more of rehabilitation works whereas most of the roads in the northern zones were freshly constructed. Part of this problem, according to Austine Asamu, could be blamed on what he termed “the problem of formulator-implementor/supervisor synergy” as there was very little or no interface between the government and SURE-P about proposed projects and programmes to be implemented. One would have expected the SURE-P committee (as implementors) to make inputs into the annual budget proposals of SURE-P but this was not the case because the committee had no power over programme determination and funding. Rather, every decision on such issues was merely decided by the government and “dropped on the lap of the committee” thereby casting doubts on the intentions of the government.

Concerning the sponsorship of only 809 mass transit buses distributed throughout the country in 2012, the Focus Group Discussion also unanimously agreed that this number was grossly inadequate to cater for the transport needs of Nigerians. Proffering answers to why loans were not granted to more transport operators to acquire these buses after the 2012 batch, the national SURE-P representative, Austine Asamu explained that after the first 809 buses were purchased by commercial bus operators through the zero per cent interest loans, the beneficiaries (who were nominated by the executive committee of the National Union of Road Transport Workers) reneged on the repayment agreements as such the SURE-P committee had no choice than to discontinue from this aspect of intervention.



Table 4.23 Respondents' opinion on the problems that undermined the effective implementation of SURE-P and suggested sectors in which funds could be invested (see Section "E", No. 2 of Appendix 1)

	1. Problem with SURE-P Implementation	Response Rate	Suggested Sectors in which SURE-P funds should be invested	Response Rate
1	Poor implementation and lack of effective supervision/monitoring	81 (26.21%)	Agriculture/Farming	98 (31.71%)
2	Lack of transparency and politicization of the process	45 (14.56%)	Education/Scholarship	75 (24.27%)
3	Corruption, embezzlement and diversion of funds	32 (10.35%)	Industrialization	36 (11.65%)
4	Lopsided/unequal distributed of projects	31 (10.03%)	Electricity/Power	30 (9.70%)
5	Inadequate funding	23 (7.44%)	Petroleum/Refinery	25 (8.09%)
6	Lack of awareness among the citizens on the implementation	21 (6.97%)	Salary	23 (7.44%)
7	Non involvement and consultation on citizens in policy making and implementation of SURE-P	19 (6.14%)	Housing	19 (6.14%)
8	Incompetent personnel/inadequate technical know-how	17 (5.50%)	-	-
9	Non completion of projects	17 (5.50%)	-	-
10	Embarking on too many projects at the same time	13 (4.20%)	-	-

Source: Field Work (2016)

While analyzing the likely problems encountered during the implementation of SURE-P from the point of view of respondents, question 2 (open-ended) in Section “E” of the questionnaire sought the views of respondents in this regard. Table 4.23 indicates that out of the number of respondents who filled out answers to this question, 81 (26.21%) were of the view that SURE-P suffered from poor implementation and lack of effective supervision/monitoring; 45 (14.56%) respondents attributed the problems of implementation to lack of transparency and politicization of the process; 32 (10.35%) respondents blamed the poor outing of SURE-P on corruption, embezzlement and diversion of funds; 31 (10.03%) respondents believed that SURE-P implementation was lopsided and that projects were unequally distributed throughout the geo-political zones of the country; 23 (7.44%) respondents felt that the problem with the implementation of SURE-P was as a result of inadequate funding while 21 (6.97%) decried the lack of awareness on the implementation of SURE-P. 19 (6.14%) respondents complained that SURE-P was designed and implemented without consultation and involvement of the citizens in the policy-making process; 17 (5.50%) harped on incompetent, untrained personnel/inadequate technical know-how; 8 (3.73) cited non-completion of projects; and 5 (2.33) respondents queried the fact of SURE-P embarking on too many projects at the same time, blaming this as being responsible for the failure of SURE-P to achieve full targets.

On the right side of Table 4.23 are respondents’ suggestions on areas/sectors in which they feel the government could channel the subsidy reinvestment funds to the benefit of the citizens. This is presented in order of ranking: 98 (31.71%) respondents suggested that the government should inject the funds into the area of agriculture. This may not be unconnected with the growing advocacy on the need to develop the agricultural sector as an alternative source due to the crash in oil prices which has seen

the Nigerian economy deepening in crisis as a result of overdependence on oil as the main source of revenue. 75 (24.27%) respondents suggested education as their preferred sector for investment from revenue accruing from the deregulation of the petroleum sector; 36 (11.65%) respondents suggested industrialization as the sector in which the subsidy reinvestment funds should be applied, probably to diversify the economy and expand the productive sector; electricity and power generation received the attention of 30 (9.70%) respondents. This is a result of the perennial drop in power generation and supply which has led to persistent outages with multiplier (negative) effects on all the other sectors of the Nigerian economy. Petroleum/refinery was the next preferred sector recommended by 25 (8.09%) respondents. It is pertinent to note here that despite the government's promise to utilise the subsidy funds for the construction of 3 Greenfield refineries in Lagos, Kogi and Bayelsa States, none of these had been undertaken as of when SURE-P was scrapped in 2015. 23 (7.44%) respondents believed that the government injecting the subsidy reinvestment funds into the salaries of public servants would be a veritable way of getting the funds across to Nigerians, whereas 19 (6.14%) respondents voted for the housing sector.

### 4.3 Testing of Hypotheses

The research hypotheses stated below were reformulated in the null alternate forms for the purpose of testing:

#### 4.3.1 Testing of Hypothesis One

**Hypothesis 1:** The effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

**HO:** The effective implementation of SURE-P is not positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

**HI:** The effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria

In testing Hypothesis One, the researcher relied on Section “C” of the questionnaire, using the following 4 items: item no. 5 labelled “E\_1”, item no. 6 labelled “E\_2”, item no. 7 labeled “E\_3” and item no. 8 labelled “E\_4” (see Appendix 1 for Questionnaire and Appendix 4 for Chi-Square test).

Table 4.24 Analysis of Chi-Square for the relationship between implementation of SURE-P and reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria

Variable	Mean	SD	$\chi^2$ - Cal	$\chi^2$ - Crit.
Impact of SURE-P on Unemployment	13.29	2.78	150.83*	22.36

\* Significant at .05 alpha level; N =309; df = 13

#### 4.3.2 Testing of Hypothesis Two

**Hypothesis 2:** The implementation of SURE-P is positively related to an improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria.

**HO:** The implementation of SURE-P is not positively related to an improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria.

**HI:** The implementation of SURE-P is positively related to an improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria.

In testing Hypothesis Two, the researcher relied on Section “C” of the questionnaire, using the following 4 items: item no. 9 labelled “I\_1”, item no. 10 labelled “I\_2”, item no. 11 labelled “I\_3” and item no. 12 labelled “I\_4” C (see Appendix 1 for Questionnaire and Appendix 4 for Chi-Square test)

Table 4.25 Analysis of Chi-Square for the relationship between implementation of SURE-P and improvement on road infrastructure in Nigeria

Variable	Mean	SD	$\chi^2$ - Cal	$\chi^2$ - Crit.
Impact of SURE-P on road infrastructure	12.37	2.78	182.02*	23.68

\* Significant at .05 alpha level; N =309; df = 14

### 4.3.3 Testing of Hypothesis Three

**Hypothesis 3:** The alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

**HO:** The alleviation of transport challenges is not dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

**HI:** The alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

In testing Hypothesis Three, the researcher relied on Section “C” of the questionnaire, using the following 4 items: item no. 15 labelled “T\_1”, item no. 16 labelled “T\_2”, item no. 17 labelled “T\_3” and item no. 18 labelled “T\_4” (see Appendix 1 for Questionnaire and Appendix 4 for Chi-Square test)

Table 4.26 Analysis of Chi-Square for the relationship between implementation of SURE-P and alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria

Variable	Mean	SD	$\chi^2$ - Cal	$\chi^2$ - Crit.
Impact of SURE-P on alleviation of transport challenges	10.24	3.45	65.03*	23.68

\* Significant at .05 alpha level; N =309; df = 14

#### 4.4 Discussion of Major Findings

This study evaluated the impact of the implementation of SURE-P using the citizens (clients) as key actors in the policy process to validate or dispute the claims of the government on the implementation of SURE-P as a palliative policy. Unlike the impression given by some analysts like Akinloye (2013) who insisted that government officials merely trumpeted the achievements of SURE-P whereas a lacklustre performance was recorded and Daniel (2013) who cited former President Olusegun Obasanjo as declaring that he (Obasanjo) did not know what SURE-P stood for because of its non-performance, findings from the field study depicted a slightly different evaluation from the perspective of the citizens.

Be that as it may, it is curious to note that when considering the mean scores of respondents about measuring the level of impact of the implementation of the three components of SURE-P under evaluation, respondents disagreed that the implementation of SURE-P has adequately mitigated the negative impacts of the partial removal of subsidy on petrol (see Table 4.22). Nevertheless, the chi-square analysis of all three hypotheses indicated that the implementation of SURE-P was significantly related to the reduction of the unemployment rate, the improvement of road

infrastructure, and the alleviation of the transport challenges in Nigeria respectively. One explanation deducible from these findings is that respondents may have appreciated the import of SURE-P as a palliative policy targeted at cushioning the negative impacts of the partial removal of subsidy on petrol, in which case, the extent of implementation, though not superlative, was still appreciated as being significant in the prevalent situation.

The other possible implication of respondents' affirmation of the significance of SURE-P implementation on the dependent variables could have been that citizens appreciated the fact that the government could have done more in meeting SURE-P objectives but for the dwindling resources at the disposal of the government due to dwindling revenue from sale of crude during the period.

Finding discernible from qualitative data also tends to clarify some areas of discrepancies like claims in the literature credited to Akinloye (2013) that SURE-P funds were not financing any new projects, but invested in projects where budgetary provisions had already been made. Although this assertion is true, findings like the ones presented in Table 4.18 clearly state the level of SURE-P intervention and expenditure on these existing projects, unlike the impression that this strategy may have been designed to scam the public. Below are the major findings of the study:

**Hypothesis 1:** The effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

**Findings:** After analysis, the testing of the hypothesis shows that the hypothesis was upheld.



**Discussion:** Entries in Table 4.24 reveal a mean score of 13.29 and 2.78 standard deviation. The mean is higher than the population mean of 12. This implies that SURE-P has a high impact on the reduction of unemployment in Nigeria. The table also reveals the calculated  $-\chi^2$  value of 150.83 and the critical  $-\chi^2$  of 22.36. Since the calculated  $-\chi^2$  is greater than the critical, the result is significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis which claimed no significant relationship between the implementation of SURE-P and a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria is rejected in favour of the alternative. The result means that the implementation of SURE-P is positively and significantly related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

**Hypothesis 2:** The implementation of SURE-P is positively related to improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria.

**Findings:** After analysis, the testing of the hypothesis shows that the hypothesis was upheld.

**Discussion:** Table 4.25 reveals a mean score of 12.37 and 2.78 standard deviation. The mean score is higher than the population mean of 12. This implies that SURE-P has a high impact on the improvement of road infrastructure in Nigeria. The table also shows that the calculated  $-\chi^2$  value of 182.02 is greater than the critical  $-\chi^2$  of 23.68 at a .05 alpha level with 14 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the implementation of SURE-P is not significantly related to improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria is rejected. The result means that the implementation of SURE-P is positively and significantly related to the improvement of road infrastructure in Nigeria.

**Hypothesis 3:** The alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

**Findings:** After analysis, the testing of the hypothesis shows the hypothesis was upheld.

**Discussion:** The result in Table 4.26 indicates a mean score of 10.24. This value is not high compared to the population mean of 12. Therefore, the impact of SURE-P on alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria is low. The table also reveals that the calculated  $\chi^2$  value of 65.03 is greater than the critical  $\chi^2$  of 23.68 at a .05 alpha level with 14 degrees of freedom. The result is significant hence the null hypothesis that the implementation of SURE-P is not significantly related to the alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria is rejected. The result means that the implementation of SURE-P significantly alleviates transport challenges in Nigeria

Despite the significance of the implementation of SURE-P as a palliative policy, findings (from both the quantitative and qualitative data) tend to confirm the concern of the researcher in 2.10.2 that there is a growing tendency (in policy analysis) to emphasis on the implementation stage as the crux of public policy instead of analysis of policy formulation to determine whether formulators of policy do consider the felt needs of the people before embarking on certain policy missions. It appears that SURE-P was hurriedly designed under pressure due to the crisis and public protests that greeted the implementation of the policy on partial removal of subsidies from petroleum in Nigeria. As a result, the implementation process was short-circuited in order to bring about visible results and impress on the people.

Besides the problem of vague policy formulation, the implementation of SURE-P had embarked upon too many projects and programmes in addition to the focus of this study. Its implementation thus suffered from the same pitfalls of policy implementation in developing countries; giving credence to Egonmwan's (2002) assertion that many policies in developing countries tend to be over-ambitious, sweeping and fundamental.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

Both the quantitative and qualitative research methods were used to carry out an impact assessment of SURE-P as a palliative policy. The quantitative approach was used in testing the hypotheses, while the qualitative method was utilized through Focus Group Discussions (FGD)/interviews and personal visits to key project sites for the collection of data. The independent variable was the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) while the dependent variables included some of the components/targets of the programme which are: poverty reduction, road infrastructure development and impact on transportation. Since the researcher targeted the adult population in Nigeria for the survey, the population of this study was adapted from the 2015 record of registered voters as obtained from the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is 70,383,427. However, the formula by the Research Division of the National Education Association, NEA, 1960 (Udoh, 2014) was used to determine the sample size of 384 divided into six geo-political zones of the country.

The main instrument for data collection was the survey questionnaire constructed by the researcher entitled “SURE-P Impact Assessment Questionnaire” (SURE-PIAQ) with sections including multiple choice questions, closed-ended questions and open-ended questions (inserted to provide a more complete picture of the respondents’ feelings and attitude toward the implementation of SURE-P). However, the main component of the questionnaire used in testing the hypotheses was Section

“C” containing 20 items of closed-ended questions designed to measure citizens’ opinions on the impact of SURE-P. The decision rule was based on the Likert Scale of five levels namely: Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Undecided (U); Disagree (D); Strongly Disagree (SD). Each level was assigned a number ranging from 5 (SA) to 1 (SD). This instrument was face validated by the thesis supervisor, the co-supervisor, the Head of the Department and one other senior lecturer from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Uyo, and one other senior lecturer from the Department of Curriculum in the Faculty of Education, University of Uyo.

In addition, the researcher mounted a Focused Group Discussion session at Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory involving 10 respondents (interviewees) classified into the following category: From SURE-P implementation side were the SURE-P National Programme Technical Adviser (Communications), the Director of Press and GIS Communication Specialist, Federal Ministry of Finance, the Deputy Director of Press and Public Relations (SURE-P CSWYE) Unit of the Federal Ministry of Labour and the National Director, Project Implementation Unit, SURE-P MCH; while from the beneficiary/impact assessment side included - one former SURE-P GIS intern (beneficiary), one representative of the GIS beneficiary firm – Resource Manager of Hipoint Global Royalty Limited, one member of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW, Gwarimkpa, Abuja, one SURE-P TVET beneficiary, the Chief Executive Officer of the Bush house Nigeria Media Group, one respondent representing the civil society. The checklists used in the discussions and interviews included all the research questions asked to ascertain the level of accomplishment of SURE-P objectives and their corresponding impacts.

Finally, the researcher undertook a personal tour of some strategic project sites to gather information to see if they would synchronize with some of the facts obtained from the qualitative data source. At a 0.05% level of significance, the Chi-Square was used to analyze all three hypotheses for the study. The decision rule was that the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) would be accepted if the calculated value is less than the table value, otherwise, the null hypothesis would be rejected in favour of the alternative ( $H_1$ ). Also, the population mean of 12 was calculated thus: 4 items from Employment, Infrastructure and Transportation (respectively) multiplied by 3 (mid-point between Agree and Disagree on the response scale) was adopted to analyze and explain responses to questions on the questionnaire.

At the end of the analysis, results obtained showed that the implementation of SURE-P is positively and significantly related to all three dependent variables i.e. reduction in the level of unemployment, improvement in road infrastructure and alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria. Therefore, all three hypotheses for the study were upheld and that is:

1. The effective implementation of SURE-P is positively related to a reduction in the level of unemployment in Nigeria
2. The implementation of SURE-P is positively related to the improvement in road infrastructure in Nigeria
3. The alleviation of transport challenges is dependent on the implementation of SURE-P.

## 5.2 Conclusion

Based on the findings of this study, the following conclusions were made:

Although the federal government of Nigeria, while implementing the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) could not fully achieve its objectives due to several impediments including the fall in its revenue profile, the implementation of SURE-P made significant impacts in the areas of reduction in the level of unemployment, improvements on road infrastructure and the alleviation of transport challenges in Nigeria.

Despite the above, the implementation of SURE-P could not be said to have adequately mitigated the negative impacts of the partial removal of subsidy on petrol since the benefiting population and sectors were too narrow and infinitesimal for example, the employment of just 164,193 Nigerians by SURE-P during the period of analysis (though significant according to the result of the study) is a far cry from the projections of the Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that a yearly 1.5 million jobs were required to have kept the unemployment rate constant as at the fourth quarter of 2015 (Udo, 2016).

Granted that the impacts created by the Federal Government cannot be overlooked, it is still not enough to justify the withdrawal of subsidy since the Federal Government could not monitor and supervise how a greater junk of the SURE-P funds (54 per cent share paid to States and Local Governments) were managed. For instance, the first Chairman of SURE-P, Dr. Christopher Kolade, while speaking with State House correspondents after a meeting with the President on Tuesday, February 5, 2013,

distanced his committee from calls to check State Governors on how they utilize proceeds from SURE-P funds. His response came against the backdrop of the Benue Government's intention to spend SURE-P fund on HIV/AIDS treatments in the State.

As a significant policy of the government, SURE-P was rather hurriedly designed due to the crisis and public protests that greeted the implementation of the policy on partial removal of subsidy from petroleum in Nigeria. As a result, the implementation process was short-circuited in order to bring about visible results and impress on the people. This did not show any departure or improvement from past experiences concerning policy formulation and implementation.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

Based on the findings and conclusions reached at the end of this research, the following recommendations are made to implement palliative policies/programmes more workable:

1. Instead of scrapping the SURE-P, the government should expedite action on the probe of the programme, publish the findings, and sanction any official or agency found wanting in the course of implementation whereas the established structure, paraphernalia and credible personnel of SURE-P should be utilized for the implementation of subsequent subsidy driven palliatives. This is to avoid the waste of resources (sunk cost in structures), especially during this period of economic downturn.
2. The government should streamline the implementation of subsidy palliatives such that clearly defined projects/programmes should be initiated and completed instead of intervention in too many projects at the end of which significant impacts may not be felt by the target population. This will engender



citizens' monitoring, evaluation and support which are all germane for the successful implementation of government programmes.

3. To bridge the monitoring and supervision gap in the implementation of SURE-P, the government should create room for a more formulator/supervisor synergy where the SURE-P implementation committee should not only be involved but also be allowed to make inputs right from the project determination/budget proposal level. This is necessary because the committee (as implementers of the programme) are in touch with the realities and felt needs of the people in the field and as such, are most strategically positioned to make informed input (feedback) into the policy choices of government.
4. A very strategic (if not the most important) sector of the economy where the subsidy deregulation funds should be injected is the building of greenfield refineries as promised by the government in the SURE-P document. This (if it is done) will ensure the availability of petroleum products at a cost affordable to the citizens, reduce the country's reliance on imported refined products and ensure the availability/utilization of such funds into productive ventures like agriculture and industry.
5. Instead of the revolving loan scheme for transporters to purchase mass transit buses, the government should float a transport agency that is completely funded with SURE-P funds and strictly responsible to the SURE-P committee. The committee should then establish state-related transport implementation units where buses are purchased and massively distributed throughout the country to alleviate the high cost of transportation of citizens and goods. This is important because one of the most affected sectors of the economy during any

deregulation exercise is always the transportation sector with spiral effects on the costs of consumer goods and hyperinflation.

6. To ensure a more corruption-free implementation of palliative programmes such as SURE-P, the implementation process should be open to the scrutiny and supervision of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission to ensure accountability, transparency and prudence in the allocation and management of resources dedicated to the funding of palliative programmes.
7. As a follow-up on the above, States and Local Governments should also be directed to enact their version of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Accordingly, they should be made to publish in the media, projects executed with the SURE-P funds, and the projects should be such that can be verified by the people.

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## APPENDIX I

### SURE-P IMPACT ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (SURE-PIAQ)

Dept. of Political Science & Public Admin.

University of Uyo, Uyo

Akwa Ibom State

May, 2016

Dear Respondent,

The Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) was designed and implemented by the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan, to mitigate the negative impact of the partial removal of subsidy on fuel. Between 2012 and 2015, SURE-P achieved the following as part of its set objectives:

1. Employment and Training of at least one hundred and sixty-four thousand, one hundred and ninety-three (164,193) Nigerians in all sectors of the economy, across the six geopolitical zones of the country.
2. Construction, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of at least five hundred and two kilometers (502 km) of federal Roads/Bridge Infrastructure spread across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria.
3. Purchased 809 mass transit buses distributed to all the geopolitical zones of the country to alleviate the transportation challenges faced by Nigerians.

This questionnaire is therefore designed to obtain information on the impact of the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) on unemployment, road infrastructure and reduction in the transport challenges among Nigerians.



Kindly respond honestly to the questions. It is a research exercise. You are assured of confidentiality of any information provided. You are not expected to write your name nor that of your state of origin. The findings of this study will help to improve the implementation of social safety programmes for the betterment of the welfare of Nigerians.

Thank you.

## SECTION A

**Instruction:** Please tick (✓) in the box as applicable to you

1. What is your gender?

MALE ☐

FEMALE ☐

2. What is your highest qualification?

WAEC/SSC ☐

OND/NCE ☐

BA/B.SC ☐

M.SC/P.hD ☐

3. What range is your age?

18 – 25 ☐

26 – 33 ☐

34 – 41 ☐

42 – 49 ☐

50 AND ABOVE ☐

## SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

**Instruction:** Please tick (✓) as many as you know

**1. Which of these SURE – P employment related schemes are you aware of?**

- a. Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) ☐
- b. Community Services Women and Youth Empowerment Scheme (CSWYE) ☐
- c. Technical Vocational Education and Training Project (TVET) ☐
- d. Maternal and Child Health Coordinators, Midwives and Village Health Workers ☐

**2. Which of these SURE – P constructed/rehabilitated road projects are you aware of?**

- a. Abuja – Abaji - Lokoja Road ☐
- b. Kanu – Maiduguri Road ☐
- c. Benin – Ore – Shagamu Road ☐
- d. East West Road ☐
- e. Lagos – Ibadan Expressway ☐
- f. Onitsha – Enugu –Port Harcourt Road ☐
- g. Calabar – Katsina Ala Road ☐
- h. 2<sup>nd</sup> Niger Bridge ☐

**3. Which of these SURE – P constructed/rehabilitated railway projects are you aware of?**

- a. Gombe – Kafanchan – Port Harcourt Rail Track ☐
- b. Gombe – Kafanchan – Kaduna Inter – City Rail Track ☐
- c. Port Harcourt – Makurdi Rail Rehabilitation Project ☐
- d. Jebba – Kano Rail Rehabilitation Project ☐
- e. Lagos - Jebba Rail Rehabilitation ☐
- f. Abuja (Idu) – Kaduna Railway Modernization Project ☐

**SECTION C: SURE-P IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

**Instruction:** Please tick (✓) as appropriate. SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; U = Undecided; SD = Strongly Disagree; and D = Disagree.

S/N	ITEM	SA 5	A 4	U 3	SD 2	D 1	Mean Score
1	50% of graduates in Nigeria gained employment through the SURE-P Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS)	19 6.1%	69 22.3%	47 16.2%	77 24.9%	97 31.4%	2.46
2	A significant number of youths/women across the country gained temporary employment under the SURE-P Vocational Employment Scheme	28 9.1%	138 44.0%	40 12.9%	65 21.0%	40 12.9%	3.15
3	The 118,984 Primary Health Workers employed across the country by SURE-P is significant enough to boost employment at the rural health sector of Nigeria	16 5.2%	98 31.7%	63 20.4%	92 29.8%	40 12.9%	2.86
4	₦30,000 monthly allowance paid to each SURE-P Graduate Intern was adequate to cater for their welfare	38 12.3%	74 23.9%	41 13.3%	97 31.4%	69 19.1%	2.78
5	Through SURE-P, the federal government provided employment opportunities for a lot of Nigerians	34 11.0%	127 41.1%	38 12.3%	63 20.4%	47 15.2%	3.12
6	The rate of unemployment in Nigeria has reduced because of SURE-P	47 15.2%	83 26.9%	42 13.6%	83 26.9%	54 17.5%	2.95
7	The number of Nigerians employed through SURE-P is not enough to reduce the rate of unemployment in Nigeria	100 32.4	109 35.3%	45 14.6%	36 11.7%	19 6.1%	3.76
8	Any success in the rate of employment recorded in Nigeria between 2012 and 2015 cannot be attributed to SURE-P Only	56 18.1%	115 37.2%	71 23.0%	48 15.5%	19 6.1%	3.45

9	SURE-P construction of 502 km of federal roads across the country is adequate to improve on road infrastructure in Nigeria	24 7.8%	78 25.2%	67 21.7%	100 32.4%	38 12.3%	2.85
10	The condition of federal roads has generally improved because of intervention with SURE-P funds	34 11.0%	103 33.3%	65 21.0%	57 18.4%	49 15.9%	3.06
11	SURE-P has achieved a lot in the area of road infrastructure in Nigeria	43 13.9%	113 36.6%	87 28.2%	49 15.9%	17 5.5%	3.37
12	SURE-P has not achieved much in the area of road infrastructure in Nigeria	22 7.1%	94 30.4%	108 35.0%	55 17.8%	30 9.7%	3.07
13	There are SURE-P funded functional railway lines in Nigeria	22 7.1%	94 30.4%	108 35.0%	55 17.8%	30 9.7%	3.07
14	SURE –P construction/rehabilitation of railway lines has restored train services in some parts of Nigeria	33 10.7%	108 35.0%	73 23.6%	52 16.8%	43 13.9%	3.11
15	The availability of train services has reduced the cost of transportation for inter-city commuters in Nigeria	20 6.5%	93 30.1%	65 21.0%	83 26.9%	48 15.5%	2.85
16	The availability of train services has made travelling easy for commuters in the country	10 3.2%	88 28.5%	62 20.1%	89 28.8%	60 19.4%	2.67
17	The provision of 809 mass transit buses for the whole of Nigeria by SURE-P is adequate enough to alleviate the transport challenges faced by Nigeria commuters	11 3.6%	56 18.1%	56 18.1%	87 28.2%	99 32.0%	2.33
18	Transport fares have reduced in the country because of the availability of SURE-P commercial vehicles	20 6.5%	48 15.5%	51 16.5%	103 33.3%	87 28.2%	2.38
19	Judging from the number of projects/programmes executed by SURE-P, the	14 4.5%	64 20.7%	57 18.4%	111 35.9%	63 20.4%	2.53

	implementation process of SURE-P is satisfactory						
20	The implementation of SURE-P has adequately mitigated the negative impacts of the partial removal of subsidy on petrol	19 6.1%	67 21.7%	69 22.3%	106 34.3%	48 15.5%	2.68

## SECTION E: SUGGESTIONS ON POLICY DIRECTION FOR SURE-P

**Instruction:** Kindly indicate your opinion on the following policy direction of SURE-P

1. In which sector of the economy do you think the SURE-P funds should have been invested in addition to the ones indicated above?

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2. What do you feel the federal government did not do well in the implementation of SURE-P? \_\_\_\_\_

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3. What improvements do you suggest should be made in order to strengthen the implementation of SURE-P? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Any other general comment or opinion you might wish to make concerning the implementation of SURE-P by the federal government \_\_\_\_\_

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## Appendix 2

### PUBLIC MASS TRANSIT REVOLVING FUND SCHEME (PMTRF) PROGRESS REPORT

S/N	GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE	SURE- P BUDGET (N) TO INFRASTRUCTURE BANK	AMOUNT LOANED (N) BY INFRASTRUCTURE BANK	TOTAL AMOUNT OF BUSES	SECTOR
1	South East	8.9bn	663,385,000.00	52	Private
2	South -South		118,750,000.00	10	Private
3	South West		205,936,730.00	20	Private
4	North East		51,058,038.00	15	Private
5	FCT		3,006,548,365.00	245	Private
6	North West		1,013,175,000.00	34	Private
7	Nationwide		3,143,514,965.00	320	Private
8	North Central		227,620,000.00	13	Private
9	Lagos		1,235,000,000.00	100	Private
	TOTAL		9,137,375,155.00	809	

Source: SURE-P Annual Report 2013

## Appendix 3

## PROGRESS REPORT ON SURE - P RAILWAY PROJECTS

ITEM	CONTRACT INFORMATION					FINANCIAL INFORMATION						PROGRESS		REMARKS
	PROJECT	GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION	DATE OF AWARD	CONTRACTOR	CONSULTANT	ORIGINAL CONTRACT SUM (N)	REVISED CONTRACT SUM (N)	AMOUNT PAID TO DATE: MDA	SURE - P Budget 2012	AMOUNT PAID TO DATE: SURE-P	AMOUNT OUTSTANDING SURE-P	PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS COMPLETION AT SURE-P INTERVENTION	PERCENTAGE COMPLETION TO DATE	
1	Jebba-Kano Railway Rehabilitation Project	North West	29th, Dec, 2009	Costain W.A	Rought on International	N12.169bn	N/A	N9.6bn	N8bn	IPC No. 26, 27 and 28 N1.12bn	IPC No.29 and 30 N592.7m	87%	98%	Rehabilitation
2	PH - Makurdi Railway Rehabilitation Project	SouthSouth/ North Central	7th April, 2011	Esser W.A	Rought on International	N19.165bn	N/A	N4.02bn	N15bn	IP No 4 N2.002bn and IPC No 5 N195.7m	IPC No.6 N336.7m	25%	30%	Rehabilitation

Source: SURE-P Annual Report 2013



## Appendix 3

No.	PROJECT	GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION	DATE OF AWARD	CONTRACTOR	CONSULTANT	ORIGINAL CONTRACT SUM (N)	REVISED CONTRACT SUM (N)	AMOUNT PAID TO DATE: MDA		AMOUNT PAID TO DATE: SURE-P	AMOUNT OUTSTANDING: SURE-P	PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS COMPLETION AT SURE-P INTERVENTION	PERCENTAGE COMPLETION TO DATE	REMARK
3	Makurdi - Kanfanchan - Kuru - Jos & Kanfanchan - Kaduna Junction Railway Rehabilitation Project	North Central/ North West		Messrs CCGC	Rought on International	N24.451bn	N/A	N4.2bn	N15bn	IPC No.4 N1.19bn and IPC No.5 N728.5m		6%	25%	Rehabilitation
4	Kuru - Maiduguri Railway Rehabilitation Project	North Central/ North East	7th April, 2011	LINGO	Rought on International	N23.720bn	N/A	N3.5bn		IPC No.1 N743.6m		6%	12%	Rehabilitation
5	Abuja (Idu) - Kaduna Railway Modernisation Project	North Central/ North West	22, October, 2009	CCECC	Team Nig Ltd	N136.39bn	N/A	contractor N2.2bn Consultant N663m	N10.290bn	IPC No 5, 6, 7 & 9 N3bn (Contract No 3-9 and IPC No 3-9 N471.7m (Consultant))	IPC NO. 10 & 11 N1.67bn	35%	45%	Construction of brand new line (modernisation) Chinese Exim Bank to contribute 69.3%. FGN and SURE-P to contribute 30.7%.

Source: SURE-P Annual Report 2013

## APPENDIX 4

```

NPAR TEST
  /CHISQUARE=Employment
  /EXPECTED=EQUAL
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
  /MISSING ANALYSIS.

```

## NPar Tests

Data 2016\OFONMBUK ATAKPA.sav

## Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Employment	309	13.2945	2.77758	6.00	19.00

## Chi-Square Test

## Frequencies

## Employment

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
6.00	6	22.1	-16.1
7.00	4	22.1	-18.1
8.00	12	22.1	-10.1
9.00	12	22.1	-10.1
10.00	10	22.1	-12.1
11.00	25	22.1	2.9
12.00	41	22.1	18.9
13.00	42	22.1	19.9
14.00	50	22.1	27.9
15.00	40	22.1	17.9
16.00	31	22.1	8.9
17.00	20	22.1	-2.1
18.00	13	22.1	-9.1
19.00	3	22.1	-19.1
Total	309		

## Test Statistics

	Employment
Chi-Square <sup>a</sup>	150.825
df	13
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 22.1.

```

NPAR TEST
  /CHISQUARE=Infrastructure
  /EXPECTED=EQUAL
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
  /MISSING ANALYSIS.

```

## NPar Tests

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

## Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Infrastructure	309	12.3689	2.77859	4.00	19.00

## Chi-Square Test

## Frequencies

## Infrastructure

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
4.00	3	20.6	-17.6
6.00	4	20.6	-16.6
7.00	4	20.6	-16.6
8.00	12	20.6	-8.6
9.00	22	20.6	1.4
10.00	31	20.6	10.4
11.00	37	20.6	16.4
12.00	47	20.6	26.4
13.00	41	20.6	20.4
14.00	48	20.6	27.4
15.00	19	20.6	-1.6
16.00	20	20.6	-.6
17.00	9	20.6	-11.6
18.00	8	20.6	-12.6
19.00	4	20.6	-16.6
Total	309		

## Test Statistics

	Infrastructure
Chi-Square <sup>a</sup>	182.019
df	14
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.6.

```

NPAR TEST
/CHISQUARE=Treansprtation
/EXPECTED=EQUAL
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
/MISSING ANALYSIS:

```

## NPar Tests

## Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Treansprtation	309	10.2427	3.44756	4.00	19.00

## Chi-Square Test

## Frequencies

SOURCE: FIELD DATA 2016

## APPENDIX 4

## Treansprtation

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
4.00	13	20.6	-7.6
5.00	11	20.6	-9.6
6.00	25	20.6	4.4
7.00	27	20.6	6.4
8.00	28	20.6	7.4
9.00	34	20.6	13.4
10.00	27	20.6	6.4
11.00	31	20.6	10.4
12.00	32	20.6	11.4
13.00	22	20.6	1.4
14.00	17	20.6	-3.6
15.00	13	20.6	-7.6
16.00	20	20.6	-.6
17.00	8	20.6	-12.6
19.00	1	20.6	-19.6
Total	309		

## Test Statistics

	Treansprtation
Chi-Square <sup>a</sup>	65.029
df	14
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.6.

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=E_1 E_2 E_3 E_4
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

[DataSet5]

## Statistics

		E_1	E_2	E_3	E_4
N	Valid	309	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.1230	2.9547	3.7605	3.4563
Std. Deviation		1.28595	1.35963	1.19832	1.13770
Sum		965.00	913.00	1162.00	1068.00

## Frequency Table

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

E\_1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	47	15.2	15.2	15.2
	2.00	63	20.4	20.4	35.6
	3.00	38	12.3	12.3	47.9
	4.00	127	41.1	41.1	89.0
	5.00	34	11.0	11.0	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	54	17.5	17.5	17.5
	2.00	83	26.9	26.9	44.3
	3.00	42	13.6	13.6	57.9
	4.00	83	26.9	26.9	84.8
	5.00	47	15.2	15.2	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	19	6.1	6.1	6.1
	2.00	36	11.7	11.7	17.8
	3.00	45	14.6	14.6	32.4
	4.00	109	35.3	35.3	67.6
	5.00	100	32.4	32.4	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	19	6.1	6.1	6.1
	2.00	48	15.5	15.5	21.7
	3.00	71	23.0	23.0	44.7
	4.00	115	37.2	37.2	81.9
	5.00	56	18.1	18.1	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=I_1 I_2 I_3 I_4
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

### Frequencies

[DataSet5]

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

## Treansprtation

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
4.00	13	20.6	-7.6
5.00	11	20.6	-9.6
6.00	25	20.6	4.4
7.00	27	20.6	6.4
8.00	28	20.6	7.4
9.00	34	20.6	13.4
10.00	27	20.6	6.4
11.00	31	20.6	10.4
12.00	32	20.6	11.4
13.00	22	20.6	1.4
14.00	17	20.6	-3.6
15.00	13	20.6	-7.6
16.00	20	20.6	-.6
17.00	8	20.6	-12.6
19.00	1	20.6	-19.6
Total	309		

## Test Statistics

	Treansprtation
Chi-Square <sup>a</sup>	65.029
df	14
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.6.

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=E_1 E_2 E_3 E_4
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

[DataSet5]

## Statistics

		E_1	E_2	E_3	E_4
N	Valid	309	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.1230	2.9547	3.7605	3.4563
Std. Deviation		1.28595	1.35963	1.19832	1.13770
Sum		965.00	913.00	1162.00	1068.00

## Frequency Table

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

E\_1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	47	15.2	15.2	15.2
	2.00	63	20.4	20.4	35.6
	3.00	38	12.3	12.3	47.9
	4.00	127	41.1	41.1	89.0
	5.00	34	11.0	11.0	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	54	17.5	17.5	17.5
	2.00	83	26.9	26.9	44.3
	3.00	42	13.6	13.6	57.9
	4.00	83	26.9	26.9	84.8
	5.00	47	15.2	15.2	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	19	6.1	6.1	6.1
	2.00	36	11.7	11.7	17.8
	3.00	45	14.6	14.6	32.4
	4.00	109	35.3	35.3	67.6
	5.00	100	32.4	32.4	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

E\_4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	19	6.1	6.1	6.1
	2.00	48	15.5	15.5	21.7
	3.00	71	23.0	23.0	44.7
	4.00	115	37.2	37.2	81.9
	5.00	56	18.1	18.1	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=I_1 I_2 I_3 I_4
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

[DataSet5]

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

Statistics

		I_1	I_2	I_3	I_4
N.	Valid	309	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		2.8576	3.0615	3.3754	3.0744
Std. Deviation		1.19215	1.27390	1.07880	1.07403
Sum		883.00	946.00	1043.00	950.00

## Frequency Table

I\_1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	38	12.3	12.3	12.3
	2.00	100	32.4	32.4	44.7
	3.00	67	21.7	21.7	66.3
	4.00	78	25.2	25.2	91.6
	5.00	24	7.8	7.8	99.4
	6.00	2	.6	.6	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

I\_2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	49	15.9	15.9	15.9
	2.00	57	18.4	18.4	34.3
	3.00	65	21.0	21.0	55.3
	4.00	103	33.3	33.3	88.7
	5.00	34	11.0	11.0	99.7
	6.00	1	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

I\_3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	17	5.5	5.5	5.5
	2.00	49	15.9	15.9	21.4
	3.00	87	28.2	28.2	49.5
	4.00	113	36.6	36.6	86.1
	5.00	43	13.9	13.9	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016



## APPENDIX 4

I\_4

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	30	9.7	9.7	9.7
2.00	55	17.8	17.8	27.5
3.00	108	35.0	35.0	62.5
4.00	94	30.4	30.4	92.9
5.00	22	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=T_1 T_2 T_3 T_4
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

[DataSet5]

Statistics

		T_1	T_2	T_3	T_4
N	Valid	309	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		2.8511	2.6731	2.3301	2.3883
Std. Deviation		1.19679	1.17328	1.20110	1.22660
Sum		881.00	826.00	720.00	738.00

## Frequency Table

T\_1

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	48	15.5	15.5	15.5
2.00	83	26.9	26.9	42.4
3.00	65	21.0	21.0	63.4
4.00	93	30.1	30.1	93.5
5.00	20	6.5	6.5	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

T\_2

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	60	19.4	19.4	19.4
2.00	89	28.8	28.8	48.2
3.00	62	20.1	20.1	68.3
4.00	88	28.5	28.5	96.8
5.00	10	3.2	3.2	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

T\_3

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	99	32.0	32.0	32.0
2.00	87	28.2	28.2	60.2
3.00	56	18.1	18.1	78.3
4.00	56	18.1	18.1	96.4
5.00	11	3.6	3.6	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

T\_4

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	87	28.2	28.2	28.2
2.00	103	33.3	33.3	61.5
3.00	51	16.5	16.5	78.0
4.00	48	15.5	15.5	93.5
5.00	20	6.5	6.5	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=Sure_PERS Sure_PCRP Sure_PCRailwayProject
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

## Statistics

		Sure_PERS	Sure_PCRP	Sure_PCRailway Project
N	Valid	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0
Mean		1.7087	3.6828	3.1230
Std. Deviation		.88601	1.85944	1.46975
Sum		528.00	1138.00	965.00

## Frequency Table

## Sure\_PERS

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid a	166	53.7	53.7	53.7
b	80	25.9	25.9	79.6
c	50	16.2	16.2	95.8
d	13	4.2	4.2	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

Sure\_PCRRP

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a	42	13.6	13.6	13.6
	b	50	16.2	16.2	29.8
	c	46	14.9	14.9	44.7
	d	90	29.1	29.1	73.8
	e	31	10.0	10.0	83.8
	f	20	6.5	6.5	90.3
	g	17	5.5	5.5	95.8
	h	13	4.2	4.2	100.0
Total		309	100.0	100.0	

Sure\_PCRailwayProject

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a	39	12.6	12.6	12.6
	b	73	23.6	23.6	36.2
	c	100	32.4	32.4	68.6
	d	39	12.6	12.6	81.2
	e	24	7.8	7.8	89.0
	f	34	11.0	11.0	100.0
Total		309	100.0	100.0	

FREQUENCIES  
 VARIABLES=Gender Qulification Age  
 /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM  
 /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

## Frequencies

Statistics

		Gender	Qulification	Age
N	Valid	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0
Mean		1.2783	2.4337	2.1715
Std. Deviation		.44890	1.08695	1.31167
Sum		395.00	752.00	671.00

## Frequency Table

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	223	72.2	72.2	72.2
	Female	86	27.8	27.8	100.0
	Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

## Qualification

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	95	30.7	30.7	30.7
2.00	28	9.1	9.1	39.8
3.00	147	47.6	47.6	87.4
4.00	37	12.0	12.0	99.4
6.00	2	.6	.6	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

## Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 18-25	125	40.5	40.5	40.5
26-33	85	27.5	27.5	68.0
34-41	50	16.2	16.2	84.1
42-49	28	9.1	9.1	93.2
5.00	12	3.9	3.9	97.1
6.00	9	2.9	2.9	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

## FREQUENCIES

VARIABLES=VAR00009 VAR00010 VAR00011 VAR00012  
 /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM  
 /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

## Frequencies

## Statistics

		VAR00009	VAR00010	VAR00011	VAR00012
N	Valid	309	309	309	309
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		2.4693	3.1521	2.8641	2.7896
Std. Deviation		1.30304	1.22984	1.15136	1.33062
Sum		763.00	974.00	885.00	862.00

## Frequency Table

## VAR00009

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	97	31.4	31.4	31.4
2.00	77	24.9	24.9	56.3
3.00	47	15.2	15.2	71.5
4.00	69	22.3	22.3	93.9
5.00	19	6.1	6.1	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

VAR00010

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	40	12.9	12.9	12.9
2.00	65	21.0	21.0	34.0
3.00	40	12.9	12.9	46.9
4.00	136	44.0	44.0	90.9
5.00	28	9.1	9.1	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

VAR00011

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	40	12.9	12.9	12.9
2.00	92	29.8	29.8	42.7
3.00	63	20.4	20.4	63.1
4.00	98	31.7	31.7	94.8
5.00	16	5.2	5.2	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

VAR00012

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	59	19.1	19.1	19.1
2.00	97	31.4	31.4	50.5
3.00	41	13.3	13.3	63.8
4.00	74	23.9	23.9	87.7
5.00	38	12.3	12.3	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=VAR00021 VAR00022
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

Statistics

	VAR00021	VAR00022
N	309	309
Valid		
Missing	0	0
Mean	3.0744	3.1165
Std. Deviation	1.07403	1.22183
Sum	950.00	963.00

## Frequency Table

Source: Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 4

## VAR00021

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	30	9.7	9.7	9.7
2.00	55	17.8	17.8	27.5
3.00	108	35.0	35.0	62.5
4.00	94	30.4	30.4	92.9
5.00	22	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

## VAR00022

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	43	13.9	13.9	13.9
2.00	52	16.8	16.8	30.7
3.00	73	23.6	23.6	54.4
4.00	108	35.0	35.0	89.3
5.00	33	10.7	10.7	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

```

FREQUENCIES
  VARIABLES=VAR00027 VAR00028
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN SUM
  /ORDER= ANALYSIS .

```

## Frequencies

## Statistics

		VAR00027	VAR00028
N	Valid	309	309
	Missing	0	0
Mean		2.5307	2.6861
Std. Deviation		1.16072	1.15454
Sum		782.00	830.00

## Frequency Table

## VAR00027

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1.00	63	20.4	20.4	20.4
2.00	111	35.9	35.9	56.3
3.00	57	18.4	18.4	74.8
4.00	64	20.7	20.7	95.5
5.00	14	4.5	4.5	100.0
Total	309	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field work, 2016

VAR00028

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	48	15.5	15.5	15.5
	2.00	106	34.3	34.3	49.8
	3.00	69	22.3	22.3	72.2
	4.00	67	21.7	21.7	93.9
	5.00	19	6.1	6.1	100.0
Total		309	100.0	100.0	

**Source:** Field work, 2016

## APPENDIX 5

### CHI-SQUARE CALCULATION TO DETERMINE POPULATION SIZE

$$S = \frac{\chi^2 NP (1-P)}{a^2 (N-1) + \chi^2 P (1-P)}$$

$$S = \frac{3.84 \times 70383427 \times 0.5 \times (1-0.5)}{0.05^2 \times (70383427 - 1) + 3.84 \times 0.5 \times (1 - 0.5)}$$

$$= \frac{3.84 \times 70383427 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{0.05^2 \times 70383426 + 3.84 \times 0.5 \times 0.05}$$

$$= \frac{3.84 \times 70383427 \times 0.25}{0.0025 \times 70383426 + 0.96}$$

$$= \frac{67568089.92}{175958565 + 0.96}$$

$$= \frac{70383427}{175959.525}$$

$$= 383.9979104285$$

Approximated to the next whole number, the sample size is = 384.